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MODERN  
ITALY

*A SHORT HISTORY*

BY  
GEORGE B. McCLELLAN

*Professor of Economic History  
Emeritus in Princeton University*

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*To the Princeton men whom I have taught.  
In memory of friendships never forgotten  
and greatly prized.*

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## PREFACE

**T**HIS book makes no claim to scholarship, for I have relied entirely on the researches of other men as contained in their writings, and on a considerable knowledge of Italy and the Italians acquired during many visits to the peninsula.

I should like to express my appreciation of the admirable works from which I have freely drawn for facts, but especially of those of Bolton King, G. M. Trevelyan, and Luigi Villari, and my gratitude to my wife for her invaluable suggestions and criticisms.

I have used the usual English equivalents for Italian nouns, only employing the Italian when the use of English would be pedantic, as, for example, *fascismo* and *fascista* instead of their atrocious English translations.

I have for the same reason called the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, *Austria*; the Kingdom of Sardinia, *Piedmont*; and the president of the council of ministers, the *premier* or *prime minister*.

G. B. McC.



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## CHAPTER I

### AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

**W**HEN the Congress of Vienna adjourned on June 9, 1815, its members congratulated themselves that under the leadership of the exceedingly able and astute Metternich they had turned the hands of the clock back a quarter of a century and had made the world forever safe for absolutism. Metternich and his associates redrew the map of Continental Europe with an entire disregard of the wishes of the millions of people involved, treating them and their fields and cities as mere chattels in a game of bargaining played by the four great victorious powers, Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia.

Of the various parts of the Napoleonic Empire, France received the fairest treatment and Italy the worst. France was represented at the Congress by Talleyrand, who with extraordinary skill, by playing the great powers against each other, succeeded in obtaining for his country substantially the same boundaries she had had before the revolution. Even after the Hundred Days he was able to preserve those boundaries almost intact, compromising with the wrath of the victors by agreeing to 700,000,000 francs indemnity and a five-year military occupation of France, at French expense.

Italy on the other hand fared almost as badly as was possible. The kingdom of Northern Italy was divided into the states as they had existed before the French invasion, but merely as a convenience in playing the game of bargain and sale. Victor Emanuel was restored to the throne of Sardinia and as a reward for his consistent reactionism and subservience to the ideals of the Holy Alliance, was given the former republic of Genoa, despite the violent protest of the Genoese,

who asked that as a matter of ordinary justice they be restored to the independence of which France had deprived them. He also received Nice, which was as much French as it was Piedmontese, and Savoy, which was altogether French in language and sympathy.

Lombardy and Venetia, including the Trentino, Triestino, Istria, and Dalmatia, were given to Austria in return for the withdrawal of her claims on Belgium. Ferdinand III of Habsburg-Lorraine was restored to the throne of Tuscany as grand duke, while Francis IV, son of Hercules III whom the French had deprived of the duchy of Modena, the Stati Estensi, received his father's patrimony. The little duchy of Lucca was given to Maria Louisa, ex-queen of Etruria and daughter of the Bourbon Charles IV of Spain. The duchy of Parma, including the territories of Piacenza and Guastalla, were given to Napoleon's widow, Marie Louise, for life, with the proviso that at her death her son, the little King of Rome, should not succeed to the throne, but that the duchy should go to the ex-queen of Etruria or in the event of her death to her son, while at the same time Lucca should go to Tuscany. The pope received back the former States of the Church, while Ferdinand of Bourbon, who had been kept upon the throne of Sicily by the British, received Murat's kingdom of Naples and assumed the title of Ferdinand I, King of the Two Sicilies. The plucky little mountain oligarchic republic of San Marino, which had been spared by Napoleon, was ignored by the Congress of Vienna, and has with Andorra come down to us today as one of the two last survivals in Europe of the Middle Ages. From his point of view Metternich had every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the Congress of Vienna, for Italy had become in truth "a mere geographical expression."

The great peninsula which bore the name was divided into a number of States all ruled by princes in whose reactionism and absolutism Metternich had full confidence.

Austria had become the great dominant power, for not only did she directly own Lombardy and Venetia but with the exception of the duchy of Lucca and the States of the Church, every Italian government was linked to her by a close personal tie. Ferdinand III, grand duke of Tuscany, was the Austrian emperor's brother; Francis IV, duke of Modena, was his first cousin; Marie Louise, duchess of Parma, was his daughter; Maria Carolina, wife of Ferdinand of Naples, was his aunt; and Maria Theresa, wife of Victor Emanuel of Piedmont, was his cousin.

At Rome the power of Austria was greater than that of any other state, for besides being the "favorite daughter of the Church" the possession of a veto in papal elections, a veto she never hesitated to use, made it certain that no pope would ever ascend the throne of St. Peter who was inimical to Austrian interests. In Lucca, Maria Louisa relied on Austria to carry out the terms of the treaty of Vienna and give her or her son Parma on the death of the other Marie Louise. Needless to say the influence of Austria in Lucca was supreme. The only Italian state where Austria was not dominant was Piedmont. While Victor Emanuel was known to possess a very vigorous hatred for Austria he was so intensely reactionary that Metternich had no fear that he would give trouble and, besides, his queen was an Austrian archduchess.

Yet, able man though he was, Metternich could not realize the impossibility of bringing back to the world an era that had passed forever. He utterly failed to understand that the French Revolution had destroyed the old world that had gone before and had ushered in the new, and that it had conferred upon mankind as its most important heritage the spirit of modern nationality. The efforts which Metternich made in his own selfish interests to disregard the national spirit of the states of Europe only served, first to kindle, and then to fan into a world-wide conflagration the very forces he had tried to curb.

As the modern spirit of nationality was evoked by the oppression of Napoleon it was proclaimed and enthroned by the oppression of Metternich. By it and because of it Continental Europe has been entirely transformed. It called into being the German Empire, modern Italy and modern Greece. It drove the Turk almost out of Europe, created the Balkan States, Ireland, Poland, the Baltic States, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia. This spirit of nationality in its modern phase, while a direct result of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, is the outcome of a gradual evolution which has been going on since man has existed and the end of which is not yet. Beginning with the family and ending with the great nations of today is a continuous process of growth and development, which has influenced all economic life as it has expanded.

The families of prehistoric times, grouped in little villages, became towns through mere increase of population, and the towns in due course became cities. Until well on toward our own day the city-state was the only political organization the world knew and city economy was its only scheme of government. Gradually the cities grew by the absorption of adjoining territory, or were themselves absorbed by the surrounding lands belonging to some powerful lord of the soil. And so came into being the territorial states, small at first, but soon increasing in size by marriage, by inheritance, or by conquest.

Eventually the old city economy broke down. It had served its purpose and with more or less success had met the not over-exacting requirements of its time. But when ambitions became wider, when the point of view became more extended, and population greatly increased, new methods of economic administration were required to carry forward human development, and the territorial states came into being.

From the close of the fifteenth century until the French Revolution the territorial states of Europe busied themselves

with the progress of civilization, seeking the same goal of self-sufficiency as had the city-states that had gone before. But the new units of economic and political organization were larger and more diversified than their predecessors. The territorial states, containing as they did all sorts and conditions of men, dwellers in the towns and on the fields, manufacturers, traders, and tillers of the soil, necessarily developed a larger policy and one which could further industrial development more rapidly than any that had preceded it. Each territorial state was ruled by a prince (in a few cases by an oligarchy) who concentrated in his hands the sovereign power. The loyalty of all classes was to the sovereign himself. He was to them in some instances the actual owner, in all cases "the great and good friend" whom they followed in war and revered in peace. Loyalty to the soil, to the race, to what we call the nation was unknown. Loyalty to the king was everything.

Some of the territorial rulers were wise and strove to make their states strong and self-contained within and powerful and respected abroad. Some of these rulers were foolish and, regarding their states as nothing but their personal property, ruled them with an ignorance and caprice that could only end in ruin. All, however, continued the old selfishness in policy, and strove to acquire wealth and power at the expense of the other countries.

As time went on many of these territorial states had grown large enough to include almost all the people of some given nationality in the modern sense. In many cases the conditions prerequisite to nationality were in being, waiting to be called into action.

England had more rapidly approached the condition of a nation than any other state and yet even England lacked something in her development to make her the British nation of today.

Long before the French Revolution conditions were ripe for the touch of the enchanter's wand. The giants of nationality lay sleeping, waiting to be awakened into active life. The world was becoming too large, population was too great to be satisfied with the crude and loose organization of the territorial state, whose people were bound together by nothing but a common service to a common sovereign. No matter how great a noble might be, no matter how humble was the peasant, noble and peasant alike were nothing more than the creatures of the king, with no more interest in the body politic than that which came from devotion to the person of the sovereign and dependence upon him for political existence. Before 1789 patriotism existed which was just as pure, just as noble, just as unselfish as that which followed, but the ideal of the eighteenth century patriot was very different from that of his nineteenth century prototype. The ante-revolutionary patriot served not his country, but his sovereign. The doctrine of the divine right of kings was generally accepted, so that the king as the God-appointed ruler was regarded as the ultimate object of all loyalty and service. The king was in himself the state so that the emigrés of the French Revolution sincerely believed that in fighting against the armies of the republic they were fighting for France, for they were fighting to restore the king.

The French Revolution marks the birth of the modern world as we know it. It marks the beginning of our world, the world in which we live. The ragged army with which Dumouriez and Kellerman won Valmy called into being the modern spirit of nationality. Frenchmen suddenly awoke to a realization that there was a France which was not the appanage of the crown, which was not the property of the Bourbon lilies but which was the birthright of her sons, the heritage and possession of all Frenchmen, to be fought for, to be died for, and to be lived for. The men of the revolution believed it to be their mission to force upon Europe their own

doctrines and ideals, just as later Napoleon believed it to be his mission to force his rule upon the world. And the countries of Europe, realizing that if they were to live free from France they must fight each for itself as an independent unit, sprang to the fray with the already laid fires of nationality bursting into flames, kindled by the spark of French world ambition.

The doctrine of the revolution—that the people have the right to rule themselves—did away forever with the doctrine of the divine right of kings. The moment that the state was regarded as no longer the property of the monarch, the crown became the creature of the people. The moment that it was conceded that the people might rule themselves in their own way, the spirit of nationality became more self-assertive. Masses of men having the same interests, the same hopes, the same ideals, naturally tended to separate from those who differed from them, while groups of men with like interests strove to join themselves together.

This national movement began as soon as Europe had been freed from Napoleon. Reactionary princes and ministers for years failed to recognize the new force, but it was ever present and ever growing in importance and in power.

In no country in Europe was the call of nationality felt more strongly than in Italy. Descended from the same Latin stock, practising the same religion, possessing a common literary language, inhabiting a peninsula surrounded by the Alps and the sea, the Italians would seem to have been predestined to form one great nationality.

Through the centuries, after the fall of the Roman Empire, the presence of the barbarian had been bitterly resented. Local jealousies and antagonisms, the ignorance of the peasantry, the inertia of the educated and upper classes had permitted the outlander to rule the people of Italy with comparative ease.

It required the stimulus of the new spirit of nationality which the French Revolution had called into being to rouse



the Italians from their lethargy, to develop the leaders of the cause, to unite the people in the supreme struggle for nationhood.

It is a curious fact that of all the great men whom Italy has produced until the dawn of our own day, but one had the vision to dream of an Italian nation. Neither Dante nor Petrarch, for all their genius and their imagination, ever but vaguely suggested the possibility of Italian unity. Machiavelli stands alone as its forerunner, for he advocated the union of all Italians into one great state, and believed that his hero and ideal prince, Cesare Borgia, had the ability and strength to bring that state into being. What Cesare Borgia might have accomplished, had he lived, is problematical, for while his ability was great, the idea of Italian unity was so foreign to the thought of the time as to have made it almost impossible of realization.

It was not until the very eve of the nineteenth century that Italian unity was brought into the domain of practical politics. After the fall of the Venetian republic, while the democracy was struggling for life under the death sentence of Bonaparte, those two great patriots and statesmen, Vincenzo Dandolo and Tomaso Gallino, strove desperately to bring about a union of the Italian states into one great Italian republic. But regionalism was too strong, and the petty ambitions and jealousies of the politicians in the mushroom republics that Bonaparte had created, prevented them from even obtaining a respectful hearing. The idea of Italian unity in no way appealed to Bonaparte, who was unwilling to have a single great Italian nation as his neighbor. His purposes were better served by dividing the peninsula into three states, all under his control, than they would have been with a single nation at his door, influenced by a common spirit of nationhood.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Venice and Bonaparte*, by George B. McClellan. Princeton, 1931.

It is true that later Napoleon experienced a change of heart, but in view of the circumstances under which the change occurred the sincerity of his conversion may well be questioned.

While at Elba he received an invitation from a group of fourteen of his former officers and supporters, meeting at Turin and headed by Pellegrino Rossi, to take over the government of Italy with the understanding that he should refrain from all foreign conquests. As the members of the group were acting entirely on their own responsibility, with no apparent outside support, it is doubtful if the former emperor took their invitation very seriously. It gave him, however, an opportunity to appeal to the Italian people, and to make a bid for their support, which in the event of the failure of his designs on France might advantageously be followed up.

Although the invitation was dispatched May 19, 1814, Napoleon did not answer it until the following October, when he replied in a letter worded in the best style of a Napoleonic proclamation and evidently intended to fire the hearts of the Italians. "I shall make of the people of Italy a single nation," he said. "I shall impress on them unity of manners and customs at present lacking, and this will be the most difficult enterprise which I have ever undertaken—within twenty years Italy will have thirty million inhabitants. Then she will be the most powerful of nations—we shall abstain from wars of conquest, but I shall have a brave and powerful army. I shall write upon our banners my motto of the iron crown, 'woe to him who touches it,' and no one will dare do so."

Four months after sending his answer Napoleon had left Elba and embarked on the adventure of the Hundred Days, all thoughts of Pellegrino Rossi's invitation forgotten. It will always remain one of the "what might have beens" of history, whether he might not have won had he thrown the dice

with fortune for the last time, with Italy rather than France as the stake. It is interesting to remember that the greatest man of his age contemplated a united Italy as a political possibility.

Presumably taking a leaf from the book of the man who had made him and whom he had afterwards betrayed, Murat, the arch-ingrate, finding himself slipping, and as a last desperate effort to save his throne, tried to awaken among Italians a desire for unity. But outside of his own kingdom he was distrusted and disliked and he was allowed to go before the firing-squad unhelped and unmourned.

It required more than the eloquence of Dandolo and Gallino, more than the desperate earnestness of Murat or the academic interest of Napoleon, to call into being the spirit of Italian nationality. The doctrines of the revolution made much progress among the educated Italians, but this was not enough. Under Napoleon all parts of Italy were given the best governments they had ever had, and while they were governments of foreigners, supported, if necessary, by foreign bayonets, they were not oppressive and even though the conscription was a great hardship, economic conditions were far better than under the despots who had gone before. The people were sufficiently contented with their lot to make them deaf to the appeal of nationality. It required the oppression of Austria and the rigor and corruption of the Bourbons to bring about a state of mind that would welcome the idea of union.

As the years passed the misrule of the foreigner became ever more difficult to bear, until at last the people began to realize that the only way by which they could be freed from the barbarians was by uniting for their expulsion. At first, union was thought of merely as a means to an end, but ere long, under the preaching of Mazzini and his followers, the means became an end in itself, an end enlarged and glorified into the hope of creating the Italian nation.

The story of modern Italy, beginning with the *vox clamatis* of Mazzini and ending with the accomplishments of Mussolini, is the story of a great people whose leaders were grimly determined at all costs to free themselves from the barbarian, and to achieve and to perfect the Italian nation to which God had entitled them.

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## CHAPTER II

### MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX

THE restored absolutist rulers of Italy, all creatures of Metternich, were true to their salt in carrying out in varying degrees of intensity the reactionary policy of their master. Victor Emanuel of Piedmont celebrated his restoration and his fifty-sixth birthday by ordering the army to resume the wearing of pigtails, and by restoring to his former position every surviving office-holder of the old régime. By the edict of May 21, 1814, he put into force all the royal ordinances and decrees that had been repealed by the French and renewed the disabilities of Protestants and Jews.

He was kindly, incompetent and ignorant, honestly believing in the divine right of kings, especially of that of Casa Savoia. His one redeeming quality from the Italian point of view was an intense hatred of all things Austrian. Ferdinand III of Tuscany and the two Marie Louises of Parma and Lucca, respectively, governed patriarchally and fairly well. Francis IV of Modena was a man of considerable ability who governed his small state harshly but efficiently. Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies was an ignorant tyrant who governed his kingdom without regard to honesty, decency or justice.

The kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia, which included one-eighth of the population and one-eighteenth of the territory of the Austrian Empire, paid one-quarter of the taxes levied in the Habsburg possessions. After all local expenditures had been paid, including the cost of the Austrian army of occupation, Lombardy was annually assessed thirty-four million lire and Venetia twenty-three million. Under the Archduke Renier, as vice-regent for his brother the emperor,

the exorbitant and oppressive taxes were rigorously collected, but it must be conceded that the government was efficient and honest.

In 1846, out of 2,247 townships only 50 were without elementary schools for boys, while in most of the chief towns there were secondary schools. Economic conditions were better than in any other part of Italy, except perhaps Piedmont, and life was not hard for those who could bring themselves to forget that they were Italians. Abject subservience to Austrian rule was demanded from all, for as Francis I once said, "What is required is obedient subjects, not enlightened citizens."

The States of the Church were ruled by Pius VII, that saintly and courageous victim of Napoleon, who returned to Rome a broken old man of seventy-three. His prime minister, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, was one of the best administrators of his time. A member of a very old Pisan family, he had made his career as a civil servant at Rome. He was a lawyer who only took minor orders in 1800 on receiving the red hat, and had devoted himself chiefly to legal matters before attaining the prime ministership. His administration was despotic, but efficient, and was the best that Rome had had in many generations, or was ever destined to have again. He appointed a great number of laymen to important positions, reformed the finances, reorganized the judiciary, and gave the Papal States a really good government, which would have been impossible but for the loyal support which he received from his friend and patron the Holy Father.

In 1815 every corner of Italy was ruled despotically at the whim of its prince, as his personal possession, without regard to the wishes of the people. Political liberty was non-existent, the individual was nothing but the chattel of the sovereign. When the sovereign was of kindly disposition and of enough ability to choose a competent prime minister, as was the case in Tuscany, Parma, Lucca, and Rome, the lot of the gov-

erned was at best tolerable. When on the other hand the sovereign was ignorant or cruel or extravagant, as was the case in Modena and Naples, the lot of the governed was hard beyond description.

In every Italian state the sovereign lived in constant fear of revolution and by his oppressive efforts to prevent its occurrence only succeeded in bringing about what he strove to avoid. While the proletariat and the peasantry took but little interest in politics, the Italian intellectuals had never forgotten their hatred of the barbarian and their longing to be rid of him.

The first concrete expression of discontent, the first concrete movement against the oppression of the foreigner, was made by the carbonari. The carbonari or "charcoal burners," as they called themselves, were members of a secret society having for its purpose the expulsion of the barbarian from Italy and the acquisition of constitutional governments.

The society had its origin in Naples in the early days of the nineteenth century, and was composed chiefly of intellectuals, members of the aristocracy and middle class, with some workingmen and peasants. It modelled itself largely on Italian Freemasonry, and had a mystical and exaggerated ritual that appealed strongly to the South Italian. The flag of the society was red, black, and blue, and remained the emblem of revolution in Italy until the adoption of the red, white, and green in 1831.

The original purpose of the carbonari was the expulsion of the French. During the last years of his reign Murat tried unsuccessfully to win carbonari support and having failed persecuted them with great vigor. Turning to the Bourbons, Ferdinand received their overtures with friendliness, and they became his strong supporters and did much to hasten the fall of Murat.

On his restoration Ferdinand with his usual disloyalty broke faith with them, organized a reactionary society called

the calderari, and did all in his power to destroy them. They threw on persecution and spread with great rapidity all over Italy and even to France, and became for a time the only liberal party in the land. While at first limiting their activities to subterranean agitation, it was not long before they changed their propaganda into one of direct and open action.

The government of Naples was not only arbitrary but it was unspeakably corrupt. To meet the demands of an extravagant court and dishonest bureaucracy, taxes were inordinately high and economic conditions inordinately low. Public officials were expected to make up by graft for unpaid salaries, while the army whose pay was always in arrears and whose discipline was non-existent lived from hand to mouth by petty larceny and sometimes, it was hinted, even by highway robbery.

The membership of the carbonari, in the beginning restricted very carefully to those who believed in its ideals, was thrown open to anyone who cared to join, and the disaffected joined by thousands—small proprietors and peasants, civil servants, soldiers and priests.

The militia, which had been organized under Guglielmo Pepe to suppress brigandage, was turned by its commander, who was a carbonaro, into a supporter of revolution and was preparing a *coup d'état* when Morelli and Salvati, two young cavalry officers, on July 2, 1820, deserted the army with their squadron and marched on Naples demanding a constitution. The movement grew at once into a revolution. Reinforced by Pepe and a part of his militia the insurgent army numbered nearly 12,000 men, encamped at Avellino some sixty miles from Naples.

As soon as Ferdinand heard that the insurgents threatened his capital he became panic-stricken, for he was not only a tyrant and a liar, but also a moral and physical coward. Without waiting for Pepe to begin his march on Naples the king,



on July 5, proclaimed his intention of granting "of his own free will" a constitution the details of which he failed to specify, while at the same time he secretly dispatched an agonized plea to Austria for help.

The constitution which the revolutionists demanded was the Spanish constitution of 1812, a thoroughly unworkable and impossible document, that was supposed to be the last word in democracy. It was proclaimed with delirious joy, and formally approved by the king and his eldest son whom he had appointed regent, both of whom solemnly swore to support and enforce it.

The revolution in Naples had its repercussion in Sicily which, having remained loyal to the Bourbons throughout the Napoleonic period, was rewarded by Ferdinand by being deprived of the constitution which the British had forced him to grant. The Sicilians rose almost to a man demanding the Sicilian constitution of 1812, and independence from Naples under the same king.

The revolutionary government in Naples handled the situation with neither understanding nor tact. They insisted that Sicily should take the Spanish constitution, and refused very discourteously to accept an offer of an army of 10,000 Sicilians. The uprising for a time got out of hand, and peace and the Spanish constitution were imposed only after much unnecessary bloodshed.

The news of the uprising seriously disturbed Metternich who had convinced himself that revolution in Europe had finally been killed. On July 25, 1820, he informed the German sovereigns that he would not tolerate revolution in Naples and that under a secret treaty between Austria and Naples, signed June 12, 1815, he was authorized to use force in its suppression. He summoned the sovereigns to a conference at Laybach to consider the situation and invited King Ferdinand to attend. Ferdinand in December 1820 asked par-

liament for permission to accept the invitation, which parliament granted, the king once more on the eve of his departure swearing fealty to the constitution.

From Laybach Ferdinand wrote his ministers that the allies would not recognize the constitution, that force would be employed to restore the old order, that Austria had been authorized to send an army into Neapolitan territory for the purpose, and that he agreed with the program.

In January the Austrians crossed the Po, moving on Naples. The Neapolitan army, consisting of some 20,000 regulars and 25,000 militia, was divided into two columns, under Generals Pepe and Carrascosa; the former was ordered to defend the Abruzzi, the latter the line of the Garigliano.

On March 7, 1831, Pepe, for some unexplained reason, crossed the Neapolitan frontier near Rieti, and with 20,000 men attacked the entire Austrian army of nearly twice his strength. After a day's fighting Pepe was routed, and his army broke up and went home.

On March 23 the Austrians entered Naples, the garrison of the city declared for Ferdinand, and parliament begged his forgiveness. The king returned to his capital, annulled the constitution, restored absolutism and began the punishment of the constitutionalists who were not fortunate enough to have left the kingdom.

In Milan the increase of carbonari activity caused the Austrian government to arrest and imprison without trial a number of Italians including the poet Silvio Pellico, who with his book *Le mie prigioni* achieved immortality for himself and greatly helped his country.

In the same year a carbonaro revolt occurred in Turin. Victor Emanuel had abdicated, and Charles Albert, the heir presumptive and regent in the absence of the new king, Charles Felix, granted a constitution. On the return of the king the constitution was withdrawn, with Austrian help

an uprising of the constitutionalists was suppressed near Novara, and Charles Albert was banished.

The French revolution of July 1830 started the cauldron of insurrection boiling all over Europe, and nowhere more vigorously than in Italy. Charles Felix died April 27, 1831, and was succeeded by his distant cousin, Charles Albert, head of the Carignano branch of Casa Savoia, who was a curious combination of contradictions. At times a bigot and a reactionary in religion and politics, at times a liberal in both, at times showing decision and strength of character, at times showing pitiable weakness, he was a religious mystic who went through life wearing a hair shirt next to his skin for the mortification of the flesh, and suffered from an over-sensitive conscience which caused him agonies of fear and of regret. He was a harsh, cold, shy man who made few friends and never succeeded in winning either the love or the admiration of his people.

Yet with all his weaknesses and his shortcomings he had one redeeming quality, for when once he had plighted his word no power on earth could make him break it, and in this he differed radically from his fellow Italian sovereigns.

Shortly after his accession Charles Albert received a letter from Giuseppe Mazzini, urging him to lead the movement for the union of Italy, which marks the entrance of that remarkable man into the politics of his fatherland.

Mazzini was in the truest sense "the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." Born in Genoa in 1805 of middle-class parents, he devoted his life, his eloquence and his great ability with complete unselfishness and without hope of reward to the cause of Italia Unita. While he realized the necessity of driving out the barbarian, the freeing of the peninsula from alien rule was for him only the condition precedent to the far more vital necessity of the union of all Italians under one flag and government.

Others, like Gioberti, might be quite as sincere in their desire to rid Italy of the Austrian, but for them the form of government to follow was of comparatively slight importance.

So Gioberti advocated a federation of Italian states under the presidency of the pope. For Mazzini, however, there could be no compromise with the one overwhelming urge toward union in one Italian state. Whatever may have been his eccentricities and mistakes in old age, in his youth and in his prime, in season and out of season, despite ill health, poverty and banishment, sometimes in Italy, more often a refugee abroad, he kept alight the pure flame of union, never hesitating when lesser men faltered, never discouraged, never losing heart. Fundamentally a republican, he was nevertheless willing to approach the King of Piedmont in behalf of his objective. For him the union of Italy so far exceeded in importance every other question, that in its attainment every and any means were in his opinion legitimate.

He was undoubtedly a conspirator and a fanatic, who hesitated at nothing, not even assassination, it has been said, in the attainment of his end. He was often unreasoning, unreasonably difficult to get on with, and impossible to lead. Yet modern Italy owes him a debt, far too great for assessment, in that he educated the Italian people into thinking of themselves as a nation, and never let their leaders forget that nationality was their heaven-sent heritage.

Disgusted with the cheap claptrap of the carbonari he organized among the Italian refugees at Marseilles an association which he called *Giovane Italia*, or Young Italy, which soon spread all over the peninsula and by 1833 numbered over 60,000 members. The purpose of *Giovane Italia* was the propaganda of the Mazzinian doctrine of unitarianism, as it was called—one republican Italian nation. The Mazzinian theories of government were never tried out practically but once, when during the short-lived Roman republic they proved to be utterly unworkable.

Under the auspices of Mazzini and his followers several small rebellions broke out in Piedmont, only to be mercilessly stamped out by Charles Albert.

The pathetic little filibustering expedition of the Venetian Bandiera brothers, fathered by Mazzini, ended in disaster. From the moment the expedition landed on the Calabrian coast everything went wrong. The peasants instead of joining the Bandieras turned against them. They were captured by Neapolitan troops and promptly shot. Mazzini was severely criticized for encouraging the expedition which was from the start foredoomed to failure. While he tried to shift responsibility, he need not have done so for the Bandieras did not die in vain. Their twenty-odd followers were drawn from almost every part of Italy, and their little band was the first truly Italian expedition to fight and suffer for Italian nationality. The fate of the Bandieras and their companions was mourned by all Italians, for they were the sons of all Italy.

In 1843 Vincenzo Gioberti published his book *Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani* which had an immediate and far-reaching success.

Gioberti (1801-1852), who was a Piedmontese priest, had been exiled by Charles Albert for sympathy with the Giovane Italia movement. When permitted to return he had given up his republicanism but remained true to the cause of independence.

His *Del primato* was the statement of his creed. He insisted that Italy having produced Caesar, Dante, and Napoleon was the land from which was destined to come the leaders of the world, that Italy was destined to become the world center in moral and spiritual things, that the prerequisite of such moral and spiritual leadership was national independence, freedom from the barbarian.

Gioberti was, however, far too conservative to be a unitarian. He proposed to regenerate and free Italy through the instrumentality of the King of Piedmont and the pope. Aus-

tria being expelled, the Italian states were to be organized into a loose confederacy under the presidency of the pope, and all forces in Italy, even the Jesuits, were to assist.

Gioberti, who had no illusions as to the political opinions of Gregory XVI, called upon the pope to rejoice in the great destiny reserved for his successor on the delivery of Italy from the barbarian.

The success of the *Primato* was due largely to its conservatism. It was catholic; it praised impartially the pope and Charles Albert; it did not favor the republic, nor did it propose to tear down the boundaries of existing states. While the Jesuits refused to approve it, the Franciscans and Dominicans praised it. Politically it was a safe compromise, for while it did not win the support of extremists of either side, of either the extreme conservatives like the Jesuits, or the extreme radicals, like the Mazzinians, its strength lay entirely in the center between the two. What was needed to make possible the Giobertian ideal was a reforming pope, and on June 1, 1846, Gregory XVI died.

The conclave met June 14 with Cardinal Lambruschini, Gregory's secretary of state, as the Austrian candidate. The opponents of Lambruschini combined in support of Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti who was elected in haste on June 17, barely in time to prevent the interposition of the Austrian veto which was being brought from Vienna by Cardinal Gaysruck, archbishop of Milan.

With great reluctance Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti accepted the tiara as Pius IX.

Born in Sinigaglia in 1792 of an old and noble family, the new pope had in his youth hoped to become an officer in the army, but because of epilepsy he was refused a commission. He then turned his thoughts to religion and took orders, and very soon became known for his eloquence and at the early age of thirty-eight was made bishop of Spoleto. From there he was translated to Imola in 1832 where he acquired a repu-

tation for fairness and kindness, and absolutely refused to have anything to do with the policy of political persecution carried on by Lambruschini. He was generally beloved by his people for his courtesy and graciousness. He was a handsome man of culture, refinement, and pure life. In politics he was obviously a liberal and the enthusiasm of the Italians over his election was still further increased when it became known that Austria had intended to impose her veto against him.

Pius IX has been criticised and censured with much injustice for his political course during the years of revolution. That he entirely changed his political position and from being a liberal became a reactionary is undoubtedly true. Yet other statesmen have changed their opinions before his time and since, and been given credit for having done so honestly. It is as unjust to assume that Pius IX changed without sincerity as it is to assume, as many do, that he never was a liberal, but only posed as such, for the purpose of winning personal popularity. Whatever may have been his real motive in declaring for liberalism (and it is only fair to assume that he meant what he said and did), the fact remains that the policy of liberalism followed by him in the early years of his pontificate gave an impetus to the cause of Italian unity that but for him it might never have received, and marked the first great step forward in the creation of the Italian nation. However he may have changed later, however he may have tried to undo the work of his early years, that work remained, enduring, as one of the foundation stones of the modern Italian state.

Pius IX began his reign by performing a series of acts which created a tremendous sensation, acts which seem ordinary enough to us but which, given the time and place of their performance, not only required moral courage but also a distinct liberality on the part of the performer.

Political offenders, who under the previous régime had been imprisoned and banished by the hundred, were amnestied during the early days of the new régime. Scientific congresses that had been viewed with grave suspicion by Gregory as savoring of a dangerous liberalism, and therefore banned, were invited to meet in Rome. The Papal States were entirely without railways, for they had been classed with scientific congresses as modernistic and therefore savoring of liberalism and dangerous to the existing order. Pius appointed a board to study the question of laying out a railway system in his kingdom. But more important than any of these rather mild suggestions of liberalism was his choice of Cardinal Gizzi as secretary of state and of Carboli-Bussi as his private secretary. Both these men were and always had been outspoken and consistent liberals. It argued well for the future that Pius should be willing to have as his closest political associates two men of avowed liberalism. To cap the climax of his liberalism, early in 1847 he created the *consulta di stato*, an appointed council with merely advisory powers, which had been advocated by Gioberti as the forerunner of a regularly constituted constitutional government.

Liberal Italy went almost mad with enthusiasm for the reforming pope. At last the dreams of Gioberti and his disciples seemed possible of realization, and Gioberti in his *Modern Jesuit* said: "Pius has reconciled men to religion by proving himself a friend of civilization and begins a new era for Italy and the world."

No pope was ever so popular on so slight foundations. Whenever he appeared in public he was surrounded by cheering crowds who followed his carriage through the streets, and night after night Piazza Quirinale was crowded with people shouting for the Holy Father to bless them, and again and again would he appear upon the palace balcony and bless the kneeling thousands. He obviously enjoyed his popularity and felt kindly to his people who for the moment



almost worshiped him. Unfortunately the pope's kindness and lack of force undid most of his early success.

That he recognized his own limitations appeared obvious to Pellegrino Rossi, the French ambassador, who quotes him as saying "the people want to make a Napoleon of me, who am only a poor priest."

The civil service and the principal offices in the government were filled by men of reactionary tendency who had been appointed under Lambruschini, and formed a bureaucracy that was firmly determined to block the Holy Father in his efforts for reform. Pius was by no means either the first or the last well meaning reforming official who has found his hands tied by his subordinates. Had Leo XIII been faced by a similar problem he would have solved it promptly and completely by a general reorganization. But Pius IX was no Leo and so, unwilling and unable to turn out the men who thwarted him, he tolerated them with disastrous results to his policy.

In his reforming efforts the pope was greatly hampered by the Jesuits and the San Fedisti, as the members of the *Bande della Santa Fede* were called. This society, about which there has always been considerable mystery, was organized to counteract the activities of the carbonari. Ostensibly created to protect the Santa Fede or Holy Faith from the assaults of the revolutionists, it stood firmly for reaction, and in that cause was willing to go to any lengths. It was a secret society and exactly who belonged and how great was its strength always remained doubtful. It is probable that its numbers and influence were exaggerated. The public, however, held the San Fedisti and the Jesuits responsible for the slowness with which Pius acted.

The leader of the Roman mob that kept pushing Pius forward was a blacksmith named Angelo Brunetti, called Ciceruacchio, for whom the pope seemed to have a real liking and regard. It is extraordinary that despite the opposition

of the civil service, the San Fedisti, and the Jesuits, Ciceruacchio, working with the support of Cardinal Gizzi and Carboli-Bussi, was able to accomplish so much.

Every liberal movement in the peninsula had coupled with its demand for representative government its insistence on the necessity of a citizen guard. The citizen-soldier was supposed to be inspired by a love of liberty and therefore capable of holding his own against any number of regulars, who as "mercenaries" were held in contempt by the true "patriot." With a citizen-guard, no matter how undisciplined, the cause of liberalism was considered safe. It required the lesson of bitter experience to shake the faith of the Italian liberal in the citizen-soldier.

The Roman liberals made the usual demands—a representative assembly and of course a citizen-guard. While Pius was inclined to grant both demands, the liberalism of his secretary of state did not go quite so far. He finally agreed to the creation of provincial councils, with power to elect a council of state, and to the organization of a cabinet of ecclesiastics to take the place of the very haphazard government that had gone before, but flatly refused to approve of the citizen-guard. With all those about him opposed to a more liberal form of government and to the militia, Pius was perforce content with what he could comfortably accomplish.

The never-discouraged Ciceruacchio working in sympathy with the carbonari began to circulate rumors of a conspiracy of Austria and the San Fedisti that became so prevalent as seriously to alarm the Vatican. Pius became convinced that the "favorite daughter of the Church" had evil designs against her mother, and determined that his safety lay in a citizen-guard. As Cardinal Gizzi still remained obdurate on the subject, Pius accepted the resignation of his secretary of state, and appointed Cardinal Ferretti, his cousin, who saw eye to eye with him.

The first act of the pope, in accord with his new secretary of state, was the organization of a citizen-guard, immediately followed by the arrest and imprisonment of such suspected San Fedisti as could be found.

Metternich learned of the new papal policy with serious alarm. He had viewed the previous exhibitions of papal liberalism without much interest as being nothing more than the eccentricity of a well meaning pontiff who would soon see the error of his ways. Even the authorization of the scientific congress and the appointment of the railway commission had left him undisturbed. The creation of a council of state and the organization of a citizen-guard were entirely different matters, and in Metternich's mind savored greatly of Jacobinism and revolution.

Through his ambassador at Rome and the papal nuncio at Vienna he first reasoned and warned. Failing to meet with a favorable response he next unfolded a sensational story of a Protestant conspiracy having for its object the destruction of the papacy. When Pius declined to be frightened, he again threatened, and again failing to shake the Holy Father, on July 17, 1847, he moved an Austrian force of 1,500 men across the frontier from Venetia and occupied the papal city of Ferrara, which he claimed a treaty right to garrison.

The effect on the pope of Metternich's display of force was not at all what the latter had expected. He announced publicly that his troop movement was for the purpose of protecting the Holy Father against his insubordinate subjects, but did not hesitate to convey to the Vatican through diplomatic channels a very broad hint that it was a last warning against the flirtation between the papacy and democracy, and might be followed by the occupation of Romagna and even Rome itself.

Pius not only refused to accept Metternich's warning, but became exceedingly angry and exceedingly alarmed. He saw the possibility of Austrian troops in the Holy City, and the

heavy hand of the Habsburgs limiting his independence and his safety. He had not forgotten that he had been elected against the wishes of Austria and had all an Italian's dislike of the arrogance of the barbarian.

His secretary of state, Cardinal Ferretti, announced proudly "we shall show Europe that we can manage by ourselves." But Pius had no illusions on the subject and knew quite well that, if it came to war, his thoroughly disorganized little army and the civic guard, for all its loud-voiced patriotism, would be but a feeble reed to lean upon and would make but a poor showing against the Austrian regulars. He therefore appealed to his fellow Italian sovereigns, and asked their council and their aid in meeting the threat of Austrian invasion.

Carboli-Bussi, his private secretary, was sent to Turin to invoke the aid of Charles Albert and succeeded in arousing in that most vacillating of monarchs a momentary sympathy. The high-handedness of Metternich in his treatment of the Holy Father was felt all over Italy, among liberals at least, as a personal insult, and had as its direct result the rapid growth of war sentiment against Austria.

The autumn of 1847 saw Italian public opinion united as it had never been before in the belief that the time had come to strike if Italy were ever to be free.

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### CHAPTER III

1848

THE year 1848 marked the beginning of the end of what Napoleon III very justly called "the odious treaties of Vienna." While 1830 and the subsequent years had seen a considerable amelioration in some parts of Europe of the oppression inaugurated by the Holy Alliance, it was not until 1848 that the Continent as a whole burst into revolt against absolutism.

There was not a continental state where people did not demand from their rulers a constitution and representative government. Most of them were successful, and while, in many, victory was short-lived, in some the year showed an apparently permanent change from absolutism to a certain degree of liberalism in government.

In no part of Europe did 1848 mark a more complete and fundamental change in human relations than it did in the Italian peninsula, for it was the actual beginning of the *risorgimento*, the resurrection of a great people, inspired by a common purpose and a common hope—the purpose of driving out the barbarian and the hope of creating the Italian nation.

In 1847 Charles Louis who had succeeded his mother, the ex-queen of Etruria, on the throne of Lucca, sold his duchy to Leopold II, grand duke of Tuscany, who had succeeded his father Ferdinand III in 1824, while Leopold divided the district of Lussigiana between Parma and Modena, without consulting its inhabitants and to their intense indignation.

As under the treaty of Vienna Lucca would have verted to Tuscany on the death of Marie Louise of Parma, Charles Louis merely anticipated the inevitable. It was the fact that

two Italian sovereigns had in the middle of the nineteenth century sold their subjects to each other exactly as though they had been cattle, that served to bring home to Italians the utterly unnatural and inhuman conditions under which they were living.

While united in purpose and hope they were very sharply divided as to methods. There were three factions or, rather, schools of thought. The republicans led by Mazzini favored, in season and out of season, a republic to include all seven of the Italian states. They were irreconcilable and uncompromising, refusing to yield one jot of their principles. The federalists under the influence of Gioberti favored a loose confederacy of Italian states under the presidency of the pope. When the latter turned to reaction, Gioberti and his followers turned to Piedmont. The "Piedmontese" led by Cavour favored a North Italian kingdom under the House of Savoy and a federation with the pope and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

As time passed and both the pope and Ferdinand of Naples showed their unwillingness to federate with Piedmont, Cavour changed his position and advocated the creation of one Italian kingdom to include all seven states under the rule of Casa Savoia. While unquestionably "unitarianism" had been Cavour's ultimate purpose from the very beginning, he had at first concealed his intention for political reasons and made the bluff of calling on Pius and Ferdinand to join in the expulsion of Austria.

Although on January 2 and 3 there was rioting in Milan, sternly suppressed by Austrian troops, the honor of beginning the revolutionary year in Europe belongs to Sicily. On January 12 a revolt organized by Francesco Crispi, a young Sicilian lawyer then practising in Naples, broke out in Palermo, and almost overnight Sicily was in flames, every town of importance joining in the revolt.

While the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was very fertile ground for the revolutionary doctrines, in Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Papal States the people trusted their rulers, and hoped by peaceful means to convert them to granting constitutions. The Neapolitan Bourbons on the other hand had given so unspeakably corrupt, cruel, and inefficient government that as Settembrini said in July 1847 in his *Protest of the People of the Two Sicilies*, "the only remedy is arms." Ferdinand II had proved himself so unmitigated a liar that no one either trusted or respected him. It was therefore easy to stir up the people in favor of armed resistance to authority.

While on the mainland revolution made but slight appeal to the peasants and was generally frowned upon by the clergy, in Sicily it was supported by all classes. The peasants and the priests, even the usually reactionary Jesuits, were as enthusiastic in opposing the Bourbons as were the aristocracy and the townsfolk. All joined in nine days of desperate fighting in the streets of Palermo.

On January 21 de Sauget, the Neapolitan commander, asked for an armistice which the revolutionary leaders under Ruggiero Settimo refused unless they could be guaranteed the Sicilian constitution of 1812. Disregarding the advice of Louis Philippe, Ferdinand declined even to consider the granting of a constitution of any kind. On January 27 de Sauget withdrew with his garrison from Palermo and embarked for Naples. With the exception of the citadel of Messina, and a few other small forts, Sicily was entirely in the hands of the revolution which, for the moment at least, had triumphed. The very day that de Sauget sailed for home revolution broke out in the province of Salerno and in Naples itself, brought about by the submission to the king of a widely circulated petition for a constitution drawn by that great patriot and scholar, Pasquale Villari.

Ferdinand, frightened by the popular uprising and the wavering of some of his troops, promptly surrendered and

promised a constitution, which he granted on February 10. The effect of Ferdinand's action was felt in every other state in Italy. In Piedmont, Charles Albert had long since lived down his early liberalism. To preserve his right to the succession he had given to the members of the Holy Alliance in 1822 a promise that he would never swerve from the path of absolutism or grant a constitution to his people. This promise, acting upon a supersensitive conscience, as well as his natural aversion to liberalism kept him true to the faith of reaction.

Fortunately for Italy the Piedmontese with their hard-headed intelligence declined to be bound by the conscientious scruples of their king. As time passed the demand for a constitution became ever more insistent. The news from Sicily and Naples brought matters to a head, and Charles Albert's ministers advised him that if he did not yield to the popular demand his throne would be in peril. The king found himself in a very serious quandary, between breaking his promise and losing his throne. Happily a public-spirited archbishop was found who absolved him from his promise and on February 8 he agreed to grant a constitution.

Once he had made the change and become a constitutional monarch Charles Albert remained loyal to the constitution until the end.

The *statuto* promulgated by Charles Albert on March 4, 1848, and extended to the rest of Italy by Victor Emanuel II, remained in force unchanged until our own day and is at least the basis of the present fundamental law. Under it all executive power was vested in the king, while the legislative power was vested collectively in the king and the senate and the chamber of deputies. The senate consisted of an unlimited number of members over forty years of age, appointed by the king for life, from twenty-one categories. As one of these categories included "those who by service or distinguished merit have deserved well of their country" it is



obvious that almost any Italian over forty years of age might be considered eligible. The chamber of deputies was composed of members over thirty years of age "chosen by the electoral bodies, conformably to the law," and served for five years. Senators and deputies served without pay, enjoyed immunity for their utterances and votes in parliament and could not be tried for a criminal offense without the consent of the chamber to which they belonged. The king's ministers were mentioned only indirectly in Article XLVII which gave to the chamber of deputies the power of impeachment. The king and both chambers might initiate legislation, but money bills could originate only in the chamber of deputies. All subjects were declared to be equal, individual liberty and the inviolability of the domicile were guaranteed subject to due process of law, while the press was declared to be free, but abuses of its freedom might be punished.

The office of prime minister and the responsibility of the government to parliament were nowhere alluded to and were both accepted as a matter of course when the *statuto* was put in operation.

As the first prime minister, or "president of the council of ministers" as his official title runs, the king appointed Count Cesare Balbo. Balbo (1789-1853) was more distinguished as an author of works on history and politics than as a statesman. Born of a noble Piedmontese family, son of Prospero Balbo, sometime minister of the interior, he served in various civil capacities under Napoleon between 1808 and 1814. Exiled in 1821 under suspicion of revolutionary sympathy, he was later allowed to return to Turin but was for some time excluded from office. He became the leader of a group of moderate liberals, a devoted adherent of the House of Savoy and a vigorous propagandist of the expulsion of Austria from the peninsula. He doubted the possibility of a united Italy, but strove unceasingly for the aggrandizement of his native state. Restored to favor in 1848 he was appointed a

member of the commission charged with drafting the electoral law to carry out the terms of the constitution and, after the first election held under it, was chosen by the king as prime minister to put the *statuto* into effect.

In Rome Pius found himself carried on the crest of the popular wave far more rapidly than he liked. His liberalism was of an extremely moderate sort, and came from his essentially kindly nature, his real love for his fellow man, and his sincere desire to improve the physical welfare of his people.

Had he reigned a century earlier he would have been the ideal benevolent despot. It was unfortunate for his fame that he lived during a period when no half-measures would suffice. What would have contented and rejoiced his people in the eighteenth century only infuriated them in the nineteenth.

By the power of events he was forced much further toward liberalism than he intended or desired, and a point was finally reached beyond which he would not and could not go. Alarmed and disgusted by the very liberalism he had served, he abandoned his people and fled. But before his departure he did much, perhaps unwittingly, to help the cause of *Italia Unita* in its struggle against absolutism.

On February 10 the pope delivered an allocution containing the words "God bless Italy" and the next day in response to popular clamor granted a constitution, and a month later appointed a cabinet under Cardinal Antonelli, a majority of which were laymen.

The same day that Rome obtained its constitution the Tuscan "Iron Baron" Ricasoli forced his sovereign Leopold to grant one to Tuscany. On February 24 revolution broke out in France and on March 13 in Vienna and in Hungary, followed the next day by the flight of Metternich.

Five days later, March 18, and as the result of the events in Austria and Hungary, revolution broke out in Milan. The five days that followed, known in Italian history as "*Le Cinque Giornate*," saw barricades and desperate fighting in

almost every street in the city. Field Marshal Radetzky, that very able old soldier, who was in command with a garrison of 10,000 men, was obliged to withdraw to the citadel. On March 22 he found himself in so serious a situation that with what was left of the Milan garrison and his officers' families, he withdrew to the Quadrilateral, as were called the four fortresses of Verona, Legnago, Mantua, and Peschiera, to prepare for the struggle with Piedmont that he saw was coming.

The same day that Radetzky left Milan, the Austrian garrison evacuated Venice, whose people at once proclaimed the republic under the presidency of Daniele Manin.

In less than three months constitutionalism had won every state in Italy. It only remained to drive out the barbarian to complete the first stage toward Italian nationality.

From the moment that Piedmont obtained the *statuto* it was evident that her constitutional rulers would sooner or later bring her to grips with Austria. When Count Cesare Balbo became prime minister, the Austrians declared that his appointment meant war. Balbo, who was quite willing to fight if necessary, feared a possible republican uprising stimulated by France under Lamartine who having served as a diplomat in Naples and Florence between 1823 and 1829 had conceived a profound love for Italy. He had been in correspondence with the *carbonari* and, on becoming a member of the revolutionary executive committee in 1848, did not hesitate to intrigue in behalf of an Italian republic.

It was not until Balbo received the news of the Five Days and Milan's appeal for help that he finally decided for war, and on March 23 Charles Albert issued his declaration.

On March 25 the king crossed the Austrian frontier at Pavia and Buffalora, somewhat east of Novara, at the head of a mixed force of 75,000, of whom 45,000 were Piedmontese and the rest volunteers from the Papal States, Naples, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Lombardy. It was in the broadest sense

a national Italian army, full of enthusiasm, but, with the exception of the Piedmontese troops, sadly lacking in discipline.

Under the impression that Radetzky was demoralized and in flight, Charles Albert's first objective was the capture of Mantua. As he advanced he changed his plan and, with the purpose of cutting Radetzky's line of retreat to Tirol, he moved on Pastrengo near Verona. He crossed the Mincio at Goito on April 8 and forced the Austrians to retire to a point near Verona. Attacking Pastrengo on April 30, the Austrians were driven out and the plain of Rivoli and the neighboring hills occupied, thus entirely blocking the Austrian communications with Tirol. On May 6 Radetzky brought up his main force and the Italians were driven out from the commanding positions they had held. Meanwhile a papal army of 25,000 men, under Generals Durando and Ferrari, had been ordered north and leaving Bologna April 15 had reached the Po two weeks later. Hardly had the expedition started when Pius IX was seized with conscientious scruples against attacking Austria, and issued an encyclical in which he said "we assert clearly and openly that war with Austria is far from our thoughts, seeing that we, however unworthy, are the vicar of Him who is the author of peace and the essence of love."

The encyclical was an admirable statement of the position of the Holy Father as head of the Church, but it emphasized the utter incompatibility of the temporal and spiritual powers, and permanently sundered the pope from the Italian national movement. To Pius's apparent surprise the encyclical was received by his subjects with a storm of outraged protest. He bowed before it, dismissed Antonelli and appointed the liberal layman Mamiani in his place, who ordered the army to go forward.

On May 2 near Conegliano the papal troops met Marshal Nugent at the head of 15,000 Austrian reserves. The marshal declined to give battle and avoiding the papal army marched

on Treviso, where he fell ill and was succeeded by Thurn. The latter, having failed to drive Durando out of Vicenza, joined Radetzky at Verona.

On May 15, as the result of a dispute between the king and parliament, street fighting broke out in Naples, which was suppressed with the usual Bourbon cruelty. On the 17th Ferdinand dissolved parliament and recalled his army from the front.

With the arrival of the reserves Radetzky found himself at the head of about 45,000 men and determined to take the offensive. On May 27 the Italians were defeated at Curtatone and Montanaro, but on the 30th Peschiera, one of the four fortresses of the Quadrilateral, fell to Charles Albert, who the same day fought a drawn engagement at Goito. On the 28th Radetzky's main army entered Mantua unopposed. On June 10 he stormed Vicenza and forced the surrender of Durando with 18,000 men. Hearing that Charles Albert was marching on Verona, he sent Culoz ahead to occupy the city, and followed with his main force with the purpose of joining battle with the Piedmontese king.

Charles Albert had under him about 75,000 men of whom 50,000 were Piedmontese regulars, the rest volunteers from various parts of Italy, while Radetzky had under him 60,000 regulars.

Radetzky divided his army into five corps of which the 1st, 2nd, and reserves were in position covering Verona, the 3rd occupied a line between Verona and the Tirolian frontier in the valley of the Adige, while the 4th garrisoned Mantua. Of the Piedmontese three brigades were near Governolo, having Mantua under observation, with the evident intention of besieging that city. The rest of the army occupied a line some thirty miles long, between the plateau of Rivoli, where Napoleon had won his memorable victory, and the village of Custozza.

The two armies were manœuvring over the same terrain that had been fought over so often, especially in Napoleon's first Italian campaign, and was destined to be fought over again before Italy won her freedom.

This cockpit of Italy lies between the Po and Lago di Garda at the base of the Brenner Pass, the easiest and the most travelled route between Italy and Tirol. It is a fair, smiling, and well watered country beginning in the Lombard plain and stretching to the north across a range of hills, mostly low though some are steep, to the shores of the lake. It is dotted with villages and contains two cities, Mantua at the south, on the Mincio, near the Po, and Verona at the north, on the Adige, almost blocking the Brenner.

Leaving Haynau's brigade to hold Verona, on July 22 Radetzky sent the 3rd corps under Thurn up the Adige to attack the Italian left under Sonnaz, his intention being to bring up his main force the next day to complete the crushing of the enemy. Sonnaz, however, at once fell back on Peschiera without waiting to be attacked. Radetzky immediately changed his plan and on the 23rd sent the 1st and 2nd corps against Sonnaz, with the result that the latter was driven out of his position and across the Mincio, while at the same time Thurn occupied Rivoli.

As soon as Charles Albert heard the news of Sonnaz's retreat he ordered his right, 25,000 strong, under Bava to move forward through Custozza against Radetzky's left, Sonnaz to recross the Mincio at Valeggio below the point occupied by the Austrians and stand fast. Radetzky sent the 2nd corps across the Mincio to further Sonnaz's retreat in the direction of Volta, while he posted the 3rd corps to the north near Castelnuovo and the rest of his troops on the line between Custozza and Sommacampagna with the intention of crossing the Mincio and taking the Italians in the rear.

Charles Albert assuming that Sonnaz was at Valeggio, having heard nothing from him, ordered an advance in three

columns, one against the Austrian right at Sommacampagna, one against the center at Staffalo, and one against the left at Custozza, while the reserves were ordered to Villafranca and one brigade of cavalry to Verona on the right, and another on the left flank of the advance.

On the 24th the Italians were successful in capturing and occupying Custozza and Sommacampagna, and the king determined to resume the attack the next day. Radetzky realized that in view of the Italian success he must abandon his offensive across the Mincio. He turned back and, holding the bridges he had captured, he concentrated his army against the Italians occupying the Custozza-Sommacampagna position.

On the 25th, after very severe fighting, the Austrians drove back the Italian right, and finally the left and center were obliged to fall back also. On the 26th and 27th the fighting continued, the king stubbornly yielding ground, his army finally reaching Goito.

It was now evident that nothing could save the Piedmontese army but retreat. The four days' hard fighting had left it in a very desperate condition and it was obvious that it was finally beaten. The king asked for an armistice, which Radetzky refused. He then fell back on Cremona, the disorder of his army increasing as it retreated. Radetzky followed on a parallel line some miles to the north, defeating and driving in on the main body the Piedmontese right wing at Crema and Lodi, and storming the positions outside Milan on August 4, entering the city on the 6th.

The Italians retreated across the Ticino, and concluded an armistice with Austria August 9 under the terms of which war might be renewed by either side on eight days' notice.

There was nothing disgraceful about Custozza. The men had fought gallantly and stood the hardships of the campaign well. The army had been outnumbered and outgeneralled, but it must be remembered that it was fighting against a really

great commander. While the war ended disastrously for the army of Piedmont it marked a tremendous step forward in the cause of Italian nationality, for it was the first time that Italians from every part of Italy had served together on a large scale in the same army fighting for Italian freedom.

The immediate effects of Custoza were, however, distinctly prejudicial to the Italian cause.

The news of the defeat of Piedmont gave Pius the opportunity once more to assert himself. His idea of liberalism was very different from that of his people. Had they been content with his first reforms it is very possible that he would have remained a moderate liberal until the end, but ere long he found himself being carried forward at so fast a pace as greatly to disturb him. He did not want to break with Austria, nor to permit a papal army to take the field with Piedmont. His liberal prime minister Mamiani was forced upon him by the popular will, and the quasi-representative parliament never won either his liking or his confidence.

On August 3, before Radetzky had even reoccupied Milan, but after the defeat of Charles Albert was certain, the pope dismissed Mamiani, and appointed in his place Fabbri, whose liberalism was as moderate as his own. On August 26, without consulting his cabinet, Pius prorogued parliament and appealed to Piedmont, Naples, and France for help against his people. This was more than Fabbri, very moderate liberal though he was, could agree to, and on September 14 he resigned and was succeeded by Pellegrino Rossi.

The new prime minister was a moderate conservative, who had been a political refugee in France, whence he had returned to Rome as French ambassador. He had become a great favorite of the pope's and had gradually acquired the position of adviser and friend. Resigning his post as French ambassador he had devoted himself exclusively to papal affairs some time before taking office under the Holy Father. He was an able and just man, who, had he been spared, might



have carried the Vatican safely through the storms that were brewing.

The Roman people were commencing to lose faith in their sovereign, to doubt the sincerity of his Italianism and to question his every act as savoring of reaction. He was very rapidly forfeiting the popularity that his early governmental acts had given him. The old days of delirious enthusiasm for the Holy Father had gone forever. When he appeared in public he was no longer cheered, but received in silence, or with hisses. The crowds still filled Piazza Quirinale, not with the object of asking the papal blessing, but for the purpose of demonstrating against him. Not cast in an heroic mould, Pius was beginning to have very serious fears for his personal safety.

Events now began to move with great rapidity. On November 15 Rossi, the prime minister, was murdered by Luigi Brunetti, the eldest son of that Ciceruacchio, the blacksmith and mob leader who had been one of Pius's warmest adherents. On November 24 as the pope appeared on the balcony of the Quirinal, surrounded by his household, a priest, who was standing near him, was killed by a shot fired from the crowd and evidently intended for Pius himself.

The next day, Pius, disguised as an ordinary priest, fled to Gaeta and the protection of the king of the Two Sicilies.

The Holy Father's flight from Rome was the last event of importance in 1848, the year of revolution. Much had been accomplished, much remained to be done. If the work of '48 was subsequently largely nullified, it at least began the work of union and gave a forward impulse to the cause which all thinking Italians had at heart.

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## CHAPTER IV

### NOVARA

ON ARRIVING at Gaeta the Holy Father placed himself unreservedly in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli, who served him as secretary of state for the next twenty-seven years.

Giacomo Antonelli (1806-1876) who was not a priest, having only taken minor orders, was one of the last of the lay cardinals. He was a man of great personal charm and of exceedingly doubtful reputation, who devoted his great abilities, during his entire tenure of office, to fighting the risorgimento. He has been abused with probably greater violence than any of his Italian contemporaries, especially by Protestant historians who are unwilling to concede him any good qualities and describe him as that impossible creature "the perfect scoundrel." Despite the fact that even Catholic authors give him the cold shoulder, it is only fair to assume that his ultra-conservatism and his belief in the temporal power of the pope were sincere, and that whatever may or may not have been his moral and financial shortcomings he served his master, according to his lights, to the best of his ability.

In the Imperial City the control of affairs had fallen into the hands of the extremists. Antonelli had refused to treat with the moderates, or permit the pope to return until all signs of liberalism had disappeared; he had also in his master's name called upon the Catholic powers to restore the Holy Father to his throne as it had been before the beginning of the liberal ferment. The moderates, discouraged by Antonelli's intransigent attitude, generally withdrew from politics, many of them leaving Rome. It was the men of the left who ordered the election for a constituent assembly, which was

held despite the pope's advance excommunication of those who took part in it.

Of the deputies elected all but seven, including Garibaldi and Mazzini, were subjects of the pope. The assembly met February 5, 1849, and four days later decreed the republic and abolished the temporal power, guaranteeing the pope in the exercise of his spiritual functions. On March 23 the assembly elected a triumvirate with supreme executive power, with Mazzini at its head.

The day before the temporal power had been overthrown Tuscany had proclaimed itself a republic and Leopold had left Florence, to join the Holy Father and Ferdinand a fortnight later at Gaeta.

Meanwhile Charles Albert, who had worked himself into a condition bordering on enthusiasm for the Italian cause, was extremely restive under the memory of his defeat at Custoza. He believed that his honor was involved and that as long as he had an army in being it was his duty to use it in trying to drive out the barbarian; moreover, he received the encouragement of both France and Britain.

Accordingly on March 12, 1849, he denounced the armistice with Austria, supported by the democratic ministry under General Chiodo and the very large and noisy war party, representing all parts of the kingdom but Savoy. The Savoyards living on the French slope of the Alps were more French in race than they were Piedmontese, spoke French and were French in sympathy. They certainly took but little interest in Italian affairs and never had the slightest desire to aid the cause of Italian unity.

While the king believed that victory was certain and his advisers believed that Piedmont had more than an even chance, the prospect of defeating Austria was by no means hopeless, and the opportunity of success was by far the best that had been presented. Both Austria and Hungary were in the throes of revolution, and of Radetzky's 75,000 men a large

number were required to garrison the fortifications and to maintain the siege of Venice. His army was divided into five corps, each about the size of the usual division.

Although Piedmont could probably have obtained no help from her allies of the year before, it seemed as though she preferred to fight alone, for she gave no notice of her intention of denouncing the armistice in advance of the accomplished fact. The king had under his command some 80,000 men, exclusive of garrison troops, divided into seven divisions. Of these the 5th and 6th, about 25,000 strong, were south of the Po near Pavia, and at Sarzana near the coast.

As the generals of Custozza were all more or less discredited the government employed as chief of staff to the commander-in-chief, who was the king, a soldier of fortune of no great reputation rejoicing in the picturesque name of Chrzanowski (pronounced Shanofsky). Why he should have been chosen has never been explained. He was not well known, and proved a lamentable failure. Chrzanowski believed that Radetzky would either meet him in the neighborhood of Magenta or retire from Milan as he had the year before. Radetzky encouraged this latter belief by leaving Milan March 17, changing direction two days later, and reaching the bridgehead at Pavia late that night.

The expiration of the armistice, at noon March 20, found the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Piedmontese divisions on the line of the Ticino ready to cross in pursuit of the Austrians, while the 1st and the reserves stood in the rear, and the 5th stood ready to cross the Po and operate against Radetzky's rear. The plan would have been admirable had Radetzky really been in retreat; unfortunately for Piedmont, he had succeeded in completely deceiving Chrzanowski.

Immediately after noon of the 20th Radetzky crossed the Ticino, destroyed the bridge over the Po at Mezzana Corte, and occupied Cava, thus cutting off the Piedmontese on the south of the river and preventing them from joining the main

army. Radetzky by evening had reached Mortara, holding the territory from the Ticino to S. Giorgio, and had been joined by a brigade he had sent for from Legnago.

The king meanwhile, believing that Radetzky was in retreat, had sent the 3rd and 4th divisions across the Ticino to Magenta. So faulty was his information service that it was not until evening that he heard that Radetzky had crossed the Ticino and that the troops south of the Po had been cut off. He at once recalled the 3rd and 4th divisions and determined to meet the Austrian at Vigevano some fifteen miles south of Magenta, while Durando with the 1st and reserve divisions was ordered to hold Mortara and protect the right flank. The next morning the Austrian right engaged the 2nd Piedmontese division south of Vigevano and forced it back until the arrival of the 3rd and 4th from Magenta, when the retreat was halted.

At the same time the main Austrian army attacked Mortara, and forced the Piedmontese to retreat on Novara. That night the king called back all his troops and concentrated during the 22nd at Novara, where he occupied a strong position on the high ground to the south of the city, and determined to join battle the next day.

Radetzky in his turn suffered from bad information service. He had intended to attack the king in force, in front of Novara, when, learning that the Piedmontese were in retreat, he sent only the 2nd corps forward, the rest of the army being turned to the south to intercept the supposedly retreating enemy.

When at 11 o'clock in the morning of the 23rd d'Aspre with his 2nd corps approached what he had supposed was the Piedmontese rear guard he found himself confronted by the entire army. It was a heaven-sent opportunity for Chrzanowski. He had the advantage of a strong position and he outnumbered d'Aspre five to one. He should have been able to destroy his enemy without difficulty, after which he might

have turned to the 3rd and 4th corps and destroyed them in detail. But the Austrians held firm, and were able to beat off the repeated attacks of the Piedmontese. At 4 o'clock the 3rd corps, which had been recalled, arrived in the nick of time to save d'Aspre who was very far spent. At 6 o'clock the 4th corps arrived, and a little later the reserves. Radetzky now ordered a general attack before which the Piedmontese retreated in great disorder to Novara.

That night Charles Albert abdicated, to die some months later in a monastery in Portugal, and Victor Emanuel his son reigned in his stead.

Radetzky agreed to an armistice with the new king, by which the inevitable surrender of the Piedmontese army and the occupation of Turin were avoided.

Once more the Piedmontese had shown themselves to be excellent fighting men, but once more they had been out-generalled and out manœuvred. At the beginning of the campaign they had had the advantage of superior numbers, an advantage they had quickly lost when Radetzky had cut off their two divisions south of the Po. At Novara the opportunity of victory was thrown away through the incompetence of their commanding general.

Radetzky had lived up to his great reputation and in one of the shortest campaigns in history which lasted only three days had totally defeated the enemy, and ensured Lombardy and Venetia to the House of Habsburg.

The campaign had lasted for so short a time that no opportunity had been given the Lombards or the Venetians to rise against their oppressors. With the exception of the 2nd corps which had suffered severely the Austrian army was in good condition and perfectly fit for the work required of it, the restoration of Italy to autocracy, and Radetzky now had ample time in which to carry out the wishes of his imperial master.

In Naples Ferdinand immediately on the defeat of Charles Albert abandoned liberalism and resumed his autocratic methods. The constitution was not annulled or even openly repudiated; it was merely ignored, and continued to exist as a dead letter until the final expulsion of the Bourbons.

The Neapolitan king realizing that no foreign state either would or could interfere with his conception of government not only reverted to absolutism, but seized the opportunity of stamping out to the very best of his ability all suggestions of liberalism. The methods that he employed, the personal spite that he showed, and the cruelty with which he pursued those whom he thought opposed to his rule, suggest that if not actually insane he was at least a very pronounced victim of sadism.

He had as early as 1837 published a document, which he called his "catechism" and which he ordered taught in the schools. In it he enunciated the doctrine that "a promise of a prince to limit his sovereignty is null and void" and that "a prince is not bound to keep his oath to observe a constitution, if it is opposed to the general interests of the state."

Acting on this theory, while not formally abrogating the constitution, he proceeded to nullify it in most of its terms. The council of state was abolished and the ministers were made mere clerks to the throne.

The king's supporters, realizing that their sovereign's actions were creating very great unrest, took advantage of a riot which occurred on September 16, 1849, to induce Ferdinand, who required very little inducement, to inaugurate what was virtually a reign of terror. Those suspected of liberalism were arrested wholesale, and Settembrini and Poerio, two prominent liberals and former ministers, were tried for treason and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prisons were overcrowded with the king's critics, who were sent to jail either with or without trial, and given sentences of ever-increasing severity.

During the winter of 1850 and 1851 William E. Gladstone, then an ex-minister of a conservative government, was visiting Italy as a tourist. While in Naples he happened to be present at the trial of Poerio. Intensely interested, he obtained permission to visit the prisons where the political prisoners were confined, and was so outraged by what he saw that he returned to his hotel and wrote an indignant letter to the British minister of foreign affairs, Lord Aberdeen, much to that worthy gentleman's embarrassment.

Gladstone's letter is one of the severest indictments of a government ever written, and one of the most trenchant documents that ever came from his most able pen.

He gives three reasons for addressing Aberdeen. "First, that the present practices of the government of Naples in reference to real or supposed political offenders, are an outrage upon religion, upon civilization, upon humanity, and upon decency. Secondly, that these practices are certainly and even rapidly doing the work of republicanism in that country; a political creed which has little natural or habitual root in the character of the people. Thirdly, that as a member of the conservative party in one of the great family of European nations I am compelled to remember that that party stands in virtual and real though perhaps unconscious alliance with all the established governments of Europe as such; and that according to the measure of its influence they suffer more or less of moral detriment from its reverses and derive strength and encouragement from its successes. . . . It is not mere imperfection, not corruption in low practices, not occasional severity that I am about to describe; it is incessant, systematic, deliberate violation of the law by the power appointed to watch over and maintain it. It is such violation of human and written law as this, carried on for the purpose of violating every other law, written and eternal, temporal and divine; it is the wholesale persecution of virtue when united with intelligence, operating upon such a scale that entire classes may



with truth be said to be its object; . . . it is the awful profanation of public religion, by its notorious alliance in the governing powers with the violation of every moral law under the stimulants of fear and vengeance; it is the perfect prostitution of the judicial office which has made it under veils only too threadbare and transparent, the degraded recipient of the vilest and clumsiest forgeries, got up wilfully and deliberately by the immediate advisers of the crown for the purpose of destroying the peace, the freedom, and even if not by capital sentence the life of men among the most virtuous, upright, intelligent, distinguished, and refined of the whole community; it is the savage and cowardly system of moral as well as in a lower degree of physical torture through which the sentences extracted from the debased courts of justice are carried into effect.

"The effect of all this is total inversion of all the moral and social ideas. Law instead of being respected is odious. Force and not affection is the foundation of government. There is no association but a violent antagonism between the idea of freedom and that of order.

"The governing power which teaches of itself that it is the image of God upon earth, is clothed in the view of the overwhelming majority of the thinking public with all the vices for its attributes.

"I have seen and heard the too true expression used, 'This is the negation of God erected into a system of government.' "

The effect of Gladstone's letter, which was published after having been sent to Lord Aberdeen, was immediate and far-reaching. While Lord Aberdeen objected to the publication of the letter, and showed every disposition to forget its receipt, Lord Palmerston openly and actively supported the author. In 1856 as a protest against the misgovernment of Naples both Britain and France withdrew their ministers, and Ferdinand three years later so far yielded to the protest as to agree to free some sixty political prisoners, with the understanding

that they should go to the United States. They were put on board ship and sent away, but were wrecked off Cornwall and received in London with great enthusiasm.

While Ferdinand was reducing Naples to the peace of death, Sicily still maintained her independence, the only possession left to the king being the citadel of Messina. Affairs in Naples had caused him to defer action against his Sicilian subjects and it was not until he had once more established quiet in the capital that he dared to turn his attention southward. At the end of August 1848 he reinforced the garrison of the citadel of Messina with 10,000 men under Filangieri, who was opposed by 6,000 Sicilians.

Under orders from the king, Filangieri opened a bombardment of the city which forced it to capitulate September 7. The bombardment was so merciless and so destructive of life and property that it roused the indignation of the world and won for its author, Ferdinand, the unenviable nickname of King Bomba by which he has ever since been known. Filangieri found the subjection of the rest of Sicily an exceedingly difficult task and it was by fighting his way step by step that he finally reached Palermo. A six months' armistice imposed by the French and English admirals, whose squadrons were in Palermo harbor, gave the Palermitans the opportunity of organizing resistance, instead of doing which they spent the time in useless constitutional discussions. As Bolton King has pointed out, "Sicily was the only Italian state that had a constitutional past to build on,"<sup>1</sup> and the constitution of 1812 which had been secured under British auspices represented for all Sicilians the maximum of political excellence.

When in 1848 the Sicilians had declared their independence they had for a time at least acknowledged the nominal sovereignty of the Neapolitan monarch. As the result of the failure of the new government in Naples either to understand or cooperate with the Sicilians, the Sicilian parliament on

<sup>1</sup> *A History of Italian Unity*, by Bolton King, Vol. I, p. 311.

April 13, 1848, declared its independence of the Bourbons and elected Ruggiero Settimo president, pending the choice of a king.

Britain and France had virtually agreed to recognize the new government as soon as a king had been elected. The new government, however, declined to proceed to the election until the constitution had been reformed, and the work of reformation dragged on through interminable debates. While deputies talked, the creation of an army was ignored, and the choice of a king remained in abeyance. There were two candidates for the throne, the Duke of Genoa, brother of Victor Emanuel, and a minor son of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The dangers of a minor as king were so evident as to outweigh the danger of a too close dynastic connection with Piedmont.

The announcement by Palmerston that he would recognize Sicilian independence as soon as the Duke of Genoa was chosen, and the resulting popular demand for action, forced the parliament to close debate and rush through the completion of the constitution. July 10, 1848, the Duke of Genoa was elected king. Unfortunately parliament had wasted too much time. The Duke of Genoa delayed his answer, and before he could make up his mind the news reached Palermo that Messina had fallen, and that Filangieri was fighting his way to the capital. Torrearsa, who had formed a cabinet, feverishly began to prepare for defense, but never succeeded in arming more than 7,000 Sicilian troops, under the command of Mieroslawsky, a Polish adventurer.

Torrearsa found his task almost impossible. He failed to place a loan abroad, and was obliged to make what was virtually a capital levy, to the great indignation of the well-to-do. The Duke of Genoa, on finding that Britain would not guarantee his throne, declined it with thanks, disorder in the city increased and in February 1849 the national guard forced the ministry to resign.

The new ministry, creatures of the national guard and its supporters, did what it could to organize defense, and shortly after taking office declined to accept an offer from King Ferdinand for the recognition of the constitution of 1812. The king had made the offer of no avail by reserving the right to dissolve parliament, and taking the army entirely out of Sicilian control. Knowing their Ferdinand, the ministry declined to believe in his good faith.

As Filangieri approached Palermo he found his difficulties constantly increasing. He had been obliged to halt his march for the purpose of reducing Catania, which yielded only after a stubborn and gallant defense. Had the Sicilians at the capital shown any unity of purpose, it was well within the bounds of possibility that they might have held off the Neapolitan army long enough to have forced intervention by some of the great powers. Unfortunately they were hopelessly divided. The Polish general of the little Sicilian army had failed miserably to make any impression against Filangieri, who came constantly nearer to Palermo. The national guard was seized with panic, and demanded that the government should accept the French admiral's offer of mediation, based on a proposal that Sicily should accept Ferdinand's proposition of the previous February.

When the Neapolitan fleet arrived to carry out the terms of the surrender the mob seized the city and, the national guard making common cause with it, organized an emergency defense that kept Filangieri in check for two days of desperate fighting. Finally on May 11 Palermo surrendered and King Bomba once more ruled his double kingdom at his own arbitrary and cruel will.

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## CHAPTER V

### THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM

THAT Venice resisted Austria longer and more gallantly than any city in Italy was due to the intrinsic worth of her middle class and to the force and courage of Daniele Manin. Throughout the eighteenth century, with a rapidly degenerating aristocracy, the machinery of the Venetian republic was kept in motion by the devoted labor of the civil service drawn from the *citadinanza* or middle class, to which also belonged most of the leaders in the professions, in banking, and in trade. The short-lived Venetian democracy which ruled the state from May 12, 1797, to January 18, 1798, was dominated by two members of the middle class, Dandolo and Gallino, and their middle class associates, and might have succeeded had Bonaparte acted to it in good faith.<sup>1</sup>

The men who followed Manin were the descendants of those who had constituted the republican civil service and the government of the democracy. What was left of the aristocracy was largely Austrophil and few of them took part in the defense of the city, most either going to their villas on the mainland or remaining quiescent.

Manin was himself of the middle class. His father was a Paduan Jew, who towards the close of the eighteenth century had moved to Venice and been baptized a Christian, the brother of the last doge, Ludovico Manin, acting as his godfather and giving him the family name according to the law and custom of the time. Here on May 13, 1804, Daniele Manin was born. He took his degree in law at the University of Padua, began practice in his native city, and soon became

<sup>1</sup> See *Venice and Bonaparte*, by G. B. McClellan. Princeton, 1931.

one of the recognized leaders of its bar and, with Tommaseo, the most prominent advocate of Venetian home rule. It is probable that had Austria been willing to give her Italian subjects real autonomy when it was first asked, it would have satisfied their necessities and postponed for a generation the realization of Italian unity.

But Metternich had no intention of yielding an inch in any direction away from absolutism. It is true that he created "congregations" in the various provinces and cities of Austrian Italy, but these bodies had no real power and were little more than debating societies, limited to the discussion of such subjects as might be submitted to them by the Austrian authorities.

In 1837 Manin first appeared as a national character when he led the revolt of the Italian stockholders of the projected railway between Milan and Venice, against the route laid down by the Austrian government. The struggle assumed a political character, for it was between the Italian stockholders on the one hand and the Austrian commissioner on the other, and the Italians won and claimed a victory over the imperial government. Ten years later, in 1847, Manin, who had been unceasing in agitating for home rule and had fallen under the grave suspicion of the authorities, persuaded the congregation of Venice to petition the governor for autonomy, declaring the grievances and hopes of the Italian people. The petition was ignored but on January 18, 1848, Manin and Tommaseo were arrested for high treason. After a trial brilliantly conducted by the prisoners themselves, they were acquitted but not released.

The trial served to make of Manin a popular idol, and to fan the flame of Austrophobia in Italy.

On March 17, 1848, the news reached Venice that revolution had broken out in Vienna and that Metternich had fallen. The Austrian authorities in the city became utterly demoralized. Of the 10,000 men in the garrison most were

either Italians or Dalmatians whose loyalty in face of the Venetians could by no means be counted on. There was rioting and street fighting accompanied by the usual looting of shops, and early in the day the rioters marched to the prison and forced the release of Manin and Tommaseo.

Manin immediately set about the organization of a civil guard and a provisional government, and was so successful that when the Austrians evacuated the city on March 26 order had been restored and the republic proclaimed with Manin as president.

Manin, who had been a disciple of Mazzini, was at this period a republican. He favored the union of all Italy into one federal state with a republican form of government, and deprecated the idea of union with Piedmont under the House of Savoy, but hoped to establish the Italian republic by the aid of France. He soon, however, became convinced that nothing could be expected from either Lamartine or later from Louis Napoleon, except platonic expressions of goodwill, and that there was no prospect of seeing a French army fighting in behalf of Italy.

He realized that it would be hopeless for Venice, even if backed whole-heartedly by the mainland cities of Venetia, to fight for her liberty against the Habsburgs, and he had no illusions that the liberty so easily won by the withdrawal of the Austrian troops would or could be preserved except by force of arms, after the revolution in Austria had been ended. He would have liked fusion of a united Venetia with Lombardy, to the exclusion of Piedmont, his preference being for a federal republic, each state retaining its autonomy, his plan being very similar to that of Mazzini.

Unfortunately Venetia was not united, for the old jealousy of the capital still existed and Manin possessed no real authority on the mainland. Besides, Lombardy had by an overwhelming popular vote declared for fusion with Piedmont, and therefore Venetian fusion with Lombardy meant

fusion with Piedmont as well. Manin fought annexation to Piedmont as long as he was able, but public opinion was against him and he was obliged to consent to the election of an assembly to determine the future of Venice.

On July 3 the assembly voted by a large majority for annexation to Piedmont; Manin and Tommaseo resigned and on August 7 the Piedmontese commissioners took possession of the city in the name of Charles Albert.

Five days after the Piedmontese commissioners had assumed the government the news came that as the result of the defeat of Custoza, Piedmont had signed a six weeks' armistice with Austria by the terms of which she agreed to evacuate Venetia. Manin very justly claimed that as Venice had been abandoned by Piedmont to the mercy of Austria the proposed fusion of the two countries was void. Public opinion was very much aroused against Charles Albert, and vented itself on the persons of his commissioners who were with difficulty rescued from a mob intent on lynching them. They at once resigned and were thankful to escape unharmed from Venetian territory.

Manin now resumed the dictatorship which had before been camouflaged with the title of president. The assembly appointed a triumvirate with dictatorial powers, consisting of Manin at its head and with Admiral Graziani and Colonel Calvedalis as his colleagues.

While he still voiced his hope in the realization of his dream of a united Italy, and announced that his dictatorship was only temporary, to last no longer than was necessary to bring the question of the form of government before a congress of the entire peninsula, he realized that his back was against the wall and that he was at the head of a forlorn hope. Every other state in Italy that had been in revolt against Austria, except Piedmont, had been crushed and restored to its former owner, and even Piedmont had been



defeated and was about to be defeated again and to lose her king by abdication.

Manin's appeals to Britain and to France were equally unsuccessful. Palmerston flatly refused to strike a blow for Venice, and while Lamartine and Bastide expressed their friendship they did nothing to help; and when Louis Napoleon told him plainly that France would not go to war for Venice, he knew that unless the Hungarian revolution were a success, Venice could expect no aid from outside of Italy. When Piedmont was beaten at Novara, Manin understood that the death warrant of Venice had been signed, and prepared his people to die like men.

After Novara, Radetzky was free to concentrate on the siege of Venice. During the entire winter the Austrians had drawn constantly closer to the shore, and with the exception of the bridgehead at Malghera held all the strategic points on the mainland. The city contained some 130,000 inhabitants, and was provisioned to stand a siege of a few months. The garrison numbered 20,000 of whom 14,000 were Venetians, the rest being volunteers from northern Italy and Rome, under General Pepe who had resigned from the Neapolitan army after his command had been recalled by the Neapolitan king. As Manin had seized the arsenal, with its large supply of war material, on the departure of the Austrian garrison, Pepe's men were fairly well armed and equipped. The besieging army was so much larger than the Venetian and its artillery so much superior that all that Manin could do was to defend himself as long as possible.

The spirit of the people was excellent; they went about their business much as usual, the theaters remained open, and the usual church festivals and processions took place as though conditions were normal.

On May 26, after three days of hand-to-hand fighting, Malghera fell, and a week later the garrison was obliged to

blow up the railway bridge. On June 13 the Austrians, who had emplaced some large guns, began the bombardment of the city and eventually more than two-thirds of Venice was under fire. Typhus and cholera appeared, with death lists of more than 4,000. The food and ammunition began to give out, and Manin realized that the end could only be a matter of days. Nevertheless the people remained cheerful, and bore their sufferings heroically, determined to resist as long as their dictator desired.

Manin now approached Austria, asking for autonomy as the price of surrender, but received no satisfactory reply and was enthusiastically supported by the assembly when he dropped negotiations. By August 6, it was evident that to avoid surrender at discretion, Austria must be approached hat in hand for the best possible terms. While Tommaseo advocated a *sortie en masse*, Pepe agreed with Manin that it would be hopeless and the latter was authorized to make what terms he could with Radetzky. Radetzky showed himself more reasonable than Manin had expected. He agreed that there should be no reprisals and no looting, and that all who had taken part in the defense of Venice should be amnestied, with the exception of Manin, Pepe, and thirty-eight others, who should be permitted to leave Venice unmolested. On August 24, Venice surrendered, and three days later Manin and his friends left Venice on a French ship, never to return.

At Marseilles his wife died, and he reached Paris broken in both health and fortune. Here he supported his daughter and himself by giving Italian lessons, and became a sincere convert to the union of Italy under the House of Savoy. With LaFarina and Pallavicini he founded the National Italian Society, having for its object the creation of a unitarian state under Victor Emanuel. On September 22, 1857, he died, worn out by the strain of his intensive life.

While Manin cannot be classed with Cavour and Garibaldi as one of the greatest men of the *risorgimento*, his indirect influence to the cause of Italian unity was profound.

The conduct of the Venetian people during the siege was so glorious, and the record of their leader so heroic, that he became a legendary figure in Italian history, an example of what an Italian can accomplish, despite the limitation of ill health and frail physique when inspired by indomitable will and unlimited courage and patriotism. Manin was defeated, but he had given Austria the most serious check she had as yet received from the Italians and by so doing helped the *risorgimento* on its way, and deserving well of his countrymen is justly entitled to his final resting-place in the outer wall of San Marco, under St. Mark's lion that he had served so well.

The day after the surrender of Venice the Austrians entered Florence, where two months afterwards they replaced Leopold on his throne. A few days later Bologna and Ancona capitulated and were occupied by Austrian troops in the name of the Holy Father. Brescia, after a gallant defense under Giuseppe Martinengo, had already been captured by the Austrian General Haynau who, by his atrocities, won for himself the name of the Hyena of Brescia. It is a slight consolation to remember that some years later, when in London he visited Barkley's Brewery, he found that his fame had preceded him. The brewery hands seized him and beat him with such good will that he was rescued only after much difficulty.

Of all the states of Italy that had driven out absolutism the only one that still held was Rome. From the moment that he reached Gaeta Pius had never ceased to call on the Catholic nations to restore him to his temporal power. It was not until after the conquest of Sicily that Ferdinand could respond, nor until after Novara that Austria could give any effective help. The new president of the French republic, Louis Napo-

leon, owed a great deal of his strength to the support of the priests and the faithful of the Catholic Church in France. He could not afford to show himself ungrateful for their help, especially as he had every intention of relying on that help in the future. Remembering that France was the so-called "eldest daughter of the Church," he resolved to make use of the fact for all it was worth, for the purpose of consolidating his position at home. He calmly ignored the contradiction of the spectacle of the president of a liberal republic going to the rescue of an ex-absolutist monarch who had been defeated by a sister liberal republic, and determined to forestall Austria in sending an expedition to Rome. Accordingly, General Oudinot, duke of Reggio and eldest son of Napoleon I's marshal of the same name, landed at Civitavécchia April 25, 1849, with a French force of 8,000 men.

That Rome was able to stand a siege of two months against an overwhelmingly superior French army, with her garrison deficient in provisions and in war material, badly armed and worse equipped, that her people stood the siege with fortitude and that her soldiers fought with magnificent gallantry, was due entirely to the example, the inspiration, and the leadership of one man, Giuseppe Garibaldi.

This extraordinary man was born at Nice, then a town in Napoleon's France, July 4, 1807, of pure Italian stock, his father Domenico, the captain of a small coasting vessel, having come from Chiavari near Genoa some thirty years earlier. At the age of fifteen he went to sea and at twenty-four received his captain's certificate, and after his first voyage in command met Mazzini at Marseilles and joined "Young Italy." Two years later he was involved in one of Mazzini's many and futile attempts against Charles Albert, and enlisted in the Piedmontese navy for the purpose of inciting rebellion. When Mazzini as usual failed, Garibaldi escaped into France to be sentenced to death "in contumacio."

In 1836 he emigrated to Brazil, not to return to Europe until 1848. The twelve years he spent in South America were occupied as a privateer and filibuster in Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay. Here Garibaldi learned to fight, and learned warfare in the rough—so effectively as to become the greatest guerrilla chieftain the world has probably ever produced—organized and fought his Italian legion, and met and out of hand won his Anita.

He had always kept in touch with "Young Italy," and that shrewd propagandist Mazzini had seen to it that the fame of the Italian legion should be spread far and wide. At the beginning of '48 Mazzini called to his friend to return, and in the spring Garibaldi with some of his companions of the legion set sail. Anita, with the three children, Menotti, Ricciotti, and Teresita, preceded him as a matter of precaution.

He first offered his sword to Charles Albert, who seemed to think that the pardon he had granted the convicted traitor was all that he owed and declined the services of the legion and its chief. Garibaldi next went to Milan where the revolutionary government accepted him and sent him to the lake country to oppose the Austrians. Custozza ended the campaign before he had had much opportunity to distinguish himself, not, however, before he had shown Italy his ability as a guerrilla fighter and several of his subordinates, especially Medici, had proved their worth.

In the autumn of '48 Garibaldi with some seventy companions, about half of whom had fought under him in South America, set sail for Sicily still in revolt against Ferdinand. At Leghorn, where he touched, he was persuaded to change his plan and to move on Naples via Tuscany and the Papal States. The moderate Tuscan government allowed him to cross its territory, but it was not until he entered Romagna that he succeeded in recruiting his legion to a strength of five hundred.

The news that he received from Rome as well as what he learned when he made a flying visit there in December, determined him to abandon his Neapolitan venture and carry his legion to the aid of the Eternal City which he entered April 27, 1849.

Garibaldi was a curious anachronism, a man born five hundred years after his time. He was a knight-errant of the Middle Ages projected into the middle of the nineteenth century. With little education, with the simplicity and heart of a child, with strong likes and dislikes, great prejudices and obstinacy, vacillating painfully until he had made up his mind and then unable to change, with no knowledge of statecraft, with little conception of the art of war, no general in the broader sense, and certainly not a statesman, he was a strange union of strength and weakness, of breadth and narrowness, of greatness and smallness; he was a great condottiere of the trecento who under ordinary circumstances would never have been heard of. Yet the fates decreed that at the middle of the nineteenth century from an extraordinary combination of circumstances the cause of Italia Unita needed just such a condottiere, and Garibaldi was ready at hand to serve the cause he loved.

Five days after Garibaldi had reached Rome, Oudinot tried to capture the city by surprise. He was driven off with considerable loss by Garibaldi, who had been placed in command of the Trastevere with a force of some 20,000 volunteers from all parts of Italy, and retired to Civitavecchia to await reinforcements, which he asked from Paris.

At the beginning of May Garibaldi defeated a Neapolitan expedition of 2,000 and forced them to retire.

Oudinot to gain time sent Ferdinand de Lesseps, then a young French diplomat, to negotiate an arrangement with Mazzini. De Lesseps acting in good faith drew up a treaty with the head of the triumvirate, which on his return to Civitavecchia was at once repudiated by Oudinot, who had

received some 35,000 reinforcements, with which he marched on Rome. Garibaldi, whose headquarters were in the Villa Savorelli on the Janicolo, now the property of the American Academy in Rome, fought against overwhelming odds with great skill and gallantry. Finally, after the French had carried the walls by storm and entered the city, the revolutionary government, realizing their case to be hopeless, agreed to surrender and on July 3 the French took possession.

On June 29 Garibaldi, who was unwilling to lay down his arms, with some 2,000 devoted followers left Rome to begin one of the most romantic retreats in history. Despite the fact that he was hunted by the troops of four different armies he succeeded in reaching the tiny republic of San Marino with what was left of his followers. Here he made satisfactory arrangements for the internment of most of his men, and with a handful and the faithful Anita who had joined him in Rome he set out for Venice. Near Comacchio all his companions but Anita and one friend fell into the hands of the Austrians, who shot the devoted monk, Ugo Bassi, who had been chaplain of the legion and a noncombatant, and Ciceruacchio and his two sons, the youngest being a boy of thirteen. On leaving Comacchio Anita died in her husband's arms, and the latter with his companion Leggiere made his way across the peninsula, passed from house to house and from peasant to peasant through the Apennines, like a Scottish chieftain of the "'15" or "'45." He finally reached the Mediterranean at Cola Martina near Piombino on September 2, 1849, and sailed away to safety.

On April 12, 1850, supported by French bayonets Pius returned to Rome, embittered against his people and determined that henceforth he would rule absolutely, without regard to the wishes of those whom he governed.

With the return of the pope the triumph of absolutism seemed complete, for there was only one spot in Italy where the flame of nationalism and liberalism still burned. Pied-

mont was still loyal to the spirit of '48 and it was her good fortune and the good fortune of Italy that she should have produced a man able and willing to keep that flame brightly burning. Absolutism triumphed for the moment but the Italians of '48 and '49 had learned to know each other and trust each other as they never had before, and as the years passed under the leadership of Cavour became united in sentiment and in hope in the cause of a united state.

The idea of a federation had been cast aside, for '48 had proved the utter untrustworthiness of all the Italian sovereigns but the Piedmontese. The logic of the situation pointed to one Italian state under the government of Victor Emanuel, and it was to him that after '48 all Italians looked for leadership under the guidance of his great prime minister, Count Camillo Benso di Cavour.



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## CHAPTER VI

### CAVOUR

THE ten years which followed the triumph of absolutism in 1849 are known in Italy as "the decade of resistance" (*il decennio della resistenza*) and were marked by the patient, undiscouraged and constant work of Cavour to bring about the unification of the peninsula. Every minute of the decade was required for the enormous amount of preparation needed for the final stroke for freedom and unity.

Camillo Benso di Cavour was born in Turin August 10, 1810, the second son of Don Michele, marchese di Cavour, and his wife Adèle, daughter of Count Jean de Sellon of Geneva. The Cavour family were an old and patrician Piedmontese family, the title of marquis dating from 1649, the younger sons using the courtesy title of count. The family name was originally Benso, the Cavour being acquired from the castle of that name, near Pignerolo, held in fief from the Middle Ages. Early in life the great Cavour dropped Benso and the particle from his name and called himself simply "Count Cavour." His name Camillo was derived from Prince Borghese who with the Princess Pauline Bonaparte were his godparents.

The family lived in the Palazzo Cavour on via Jena, now via Cavour, in Turin in one great patriarchal community, father, mother, children, grandmother, uncles and aunts, exactly as is the custom in patrician households in most parts of Italy today. The family dined at one long table, the father at the head, the grandmother at the foot. Years later, when at the height of his fame, Cavour always had his accustomed place as a younger son well down the family dinner table, his elder brother the marchese sitting of right at the head.

The language spoken in the family was French, as was the case in many Italian patrician families with any pretension of education. Piedmontese was used with servants and tradesmen, Italian was unknown, and only acquired by Cavour in manhood, as a foreign language.

As custom reserved high government office and the diplomatic service to the eldest sons of the aristocracy, Cavour was almost as a matter of course destined for the army, and at ten years of age was sent to the military academy of Turin, where he remained for six years, graduating at the head of his class in 1826 and being commissioned sub-lieutenant of engineers. He soon began to express exceedingly liberal sentiments which not only caused great scandal in his family, but placed him under police suspicion.

Before going to the military academy his father, who was in high favor with Charles Albert, then prince of Carignano, had obtained for him the post of page to the heir to the throne. The small boy and the prince at once developed an intense dislike and suspicion of each other, which continued as long as the latter lived. When Charles Albert ascended the throne, Cavour, who was at the time virtually under arrest because of his liberalism, resigned his commission in the army. The next few years were spent in foreign travel and in study. He visited Paris and London and in both places made many friends among the politically great, who were of much service to him in after times.

On his return to Turin he found that because of the king's dislike a public career was closed to him. His father had been appointed sindaco, or mayor, of Turin, and was powerful enough to ensure his son at least protection, provided the latter refrained from all political activity.

With boundless energy, for want of something else to do Cavour in 1835 undertook the management of the family estates. Finding them much run down and seeing great possibilities for their development, he became the sole tenant

of his father and was so successful that by 1848 he had not only greatly improved the family fortunes, but had made a very comfortable fortune for himself. He was the first Piedmontese to introduce modern scientific farming, the first to change the medieval methods of agriculture, which had obtained, into the modern methods in vogue in England and in France.

Not satisfied with his farming activities he organized a steamboat company on Lago Maggiore, and a chemical products company, and was largely instrumental in organizing the Bank of Turin and the Bank of Genoa.

In 1847, encouraged by the liberalism of Pius IX, Cavour believed that the time had come to strike for the liberalization of the Piedmontese government and even for a constitution. Accordingly he founded a newspaper in Turin which he called *Il Risorgimento*, and through its columns began a vigorous and fearless battle for the principles he had always advocated.

There can be no question but that the constant hammering of *Il Risorgimento* did much to drive Charles Albert into granting the statuto on February 8, 1848, and into declaring war against Austria six weeks later.

Cavour was elected a deputy in the first chamber under the constitution. After the dissolution in January 1849 he was defeated but was elected to the new parliament in July of the same year, after the abdication of Charles Albert.

In parliament Cavour was a forceful and able, although not an eloquent, speaker. During his early days of service he devoted himself to questions of agriculture and finance and was very soon recognized as the leading authority on both subjects. He called himself a moderate conservative and supported with great enthusiasm the ministry of d'Azeglio, so much so that when Santa Rosa, the minister of agriculture, industry, and commerce, died in October 1850, the prime minister offered him and he accepted the vacant portfolio.

The following year he also assumed the office of finance minister.

At the age of forty Cavour had now "arrived" and was regarded not only in Piedmont but everywhere else as one of the men upon whom Italy must lean in her struggle for freedom.

He was the exact antithesis of his fellow leader of the risorgimento, Garibaldi. Coming from a very old Piedmontese family he was essentially an aristocrat and a man of the world, a man of great intelligence, ability and political genius, a realist and a cynic, willing to be not only disingenuous but absolutely unscrupulous in serving his country. He never sought popularity and never won it.

Disliked by Victor Emanuel he was tolerated only because the king was wise enough to know that there was no one to fill his place. He appreciated Garibaldi's good qualities and used him to the full, despite the guerrilla chief's almost insane hatred, caused by the cession of Nice to France. The only traits that Garibaldi and he had in common were a profound love of Italy and a complete willingness to sacrifice self in the cause of national union.

On his return to Turin after Novara the new king found himself faced with exorbitant demands on the part of Austria and it was not until Massimo d'Azeglio became prime minister that any real progress was made with the negotiations.

Marchese Massimo Taparelli d'Azeglio (1798-1866) was an excellent example of the best in Piedmontese aristocracy. He belonged to an old family that viewed with alarm his early determination to become an artist. During his father's service as minister to the Vatican he studied painting; later he married the daughter of Manzoni, the author of *I promessi sposi*, and turned his attention to writing. While he never became more than a fairly good amateur in either art or literature, he was essentially an artist at heart, and became

a politician almost under protest. He creditably served in the early days of the revolution and won sufficient distinction to be twice expelled from Tuscany. His success in politics was due not so much to his force or his ability, with both of which qualities he was only fairly well endowed, as it was to his personality. He was a man of great charm and tact, transparently honest and sincere, a true patriot who was temperamentally unable to compromise with what he deemed the wrong. His was by far the most attractive character of the risorgimento, but the times required sterner qualities than he possessed.

On assuming the prime ministership d'Azeglio appealed to France and Britain asking them to use their good offices to mitigate the harshness of the Austrian demands. At last Austria agreed to reduce the size of the indemnity that she asked from Piedmont, and very reluctantly consented to pardon most of the Lombard rebels. It was not until August that the terms of the treaty were settled, and then d'Azeglio found that there was no prospect of obtaining their ratification by parliament. Accordingly parliament was dissolved, and a general election ordered. It required all the personal influence of Victor Emanuel to secure the election of a majority that unwillingly agreed to ratification, which finally took place January 9, 1850.

Peace having been formally restored, d'Azeglio turned his energy to trying to improve relations with the Vatican. Piedmont still had upon her statute books religious laws more reactionary than those of almost any other country. Although the Vatican had long before consented to the removal of the disability of Jews and Protestants in other countries, the suggestion that Piedmont intended to permit non-Catholics to vote and to hold office was received at Rome with violent protest, and it required much courage on d'Azeglio's part to force the necessary legislation through parliament. He next enacted laws depriving the clergy of its special privileges,

again in the teeth of vigorous papal opposition. Nevertheless he succeeded in calming Antonelli's wrath to such an extent that when he left office, relations with the Vatican were, if not actually cordial, at least very much improved.

Cavour and d'Azeglio never worked together in harmony. The subordinate was so much stronger and abler than his chief that they were bound to clash.

In May 1852 Cavour made a statement in the chamber, from which it was obvious that he and his cabinet colleague, Farini, were negotiating with Rattazzi, the leader of the left, with the purpose of swinging the government in that direction. D'Azeglio, who was a conservative, with a profound distrust of extreme liberalism, openly broke with both Cavour and Farini, whom he charged with disloyalty to the prime minister, and resigned. The king refused to accept his resignation, and accordingly he reconstituted his cabinet without either Cavour or Farini.

Cavour now openly opposed the government, and d'Azeglio saw his position becoming daily weaker. By October his majority had vanished and on the 22nd he resigned and returned to his studio to paint pictures that no one bought and to write novels that no one read. From 1855 to 1859 he was director of the Turin gallery of art, the four happiest years of his life, after which, much against his will, he once more found himself in public affairs.

On leaving the prime ministership d'Azeglio urged the king to appoint Cavour in his place. Cavour was the leader of the opposition that had brought about the fall of the government, and it was in accordance with the custom prevailing in constitutional states that he should be asked to form the new ministry.

Much as he disliked Cavour, Victor Emanuel was faced with the necessity of summoning him. He was by far the most important member of the chamber, and the king found none

of his favorites willing to assume office in the face of Cavour's certain opposition.

The king's dislike was probably inherited from his father, Charles Albert, who considered Cavour a dangerous liberal and a great nuisance. This dislike was much accentuated some six years later when Cavour did all in his power to prevent the scandal of the king's marriage to his mistress Rosina, the daughter of a corporal in the army, whom he had created Countess of Mirafiori. Although the marriage was morganatic, Cavour chiefly objected because it would prevent the strengthening of the dynasty by a marriage with the daughter of some reigning house.

Had Cavour possessed the goodwill of Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel his path would have been far smoother. The hatred of the former and the dislike of the latter necessitated not only constant tact and management, but incessant watchfulness. Garibaldi's enmity was so intense that he was willing to go to almost any lengths in the effort to destroy the man who had, as he believed, corruptly sold Nice, his birthplace, to France. Fortunately for Italy and for Cavour, the old condottiere's power for evil was not by any means as great as was his intention. By the very exaggeration of his ill will he overplayed his hand and, making himself ridiculous, pitifully failed in his purpose.

The king's ill will was an entirely different matter. Cavour had no illusions on the subject and knew quite well that he must always think of his sovereign as the leader of the opposition, always intriguing against him, always using his constitutional immunity from attack to make his prime minister's task of government as difficult as possible, never wholeheartedly supporting Cavour or even tolerating him unless the exigencies of the situation made any other course impossible.

It is one of the regrettable incidents of Italian history that two men who had so much in common, who strove so earn-

estly for the same patriotic purpose, should have been separated from each other by the barrier of mutual dislike.

Victor Emanuel before his death had become an almost legendary hero to his people, why, it would be difficult to understand were it not for one fact: his devotion to the cause of Italia Unita.

Physically he was not of the stuff of which heroes are supposed to be made. Very short, broad and stout, he was of surpassing ugliness. His manners were of the worst, his morals deplorable. Personally courageous, he was a good mountaineer and sportsman and a brave soldier, although a very poor general. His conception of the duty of a constitutional king was to keep the letter of the *statuto*, and to do as he pleased with its spirit. With a strong prime minister like Cavour this led to no serious results as he feared Cavour almost as much as he disliked him, but under Cavour's weak successors it often led to grave inconveniences.

With all his shortcomings and failings, and they were many, he stood out above his contemporaries as the only Italian sovereign who kept faith with his people and did not break his word. After Novara there was no backsliding toward absolutism in Piedmont as there was everywhere else in Italy. His attitude toward the *risorgimento* may have been influenced by his whole-hearted hatred of Austria and his ambition for Casa Savoia, but be that as it may, the fact remains that but for his loyalty to the cause Cavour and Garibaldi would have worked and fought in vain. When others hesitated and fell, he stood firm. He fought the good fight and kept the faith, and well deserved the name his people gave him, "*Il re galantuomo*"—"the king who was a gentleman."

With a few short intervals Cavour remained prime minister until his death. He had become indispensable to Piedmont and indispensable to Italy.



Everywhere but in Piedmont the heavy hand of absolutism crushed mercilessly every aspiration of the people. In Lombardy and Venetia the rule of Austria was particularly offensive. Taxes were heavier than in any other part of the empire and the people were kept in order by flogging, imprisonment, and hanging.

In 1852 an unsuccessful Mazzinian plot in Mantua led to the arrest of some two hundred alleged conspirators. Under torture, confessions were obtained, which involved the priest Tazzoli and four others, who were hanged December 7. The next year twenty-four alleged conspirators were hanged and Austria seized the property of all Lombards who had emigrated for political reasons. As this was in direct violation of the peace treaty with Piedmont, Cavour at once withdrew his minister from Vienna, which act was followed by the withdrawal of the Austrian minister from Turin.

In Rome Antonelli was given a free hand by the pope to carry out his policy of repression. In 1853 four out of every thousand of the inhabitants were in prison, including over one thousand politicals. In Bologna the Austrians who garrisoned the city at the pope's request shot some two hundred brigands and peasants during the year. Economically, Antonelli had accomplished considerable improvement. Gas and the telegraph had been introduced, the customs' tariff reformed, agriculture encouraged, primary education expanded, and the better housing of the poor seriously undertaken.

In Naples conditions were unspeakable. Economic conditions were the worst of any state in Italy, crime flourished, the camorra was almost officially recognized, poverty and misery were everywhere. Ferdinand had become an absolute tyrant who governed with neither intelligence nor knowledge. Even the ultra-conservative Jesuits thought that he had gone too far.

In Tuscany Leopold followed in the footsteps of his father as a more or less benevolent despot, while in the duchies of Parma and Modena absolutism flourished without much regard to benevolence.

With one exception the states of Italy lay crushed under the heel of tyranny, almost despairing of better times. Even in Piedmont where Victor Emanuel was giving a very fair imitation of a constitutional monarch most people were content to let well enough alone.

Fortunately for Italy Cavour had long since consecrated his genius and his courage to the cause of Italia Unita, and flatly refused to leave well enough alone in Piedmont or bad enough elsewhere. The cause of Italian unity required something more than Mazzini's eloquence and futile plottings, something more than Garibaldi's heroism. It required at the head of the movement a leader who was at the same time a great statesman, for the problems to be solved and the issues to be met were so complicated and so vital that only great statesmanship could successfully deal with them. It was Italy's supreme good fortune to have as the leader of the *risorgimento* the greatest statesman of his age.

As the first important step in the fulfilment of his ultimate hope, Cavour concentrated his efforts on the expulsion of the barbarian and the creation of a North Italian state under Victor Emanuel.

Profiting by the lesson of Novara he realized that Piedmont alone could not conquer Austria. With the then conditions in the other Italian states, no help of importance could be expected from them. It was therefore essential to seek help outside of Italy. Of the great powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia were obviously for both political and sentimental reasons on the side of the Habsburgs. Great Britain, despite the liking of the queen and prince regent for Austria, had through her foreign office repeatedly expressed her sympathy for the Italian cause. She was, however, unwilling to

turn from words to deeds, and had assured Cavour that under no circumstances could he expect her material support. The remaining great power was France, and the logic of the situation pointed to France as Piedmont's only possible ally. Accordingly, Cavour concentrated his unflagging energy and his great ability to the winning of the friendship and the alliance of the emperor of the French.

Louis Napoleon had ascended the throne of France as Napoleon III by the almost unanimous vote of the French people, cast December 2, 1852. No ruler of modern times has been more unjustly belittled than has Napoleon III. Hugo and Thiers, from different motives, did much to injure him, while the Prussian guns at Sedan sealed the fate of his reputation. Had he died before 1870 he would have been hailed as a great ruler, who had found his country in economic chaos and left her restored to economic health, who gave Italy her freedom, and was the first sovereign to inaugurate those social reforms that have today become a matter of course. The world has no mercy for a beaten man, and the sneering names given him by the disappointed Hugo of "the nephew of his uncle" and "Napoleon the Little" have stuck.

All the success that went before Sedan, all the economic and political triumphs that restored France to her primacy in Europe, were either minimized or ignored in the humiliation of national defeat.

Napoleon III was not great in the sense in which his uncle was; he does not stand out among the few truly great men of history, but if merit is measured by the amount of happiness that a man confers upon his fellow men, then was Napoleon III a great Frenchman who deserved well of France.

In his youth Napoleon had been associated with the carbonari, although probably not actually a member. He had acquired a great love for Italy and a sincere hope that she might some day be united, a love and a hope that he always

retained. When he attained to power he did not hesitate to show his friendly feeling to the Italian cause, a feeling that ceased to be platonic as soon as he felt himself in a position to act.

The vacillation in reference to Italy with which he has been charged was not due to weakness of character but to changing political conditions in France. He relied to a very great extent for support for his throne upon the French conservatives, who were Catholic, and upon the Church. As both opposed a united Italy he was obliged to follow an exceedingly tortuous course, having for its goal the freeing of Italy without alienating Rome. That he finally succeeded is greatly to his credit as a statesman.

Cavour's first approach to Napoleon was upon the outbreak of the Crimean War, when in January 1855 he signed a treaty of alliance with France and Great Britain against Russia. Piedmont sent to the Crimea 17,000 extremely well equipped men under La Marmora, whose commissariat and medical service were the envy of the other powers.

The Piedmontese contingent was given but little opportunity to distinguish itself until August 16, when in the action of Tchernaja it behaved with much gallantry.

The Crimean War was of great value to Piedmont both directly and indirectly. It has been said without much exaggeration that "Piedmont's road to Lombardy lay through the Crimea." Tchernaja wiped out the disgrace of Novara and restored the confidence of the army. The victory over Russia gave Piedmont a place at the peace conference equal to that of the other powers, and her participation in the war had won the goodwill of both France and Great Britain. On the other hand Austria's neutrality had outraged Russia, who claimed with reason that it was a poor return for the latter's help in suppressing the Austrian and Hungarian revolutions of '48.

On January 14, 1858, as the emperor and empress were driving to the opera in Paris, three bombs were thrown from the crowd, leaving the royal pair untouched but killing or wounding over one hundred and fifty. The author of the outrage was soon found in Felice Orsini, a prominent Mazzinian. Orsini took upon himself the entire responsibility for the murders and from prison, where he calmly awaited the guillotine, wrote two letters to Napoleon urging him to free Italy.

Napoleon, who had behaved with great courage during Orsini's attack, was deeply impressed by the letters which awoke in him what seemed to be a sincere admiration for the character of the author, the memories of his youth and his love of Italy. Orsini's arguments apparently convinced him that if Italy was ever to be freed the time for action was at hand.

The emperor realized that the admiration of his people for him had very well defined limits, and that it was evidently cooling. A successful war in a noble cause, especially if the noble cause could be made to pay a substantial profit, would doubtless warm up the popular enthusiasm so necessary for his throne. Accordingly, he invited Cavour to meet him at Plombières where on July 21 and 22, 1858, the two statesmen conferred in secret.

A "gentlemen's agreement" was entered into between the two, under the terms of which Napoleon promised to attack Austria at a time to be later determined, he to furnish 200,000 men and Piedmont 100,000. Austria was to be deprived of all her Italian possessions, which were to go to Piedmont, which was also to receive the duchies and the papal legations and the marches, these to constitute the kingdom of Northern Italy. Umbria and Tuscany were to be joined in a kingdom of Central Italy, the pope being left only the Patrimony of St. Peter, to be garrisoned by Napoleon. After the expected

revolution the Two Sicilies were to be given to Lucien Murat, son of the ex-king and Napoleon's cousin.

In return for all this Victor Emanuel was to give his daughter, the sixteen-year-old Princess Clotilde, in marriage to Napoleon's cousin, the thirty-seven-year-old and dissipated Prince Jerome Napoleon, usually though not affectionately called "Plonplon," for whom the emperor undoubtedly intended the new kingdom of Central Italy, and was to cede to France the provinces of Savoy and Nice.

The conference over, Cavour went to Baden Baden whence he wrote Victor Emanuel a forty-page letter urging him to consent to the proposed agreement, especially to that part of it involving the Princess Clotilde.

Ten days later he returned to Turin and found that the king intended to leave the disposal of the Princess Clotilde entirely in the hands of that unfortunate child herself. Cavour believed the marriage to be of even greater importance than the cession of Nice and Savoy.

Napoleon, who had allowed his heart to dominate his head and cause him to make a *mésalliance*, was exceedingly anxious that his cousin, the heir to the throne after the little prince imperial, should make a dynastic marriage. An alliance with Casa Savoia, next to the House of Wittelsbach the oldest ruling family in Europe, could not fail to strengthen the position of his throne. An adventurer himself, in whose veins flowed only the parvenu blood of the Bonapartes, he greatly exaggerated the importance of marrying Jerome Napoleon to a princess of a really royal house. He convinced Cavour that he was so set upon obtaining the hand of Princess Clotilde for Plonplon that were he to be disappointed in his project he would in all likelihood turn his back upon Italy and her hopes.

At all costs therefore Cavour favored the proposed marriage, and it was to him a serious shock to learn that all his well laid plans for the future of his country were to be

jeopardized by what he considered his king's foolish sentimentality.

He urged Victor Emanuel to forget his scruples and to arrange the marriage without consulting the princess. The king, however, refused to be influenced by his prime minister's cynicism, and Clotilde was sent for. When she came to the king's study, Cavour rose and bowing low launched into an impassioned oration, which he himself concedes lasted for nearly an hour. He told her that the fate of her country depended upon her decision, that, were she to refuse, the cause of United Italy was lost, but that if she accepted she could always feel that she had been the chief cause of the union of Italy and its freedom from the barbarian.

The little princess listened patiently to Cavour, and when he had finished smiled at him and said very quietly, "I accept." Whether it was Cavour's eloquence, whether the length of his speech had enchanted her and destroyed her will to resist, or whether as is most likely she had already made up her mind, the fact remains that her decision undoubtedly brought Napoleon into line for Italy.

Clotilde was wise beyond her years and had undoubtedly carefully thought out the problem that confronted her. She reached her decision with a full realization of the great sacrifice she was making for her country, and had no illusions, even then, of the unhappiness that lay before her.

With neither beauty nor charm, without any sense of humor, or any great brilliancy, with only an honest heart and a saintly character as her assets, it was a foregone conclusion that she could neither win nor hold the affections of the very volatile and dissipated man of the world who was her husband. Throughout her married life she suffered greatly as the ignored and abandoned wife of a thoroughly disreputable *roué*. Yet she never regretted the course she had followed and to the end was satisfied and proud that she

had been permitted to sacrifice herself in the service of her country.

Few of the soldiers who have died for Italy have shown as much heroism as did Clotilde, for they have died but once and her martyrdom lasted a lifetime.

Immediately after his return from Plombières Cavour commenced the task of putting the army on a war footing. It was evident to all that the feverish activity of the war department could mean nothing but war with Austria; and volunteers began to flock to Turin from all parts of Italy.

On January 1, 1859, Napoleon said to the Austrian ambassador, "I regret that relations between our two countries are not as good as they have been," which was accepted by the world as meaning war with Austria. At the opening of the Piedmontese parliament a few days later the king said that he was greatly moved by "the cry of agony" (*il grido di dolore*) that came to him from all the Italian peoples. A military treaty was signed by Prince Jerome and Cavour and the outbreak of war seemed only a matter of days when unexpectedly Napoleon, influenced by his clerical supporters and probably also by Russia, suggested to Cavour that the whole matter at issue between Austria and Piedmont be referred for settlement to a European congress. When Cavour bitterly opposed the suggestion, the emperor withdrew it and substituted a demand that both Austria and Piedmont should disarm. Cavour was almost in despair at seeing his carefully laid plans coming to nothing, and in his discouragement was even tempted to suicide.

Fortunately for him and for Italy the fates, in the form of Austria, once more played into his hands. He had gone so far in acquiescence to the will of the emperor as to have actually prepared the order for the demobilization of the reserves, when on April 23 he received an ultimatum from Austria demanding demobilization within three days. By assuming this arrogant attitude Austria became the aggressor and



placed Piedmont in the eyes of the world on the defensive and in the right, and herself in the wrong. Had Cavour been in command at the Ball Platz he could not more successfully have served the interests of Italy.

On the 29th Austria declared war, and Napoleon, his hand forced by Austria, immediately afterwards followed suit. The next day the Austrian army crossed the Ticino.

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## CHAPTER VII

### SOLFERINO AND AFTER

ON THE declaration of war the Piedmontese under the command of the king, with La Marmora as chief of staff, were in position near Alessandria, it having been understood that they were to remain there until joined by the French, coming into Piedmont over the Mont Cenis Pass and by sea to Genoa.

The Austrians under the command of Marshal Gyulay, with General Kuhn as chief of staff, had crossed the frontier April 30, and advanced slowly in the direction of their enemy. It was fortunate for the allies that the Radetzky of '48 was not the Austrian commander, for the obvious thing for Gyulay to have done, with his larger army, was to have destroyed the Piedmontese before Napoleon had time to bring up his support. Instead of doing the obvious he manœvered with apparently no distinct purpose in view, and with no result except to puzzle greatly the Piedmontese and the French.

May 12 Napoleon assumed command of the allied army, his own forces having safely arrived without a blow being struck on either side. The last chance for the Austrians to engage the Piedmontese alone was gone. They had deliberately wasted twelve days, during which they outnumbered the enemy over two to one.

The two armies now began to manœuver for position, railways being used for the purpose for the first time. On May 21 occurred the first action of the war when Cialdini attacked and drove back the Austrian right wing at Palestro. Meanwhile Garibaldi at the head of a force of volunteers

was carrying on a successful guerrilla campaign in and around Como, usually against greatly superior forces.

Nine days after his first success Cialdini again attacked the Austrian right wing near Palestro and once more drove it back, this time as far as Robbio, and was again successful the following day. Four days later the main armies met at Magenta (June 4), each consisting of about 85,000 men, but not more than 35,000 Austrians and 10,000 allies were engaged.

McMahon was so successful in routing the Austrian right wing with a force of French and Piedmontese that Gyulay conceded his defeat, and although the greater part of his army was intact retreated to Cremona and Piacenza.

On June 8 the French met and defeated the 8th Austrian corps at Malegnano, the Austrians continuing their retreat and evacuating all the towns they had held so as to add their garrisons to the field army. On June 16 Gyulay was relieved, the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph himself assuming command of the army with Marshal von Hess as chief of staff.

It is a curious and picturesque fact that the two battles which won Italy for Victor Emanuel were fought near the fields which ten years earlier had cost his father Charles Albert the throne. Magenta was won close to the field of Novara and Solferino near the field of Custoza.

Instead of again meeting the allies the Austrians continued their retreat, reorganizing their forces into two armies, the first of three corps under Wimpffen on the left, the second of four corps under Schlitz on the right, with in addition one corps at Mantua, one on the lower Po, and one in Tirol. By June 21 the first and second Austrian armies were concentrated in a space of about ten miles square on the left bank of the Mincio between Peschiera, Villafranca, and Goito, headquarters being at Villafranca, the five principal bridges across the Mincio being left standing. The total Austrian force numbered about 160,000. The allies who had pursued

very slowly crossed the Chiera on the morning of the same day with a slightly superior force to that of the enemy, while Garibaldi with his volunteers took position to the north at Salo on Lake Garda. By the evening of the same day the allies were concentrated in a position also of about ten miles square, some twelve miles distant from the Austrians.

Francis Joseph determined to attack and on the 23rd crossed the Mincio and advanced against the enemy. There were actually engaged some 165,000 allies and 155,000 Austrians. The two armies met on the 24th on a front about ten miles wide, giving an average of nine men on each side to each yard of front. At 2 a.m. the allies advanced in three columns, not knowing that the Austrians had crossed the Mincio, while the Austrians, who were eating their breakfasts, were not due to move until 10 o'clock and were caught almost unaware. By 11 o'clock the allies had deployed and the engagement began.

The battle of Solferino really consisted of three almost detached actions. On the allied left the Piedmontese engaged the Austrian 8th corps near San Martino, the center, consisting of the French 1st, 2nd, and guard corps, met the Austrian 5th corps near Solferino, while the right, consisting of the French 3rd and 4th corps, met the Austrian 9th corps at Medole.

From the beginning of the action it was evident that the allies had the advantage over their enemy in generalship. The Austrians wasted their strength in disjointed and isolated attacks by the 3rd and 9th corps against the allied right, which the latter had no difficulty in resisting. While the allied right held the Austrian left, gradually forcing it back to Guidizzolo, the center vigorously attacked the Austrian center at Solferino, the Piedmontese holding the Austrian 8th corps at San Martino, an Austrian counter-attack by way of Montechiaio having failed. By half past three in the afternoon the Austrian center began to yield, then to break, carrying

with it the entire army. By evening the Austrians were in full retreat on Verona.

Custoza and Novara had been avenged, for while the Austrians had fought stubbornly they had been outgeneralled and outmanœuvred. The casualties on both sides were heavy, the Austrians losing 13,100 killed and wounded, 8,600 prisoners and 13 guns, the allies losing 14,420 killed and wounded, and 7,000 prisoners. The heaviest losses were sustained by the Piedmontese on San Martino from which they finally succeeded in forcing Benedek to retire after charging five times with losses of 216 officers and 4,047 men, and 1,200 taken prisoner.

The victorious allies already saw themselves in the possession of Venetia and dictating peace at Vienna. Actually, preparations were hurried for the siege of the Quadrilateral into which the Austrians had retired. Hopes and preparations that were alike destined to come to nothing.

The day after Solferino Napoleon secretly sent orders to Persigny his ambassador in London to ask Palmerston, the British foreign secretary, to urge Austria to seek a truce. This Palmerston promptly declined to do. Napoleon next sent General Fleury directly to Francis Joseph, who agreed to ask and did ask an armistice which was signed July 8 at Villafranca by representatives of the three sovereigns, and which was to last until August 16. Victor Emanuel, who was not taken into Napoleon's confidence until two days before the armistice was signed, was persuaded to join his ally by a very disingenuous explanation by the latter that the armistice was to be purely military and that at its expiration war would undoubtedly be resumed.

After a personal interview between Napoleon and Francis Joseph and a further interview between the latter and Prince Jerome the preliminary terms of peace were signed by the emperor. It was agreed that Lombardy was to be ceded to Napoleon, the understanding being that if he so desired

he might give it to Piedmont. Parma and Piacenza were to go to Piedmont, the dukes were to be restored to their thrones of Tuscany and Modena, but without the use of force. Italy was to become a federation under the honorary presidency of the pope, who was to be asked to reform his government. Amnesty was to be granted to all revolutionists, and a European congress was to be summoned to ratify the proposed arrangements.

Victor Emanuel reluctantly signed the treaty adding, however, the words: "*pour ce qui me concerne*," implying that he refused to be bound by the clauses referring to the duchies and to Italy in general.

When Cavour in Turin heard of the proposed terms of the peace he hurried to the front to protest, only to arrive too late. He had a violent scene with Victor Emanuel in which he expressed his opinion of his sovereign, in terms more forcible than polite, and ended by submitting his resignation which was at once accepted.

From the beginning of the war the king and his military advisers had treated Cavour with the greatest discourtesy.

Although Cavour was minister of war, della Rocca as the king's chief of staff absolutely ignored him. Cavour's dispatches were left unanswered, della Rocca even refusing to give him the numbers of killed and wounded. After Magenta Cavour was obliged to telegraph to Napoleon to find out whether the battle had been won or lost. The king, influenced by his dislike of Cavour, apparently encouraged his chief of staff to insult the minister of war. Cavour was convinced that had he been consulted in advance the terms of the peace might have been more favorable to Piedmont, and while he held Napoleon primarily to blame for what he believed to be the betrayal of the Italian cause, he greatly blamed the king for consenting.

In fairness to Napoleon it must be said that it is difficult to see how he could have acted otherwise. Despite the defeats

of the campaign the Austrian army was practically intact. In Benedek the war had produced a first-rate general, better than any other on either side. There was good reason to believe that Prussia was preparing to go to the help of Austria. In France the war had not been popular, and there was a general feeling that the sooner it came to an end the better it would be for French interests. The French Catholics had never hesitated to show their dislike of a war that they very justly believed might injure the interests of the temporal power of the pope, and the emperor himself looked askance at the possibility of a large and powerful Italian state under Victor Emanuel, contiguous to French territory. Besides, the emperor distinctly cooled to the Italian cause when he found but little Italian sentiment in favor of placing his two cousins, Prince Jerome Napoleon and Lucien Murat, on Italian thrones. Influenced by these arguments he made his peace with Austria, believing that Italy would be satisfied and that he had won the friendship of Francis Joseph, in both of which beliefs he was mistaken. Victor Emanuel could have done nothing else but sign the treaty, for it would have been madness for him to have continued the war alone, and had he done so he might and probably would have been called upon to face France also, as Napoleon very broadly hinted.

Cavour was so enthusiastically wedded to the cause of Italian unity, to which he had given his whole life, that he believed the war, which he had brought about, would realize his hopes. When he found his hopes frustrated, his disappointment was heartbreaking and he allowed his sentiment to influence his judgment. For once at least the king was wiser than Cavour.

On Cavour's resignation Victor Emanuel had called his friend and favorite, Urbano Rattazzi (1810-1873), to form a cabinet, Cavour meanwhile remaining in office.

Under the terms of the protocol of Villafranca Cavour recalled the Piedmontese commissioners from the duchies, from

Tuscany and from Romagna, at the same time secretly urging them to refuse to resign and to resist by force the return of the old sovereigns.

In Tuscany the grand duke was expelled and a government formed with Ubaldino Peruzzi as its nominal head, but with Ricasoli in actual control. In the duchies of Modena and Parma, Farini was chosen dictator, while Marco Minghetti was elected dictator in Romagna. When Rattazzi finally succeeded in forming his ministry he found a series of accomplished facts with no option left him but to follow the course laid out for him by his great predecessor.

In August a customs union and military league were formed by Tuscany, Romagna, and the duchies, and General Fanti was lent by Piedmont to organize its army. On November 10 the preliminary terms of Villafranca were incorporated in the treaty of Zurich. Napoleon realized that treaty or no treaty the cause of Italian unity had made so much progress that it could not be stopped. While at Plombières Cavour had agreed to cede Savoy and Nice in return for Napoleon's help in driving the Austrians out of Italy, the emperor had not kept his bargain in reference to Venetia. He now renewed his demands, offering to agree to the annexation of the central Italian league by Piedmont in return for Savoy and Nice.

Before the negotiations were concluded Rattazzi fell and Victor Emanuel as usual most unwillingly sent for Cavour. Cavour brought his discussions with Napoleon to a successful termination on March 24, 1860, when the cession of Savoy and Nice was agreed to, while at the same time Tuscany, the duchies, and Romagna were annexed to Piedmont.

The pope at once excommunicated Victor Emanuel for taking over Romagna, while Garibaldi declared his undying hatred of Cavour for having "sold" Savoy and Nice to France. Garibaldi's heart spoke more truly than his head. His pride was touched that Nice, his old home and birthplace, should be alienated from Italy and he loudly proclaimed that the



people of each province had been handed over against their will. In the case of Savoy the cession was a simple act of justice. Its people living on the French side of the Alps spoke French, were French in sympathy and point of view, and welcomed their transfer with enthusiasm. Nice was a small territory whose people had almost as much contact with the French as with the Italians and spoke a dialect which was a mixture of the two languages. In ten years they were as loyal Frenchmen as any in France.

While Cavour could not do otherwise than bow to Napoleon's terms, if he wished to annex central Italy, the price he paid was not unreasonable, and secured the friendship of the emperor, who was able to prove to his people that the war had not been without profit to France. Although Cavour never for a moment lost sight of his ultimate goal of a united Italy under Victor Emanuel, he realized that any open activity on his part would be at once resented even by armed force, certainly by France and Austria and possibly by Prussia as well. It was therefore necessary for him to play a double game, which has been severely criticized by those who have not fully understood the obstacles in his path. As he once said to d'Azeglio, "If we did for ourselves what we are doing for Italy we should be great scoundrels."

He determined to use Garibaldi and his associates to the utmost in stirring up revolution, but to do so in such a way as to be able to repudiate them if they failed, and to appropriate their achievements if they succeeded. While Garibaldi hated and distrusted Cavour he greatly admired and blindly trusted Victor Emanuel. Cavour, therefore, controlled the obstinate and simple-minded condottiere through the king.

Ferdinand II of Naples, "King Bomba," had died in May 1859, thus performing the only really useful and graceful act of his life. His successor Francis II, called "Bombino" or "little Bomba" after his father, possessed all his father's shortcomings, including the latter's inability to tell the truth or

keep his word. His wife, Maria, of the Bavarian royal house of Wittelsbach, was the direct opposite of her husband. She was a right-thinking woman of ability and strength of character, who strove constantly to neutralize the evil impulses of the king, and more than once succeeded in making him play a fairly manly part.

In Sicily as well as in Naples conditions in no way improved, and Crispi, that undiscouraged plotter, devoted himself to stirring up revolutionary sentiment. He believed that what was needed to change sentiment into action was a leader, and that the only possible leader was Garibaldi. But Garibaldi, disliking Mazzini, distrusted all of the latter's friends, and demanded the actual outbreak of revolution in Sicily before he would consent to take command. For a time he seriously thought of heading an expedition into Nice, but soon gave up the project as hopeless.

At the beginning of April news came of an uprising in Sicily under Rosalino Pilo, which, while unsuccessful, so aroused Garibaldi that he asked Victor Emanuel to give him a brigade and permission to attack Sicily in the name of Piedmont. Both brigade and permission were refused by Cavour who nevertheless told La Farina that Garibaldi might be given the muskets in possession of the National Society, which had been organized some time before, and of the so-called "Million Rifles Fund" that Garibaldi had himself started. In other words, while Cavour was unwilling to sanction officially any attack on the kingdom of the Two Sicilies he was willing to close his eyes and even to give unofficial help to what was nothing but an absolutely illegal filibustering expedition that seemed almost hopeless of success.

For some time Garibaldi hesitated as to whether or not he should undertake what must have appeared to even his optimistic nature a forlorn hope. He has been criticized for repeatedly changing his mind, yet who can blame him, who remembers the desperate adventure that lay before him, and

that he was not only gambling his own life and good name, but also those of his devoted followers?

Finally at the end of April he received a telegram, giving false news of the success of the revolutionary movement near Palermo. This decided him and on May 5, 1860, he sailed from Quarto, near Genoa, in command of 1,150 men on two small steamers, the *Piemonte* and *Lombardo*, which he had stolen with the connivance of the manager of the owner, Rubattino.

The story of "the expedition of The Thousand" is one of the most marvellous in history. Had it occurred in the thirteenth century we should accept it with extreme doubt as being the exaggeration of an unreliable medieval chronicler. But it occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century in the memory of men who are still alive, and lives as the undying achievement of the greatest filibuster of all time.

Of the expedition the vast majority came from the cities of Northern Italy, of the rest thirty-three were classed as non-Italians, including fourteen from the Trentino and Garibaldi himself as of Nice in France, and Menotti Garibaldi as an "American"; there were four Hungarians including Türr, also forty-six Neapolitans and forty-five Sicilians.

Of The Thousand there was hardly a peasant; many were university students, many were city workingmen; all professions were represented, including doctors, lawyers, merchants, sailors, "rentiers," artists, professors, government employees, and even ex-priests. There was one woman, the wife of Francesco Crispi. The treasury of The Thousand contained 90,000 lire, and there had already been spent in outfitting and organizing the expedition some 231,000 lire more. The men were ill clothed, ill armed, and ill supplied.

The Thousand were divided on shipboard into two battalions of four companies each, the first battalion under Nino Bixio, the second under the Sicilian Carini. Garibaldi

appointed the company commanders who in turn appointed their own lieutenants and non-commissioned officers.

In the hurry of departure the ammunition and most of the coal and food had been left behind. On May 7 the expedition anchored off Talamone, not far from the fortress of Orbetello, whose commander was persuaded by Colonel Türr, on behalf of Garibaldi, to furnish enough coal to carry *The Thousand* to Sicily, and an inadequate supply of ammunition, so little that some of the men fought from Marsala to Palermo with only ten rounds each, while food was bought at Grosseto.

At Talamone Garibaldi detached sixty-one men under Zambianchi and a Tuscan band of volunteers who had just joined him, or 230 men in all, to cross into the Papal States and attack Naples from the rear. This little expedition failed miserably, being dispersed by the Italian government a fortnight later.

In the afternoon of May 9 *The Thousand*, now reduced to exactly 1,089 men, sailed from Talamone and two days later, on May 11, anchored in the harbor of Marsala.

The news that Garibaldi had sailed caused much excitement in the chanceries of all the great powers. Russia and Prussia protested to Cavour, Britain showed anxiety lest the capture of Sicily might mean the compensatory annexation of Genoa by France, while Napoleon after having protested cancelled his order for the withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome. Cavour's answer to these various protests was to order the governor of Sardinia to stop the expedition if it should enter a Sardinian port, and to telegraph Admiral Count Persano, "Do not arrest the expedition out at sea, only if it enters a port." Persano wired for further instructions, but when he received them the expedition had safely landed. Cavour had accomplished his purpose of keeping his diplomatic record straight without interfering with Garibaldi.

By good fortune three Neapolitan war vessels cruising off the west coast of Sicily failed to get in touch with the expedi-

tion until the landing had actually begun. Embarrassed by the presence of two small British war vessels, and mistaking the red shirts of the Garibaldians for British uniforms, the Neapolitan commander, Captain Acton, delayed opening fire until satisfied of the British intentions. When he did fire his gunnery practice was so bad that the total casualties among the Garibaldians were one man slightly wounded in the shoulder and one dog wounded in the leg.

Marsala received Garibaldi politely but coldly, and he determined to set out for Palermo immediately. He first, however, proclaimed himself dictator of Sicily in the name of Victor Emanuel and appointed Crispi as his political secretary.

On May 15 at Calatafimi he met General Landi who with 3,000 Neapolitan regulars, of whom 2,000 were actually engaged, had been sent from Palermo to intercept him. Garibaldi had only 800 of his own men, and 1,000 "squadre," as the Sicilian volunteers were called, of whom only 200 took part in the fighting, the rest remaining at a safe distance and firing their muskets in the air.

With his little force of about 1,000, Garibaldi repeatedly charged and finally took with the bayonet Landi's hilltop position, Pianto dei Romani, and forced the latter to retire. Four days later The Thousand were on the hills surrounding Palermo and in sight of the city.

Hearing that the new governor of Sicily, General Lanza, a seventy-two-year-old Sicilian who had been Filangieri's chief of staff, was sending against him the Swiss Colonel von Mechel in command of 3,000 regulars and Swiss guards, Garibaldi performed one of his most brilliant guerrilla feats. Leaving a detachment to lead von Mechel astray, he abandoned his intention of entering Palermo from the south, and with his main force circled the city across country and on the 27th entered it from the east without warning and almost unopposed.

After four days of very bloody street-fighting General Lanza agreed to an armistice, just before von Mechel returned from his wild-goose chase. On June 7 Lanza evacuated the city and twelve days later the last of his army had sailed away, as Medici arrived bringing with him 2,500 well armed and equipped recruits for Garibaldi while at the same time there arrived at Marsala a supply of arms and ammunition sufficient for immediate needs.

While fighting had been going on at Palermo, all Sicily had risen and with the exception of Messina and Syracuse and the fortresses of Agosta and Milazzo the Neapolitans had everywhere been driven out. In exactly twenty-seven days Garibaldi, with less than 1,000 men, had conquered an army of 24,000 and won a kingdom with two million inhabitants.

His success was due to an extraordinary combination of luck, pluck and genius. More than once success trembled in the balance, more than once at just the right moment his opponents by their incapacity almost presented him with victory; the campaign could not have been won but for the almost superhuman courage of The Thousand, and certainly would have failed but for the guerrilla genius of its chief.

As a civil governor Garibaldi proved a lamentable failure. He trusted Crispi absolutely and gave to that unscrupulous adventurer a free hand in the management, or rather the mismanagement, of affairs.

Cavour favored immediate annexation of Sicily to Piedmont, but Garibaldi opposed it, at least for the moment, believing that were Piedmont to take over the island the conquest of Naples would not be permitted. As Cavour intended to use Garibaldi to bring Naples under the House of Savoy with the cynical intention of repudiating him if he failed, Sicily was left at the disposal of the dictator, until Naples had been either won or lost. Meanwhile Garibaldi was supplied with arms, equipment and money by Piedmont

while no effort was made to stop the departure of volunteers seeking to join the conqueror of Sicily. It must be remembered that Piedmont was at peace with the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and that Cavour was openly expressing his master's friendship for Francis, while secretly he was doing all in his power to annex Naples to the crown of Victor Emanuel.

By the end of July Garibaldi was in complete possession of all Sicily but the citadel of Messina, whose commander had agreed on the 28th to fire no shot at either the land or sea forces of the dictator. The Garibaldian army numbered nearly 20,000 well equipped North Italians besides some 6,000 Sicilians.

On August 20 Garibaldi, eluding the Neapolitan squadron, crossed the strait of Messina and landed at Melito.

Then began what was really a triumphal march to Naples. Again and again Neapolitan forces sent out to stop him either melted away without firing a shot or surrendered after a pretense of fighting. At San Giovanni, 9,000 Neapolitans first murdered their general, Briganti, and then surrendered; at Cosenza 7,000 under Caldarelli surrendered; and at Monteleone 12,000 under Viale retreated without being engaged. September 6 Francis fled from his capital to Gaeta and the next day Garibaldi entered Naples in triumph.

Cavour believed that the time had come to interfere. Garibaldi had served his purpose and must step aside. The same day that the dictator entered Naples Cavour served an ultimatum on Antonelli demanding the disbandment of the foreign mercenaries in papal pay, on the ground that they were a menace to Italian freedom and to the safety of the patriots in Umbria. On Antonelli's refusal to accept the ultimatum, a North Italian army of 35,000 men under General Fanti crossed the papal frontier and, while General della Rocca with 22,000 marched on Perugia, General Cialdini with the rest of the army marched on Ancona. Della

Rocca took Perugia and Spoleto, while Cialdini met the papal army under the former French General La Moricière on September 18 at Castelfidardo. Cialdini had 13,000 men under him to La Moricière's 5,000. After a gallant resistance the latter's army surrendered, its commander escaping to Ancona, which in its turn capitulated a few days later.

As soon as his army reached Naples Garibaldi began the siege of Volturno where most of the remaining Neapolitan force had retired, and on October 2 the city fell.

Meanwhile Victor Emanuel had joined his victorious army and at its head was marching on Naples. October 29 the two armies met and on November 7 Victor Emanuel and Garibaldi entered Naples, sitting side by side in the same carriage. The king offered Garibaldi a major general's commission in the Italian army and the Collar of the Annunziata, which Garibaldi declined, asking that he be made dictator of the Two Sicilies for life. On the king very properly refusing his request, Garibaldi departed for Caprera.

The plebiscite that was held October 21 declared almost unanimously for annexation to Victor Emanuel's kingdom and on February 18 the first Italian parliament met and declared Victor Emanuel king of Italy. March 21 Civitella del Tronto, the last Bourbon stronghold, capitulated as had Gaeta and the citadel of Messina a month earlier.

Victor Emanuel now ruled a united Italy that included the entire peninsula except Venetia, still in possession of Austria, and the papal kingdom, reduced to the so-called patrimony of St. Peter and garrisoned by French troops.



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## CHAPTER VIII

### RICASOLI

THE Two Sicilies having been annexed, Cavour found himself faced with the exceedingly difficult problem of organizing the new Italian state.

The financial situation was most discouraging, for the budget showed a deficit of 344,000,000 lire, with an interest charge on the public debt of 110,000,000. Taxes were very high and it was only at almost usurious rates that additional loans could be effected.

The unrest in the former possessions of King Francis was so serious that some years of drastic effort were required to restore order. Brigandage had been more or less endemic under the Bourbons, and when they had been expelled they took advantage of it and of the general condition of unrest that prevailed to create the impression that their former possessions were seething with Bourbonic sentiment.

The Bourbon cause was managed by the former king's very able uncle, the Count of Trapani, and by Monsignore de Merode, a Belgian priest, who afterwards became papal minister of war. Their headquarters was in Rome, where Cardinal Antonelli allowed them unlimited latitude, not only in forwarding their propaganda but even in organizing active warfare in the south. Trapani and Merode appealed to Catholics throughout the world for their support, both active and financial, in fighting to restore a legitimist dynasty upon the throne of which it had been deprived by an atheistic sovereign of an atheistic people.

While the money subscribed to the Bourbon cause was of no great amount, many volunteers offered their services, actuated by a sincere belief that they were fighting for the

Church against its enemies, and this impression was in no way dispelled by Antonelli who preserved an Olympian aloofness, allowing the Bourbon agents a perfectly free field.

Many French, Belgian, Irish, and Spanish Catholics joined the Bourbon colors in the south, as well as a great number of former Bourbon soldiers, who really had nowhere else to go. Acting in harmony with the bandit chiefs, for a time at least a fairly successful guerrilla war was waged against the Italian forces.

As time passed the pressure of the Italians grew ever greater, and what had been in the beginning actual warfare degenerated into nothing short of actual brigandage. The Bourbonists lived off the country and became constantly a harder burden for the countryside to bear. The Italian troops kept them always on the move, hunting them relentlessly, and shooting them without mercy whenever caught. One by one those who had joined the movement from religious motives or because of loyalty to the Bourbons, were either killed, or deserted in disgust and disheartenment. Finally only those were left who were frankly bandits and nothing more.

Besides these were the mafia and the camorra. The former, which was and perhaps still is an essentially Sicilian institution, was more a condition of criminal activity than an actual organization. The Sicilian, especially the peasant, was governed by a peculiar sense of honor called "omertà," which required him when injured by another to refuse any appeal to police or courts and to take justice into his own hands. It was very like the Corsican vendetta, and resulted in endless blood-feuds between families, groups, and even villages. Banded together originally for revenge, these groups ultimately extended their activities and preyed upon the country, plundering and levying tribute and blackmail. It was not until very recently that any successful effort was made seriously to interfere with mafioso activity.

On the other hand the camorra, which functioned exclusively in the city and province of Naples, was an oath-bound secret society. The secrets of this mysterious and sinister organization were made public for the first time in 1911 and 1912 at the trial at Viterbo of some thirty of its leaders for the murder in 1906 of the husband and wife, Cuocolo, who had been suspected of giving information to the police. There were two grades of membership in the camorra, the *picciotti* or neophytes who on committing a major crime and after initiation became full-fledged *camorristi*, who constituted the majority of the members. The society was organized very much as are our political parties in the great cities, the *sestiere* or ward being the unit of organization, each *sestiere* having its executive committee and leader, while for the whole province there was an executive committee with a chairman, who was the chief of the whole organization, and a secretary and a treasurer.

The activity of the society was immense, and included the handling of elections and the control of vice and gambling, and the levying of blackmail on all industries and individuals was reduced to so fine an art as to make our clumsy racketeers green with envy.

It was testified at Viterbo, by the *carabiniere* captain in charge of the case, that there were in Naples probably 5,000 oath-bound *camorristi*, 10,000 open supporters of the society, and perhaps half the population tacitly in sympathy with its purposes.

The origin of the camorra is lost in antiquity. Some believe that the Arabs brought it with them under Frederick, "the wonder of the world"; others say that it came from Spain. Under the Bourbons the camorra was almost openly encouraged and flourished exceedingly, and at the close of Francis' reign Liborio Romano, the minister of the interior, disbanded the regular police force and installed the camorra in its stead. Garibaldi found them functioning as police

and of necessity continued them, as he had not the time to organize a substitute. In justice to the camorra it must be acknowledged that under it public order was far better maintained than at any time under the Bourbons and that the depredations of the society were probably no greater than they had been under a thoroughly inefficient and corrupt police.

Another question which confronted Cavour, and it was a most difficult one, was the disposition of Garibaldi's men. The officers of the Italian regular army had lost no occasion to show their contempt of volunteers. General Fanti had been especially disagreeable and had wounded the ex-dictator to the quick. Garibaldi's demand that his entire command should be incorporated in the army was of course impossible, as was his insistence that his 6,000 officers—he had an officer for every seven privates—should be given commissions.

The plan finally adopted by Cavour was, under the circumstances, fairly generous. Each enlisted man was given a bonus and discharged, the only exceptions were the Hungarians who, being unable to return to Hungary, were enlisted in the army and used in chasing bandits in the south. A board including three of Garibaldi's generals, Sirtori, Medici, and Cosenz, was appointed which passed on the officers' claims and recommended 1,584 for commissions. These were made field and company officers, while Medici, Bixio, and Cosenz were made generals.

Garibaldi was much outraged by what he considered Cavour's ingratitude and injustice, and on April 18, 1861, appeared in the chamber of deputies, to which he had been elected, and made a very violent and, to put it mildly, unparliamentary attack on Cavour for his treatment of the Garibaldians and for the "sale" of Nice.

Cavour sat silent during Garibaldi's attack and declined to reply or in any way notice it. Five days later the two antagonists were brought together, shook hands politely but

without enthusiasm, exchanged a few commonplaces, and parted never to meet again.

The strain under which Cavour labored in beginning the organization of the new Italy was terrific. The problem that he faced was to weld into a single nation seven heterogeneous states, the vast majority of whose people had nothing in common, most of whom did not even use the same language, and had neither understanding nor desire for union.

To this complex problem was added the question of the Church. His formula, "a free church in a free state," failed to satisfy either the papacy or the latter's extreme opponents.

In Piedmont the Church fought desperately for the maintenance of privileges which it had long lost in both France and Austria, and clung tenaciously to the temporal power, which Cavour was determined sooner or later to destroy. He believed that Italian nationality could never be achieved without the incorporation of Venetia in the kingdom, and without the establishment of the nation's capital at Rome.

It was to this Herculean task, the completion of the making of the nation that Cavour now turned.

The burden that he had carried throughout the last decade was so great that the reaction was inevitable. He was worn out physically and nervously, and at this moment typhoid fever developed. His physicians treated him according to the customs of the country and of the time, and almost literally bled him to death. On June 6, 1861, he died, his life work but half done, at the early age of fifty-one.

As Cavour's successor Ricasoli, the "Iron Baron" who had governed Tuscany through the revolutionary period, was the choice of Cavour's supporters, and had been suggested by Cavour himself for the succession. Rattazzi, the king's favorite, was impossible, as his opposition to Cavour had made him, for the moment at least, extremely unpopular throughout the country. The king therefore bowed to public opinion and summoned Ricasoli.

Baron Bettino Ricasoli (1809-1880) was born March 19, 1809, of an old and aristocratic Tuscan family, at his ancestral home at Broglio in the Maremma. He entered politics early in life as a liberal, taking a prominent part in the exciting period from 1847 to 1849. In 1847 he founded a newspaper, *La Patria*, and was for a short time during the following year gonfaloniere of Florence.

On the restoration of the grand duke he retired to his estate and devoted himself to farming and the production of wine. In 1852 his wife died and the loneliness of living without her drove him back to politics.

He had always hoped to see Tuscany freed from foreign rule but strongly opposed the suggestion of winning freedom from the Habsburgs by absorption into the kingdom of the House of Savoy. By 1856 he had concluded that Tuscany was too small and weak for independence, and that the only alternative to absorption in Victor Emanuel's kingdom was the creation of a united Italy of sufficient size to neutralize the power of Piedmont. He therefore necessarily became a unitarian, and henceforth did all in his power for the creation of an Italian kingdom.

In 1859 he became Tuscan minister of the interior and virtual dictator of his country. As such he was of very great help to Cavour in the creation of the new state, and when union had been effected he was elected to the Italian chamber of deputies in 1861. Refusing the lieutenancy of both Sicily and Naples that Cavour had offered him, he held no executive office in the new state until he became prime minister.

He was always known as the "Iron Baron" because of his force, his honesty and his inflexible purpose. He could not compromise and could not yield. His mind once made up there was no power on earth that could change it.

While these qualities made him a successful dictator, they militated against his success as prime minister. He was sadly

lacking in the kind of ability required to govern parliament, especially as parliament had not learned and never learned to govern itself. He was a proud, dour, cold man, with neither eloquence nor tact, who had many admirers but few friends.

He took up the work where Cavour had laid it down, being faced with three major problems: the recognition of the new state by the great powers, the relations of the crown with the Church, and the consolidation of the kingdom.

While Napoleon gave an early though somewhat grudging recognition of the new kingdom, caused by his interest in preserving the temporal power of the pope, and Britain under the leadership of Palmerston recognized unreservedly despite the unfriendliness of the queen and prince consort to the Italian cause, the recognition by Russia, Austria, and the German sovereigns presented a question of some difficulty.

Not only had the creation of the new kingdom torn into fragments the settlement of the treaty of Vienna, but it had shattered beyond recognition the theory of dynastic legitimacy. The new Italy came into being as a triumphant vindication of the spirit of nationality. Victor Emanuel ruled not by the grace of God but by the will of the Italian people, and while his popular mandate appealed with great force to Napoleon who was the creature of the plebiscite, and to the liberal government of Britain, if not to their queen, it awoke only fear and suspicion in the minds of legitimist sovereigns who saw in the creation of another popular monarchy a menace to the theory of the divine right of kings under which they held their power. It required much negotiation and much hard work to win the consent of the reactionary powers to the assumption of diplomatic relations with a state that had come into being through the violation of the principles they deemed sacred.

Difficult as was the question of recognition, the other two major problems which Ricasoli was called upon to solve were so serious as almost to daunt his iron courage.

At the close of his life Cavour had nearly succeeded in reaching an accord with the Vatican. He had made the offer of "a free church in a free state" and Antonelli had considered it sympathetically. Cavour's concrete proposal included absolute liberty for future conclaves, free speech in the pulpits, and unsupervised instruction in church schools, a revenue to be guaranteed by the state, the latter to yield its right to nominate the bishops. On the other hand the property of the seized monasteries was to be retained by the state, the state schools were to be freed from religious instruction, and civil marriages were to be permitted. All this in return for the cession of the temporal power.

Although nine cardinals favored the proposal, it fell through and Antonelli without warning expelled from papal territory Pantaleoni, the Italian agent.

Ricasoli renewed Cavour's offer, backed by a petition to the pope signed by some 9,000 parish priests. The papal minister of war, who was now that same Merode who had been charged with organizing banditry in the south, was violently opposed to any accord with Ricasoli, and winning the pope completely to his point of view succeeded in closing the door to all negotiations.

Ricasoli was soon convinced that the Roman question could never be answered favorably to Italy with the consent of Pius IX. He believed that the acquisition of Rome was of far greater importance than the possession of Venetia, which would have to wait until Italy was prepared to fight Austria.

Discouraged by the pope's "non possumus," he turned to Napoleon in the hope of persuading him to withdraw the French garrison, believing that its withdrawal would at once be followed by a popular uprising in favor of annexation to Italy.

While the emperor was still, as he always had been, friendly to the Italian cause, his hands were tied by French public opinion which was becoming more and more friendly



to the pope and unfriendly to Italy. He was forced, because of the political situation in France, to decline Ricasoli's suggestion.

The situation in the south was still extremely perplexing. Sicily, Naples, and Tuscany had been governed since annexation by lieutenants who were really viceroys with almost independent powers. A succession of lieutenants ending with General Cialdini had failed to stamp out brigandage in the former kingdom of Naples, or to restore public order. Ricasoli therefore determined to take the drastic step of abolishing the lieutenants and of making a general and centralized reorganization of the realm.

He divided Italy into fifty-nine provinces, each under a *prefetto* with very great authority, to be appointed and removable at will by the minister of the interior. At the same time the laws and administrative regulations of Piedmont were extended over the whole country. He created elective provincial councils, with limited legislative powers subject to the veto of the *prefetto*. The various communes and towns were governed by *sindachi* or mayors, elected by the local councils and removable at the will of the *prefetti*. This was the Napoleonic system of centralized government carried out almost literally. The minister of the interior by his power over the *prefetti* and the latter's power over the *sindachi* was the absolute dictator in domestic government. It was one of his functions to "make" elections, and woe betide the *prefetto* who failed to return the deputies his chief favored.

With a very restricted suffrage, and even later when the suffrage became nominally universal, so few were the voters that the task of the *prefetti* was not difficult except where an opposition candidate was personally popular, or until after socialism was organized into a militant and for a time successful party. Ricasoli may claim the doubtful honor of having created the machinery that was used by his successors in corrupting Italian politics.

On the other hand, the centralization of Italy was undoubtedly of great value to the state in bringing closely together its heterogeneous component parts. The army recruited by conscription from the entire country served as a unifying and educational force. Illiterate recruits were taught to read and write and always performed their service away from their own provinces. At the close of their service they returned home with at least a rudimentary education and having lived for two years or more in some part of Italy other than their own.

There are those who believe that a mistake was made in going from the extreme of decentralization to its opposite, that had the different parts of Italy, the former independent states, been permitted to develop autonomously, they would have grown together more naturally and more surely than happened after violent amalgamation.

It is difficult to see how this would have been the case. The regionalism was so great, the jealousy and even the active dislike of the people of each former state for their neighbors was so intense, that it is extremely doubtful if they would ever have become united, without the legal violence of the central government. Allowing them a continuance of home rule with the concomitant enjoyment of local customs and language could only have resulted in an accentuation of internal differences.

Even with centralization the unification of the country proceeded very slowly. The ignorance and poverty of the people of the south set them apart from the rest of Italy. They were divided sharply into three classes, the *galantuomini* who were the nobles, landowners, and professional men, the aristocracy that monopolized what little wealth and education the community possessed, the *lazzaroni* or town proletarians, and the *cafoni* or peasants. These last two classes were miserably poor to the verge of starvation, and utterly ignorant, and

even the *galantuomini* were poor and ignorant as measured by the standards of the north.

Living conditions in the south were so low that it was considered a punishment for a northern civil servant to be sent to Sicily or the province of Naples, while all southern civil servants strove to be assigned to the north. The southerners strove ceaselessly to enter the civil service in which the salaries, modest though they might be, were nevertheless far higher than those obtainable in the south. Ere long, as the inevitable consequence, the vast majority of civil servants were either Neapolitans or Sicilians, who serving all over Italy helped to break down the particularism of their home provinces.

It required the strong arm of the central government to unite the people of the different parts of the peninsula under one set of laws and national customs, and one language.

Victor Emanuel never became an ideal constitutional monarch. He had been born under the absolutist rule of Charles Albert and regarded the *statuto* very much as a necessary evil that his father had been obliged to accept and to endure so as to save the throne. He had taken an oath to support it and did support it in its letter, and having done so believed himself free to violate its spirit, or to twist the letter of the law to his own purposes.

The *statuto* declared the executive power to be vested in the king, and while Victor Emanuel was perfectly willing that his ministers should under ordinary circumstances do the work and assume the responsibility of government, he was by no means willing either to keep hands off when he was greatly interested or to be relegated to the position later occupied by his descendants of a king who rules but does not govern.

During the era of Cavour the king was usually exemplary in his constitutional behavior, not because he so desired but because he could not help himself, for he feared Cavour

almost as much as he disliked him, and knew that any great show of opposition to the prime minister would be promptly and vigorously resented, and that as between himself and his minister the people would support the latter. During the war when at the front and surrounded by his generals he did not hesitate to humiliate Cavour to such an extent as to force the minister's resignation, only to be obliged to receive him back a few months later. When Cavour died conditions changed. None of his successors ever held the chamber in so firm a grip, none of them was as able or as strong. While the king had his likes and his dislikes, he never again feared a prime minister as he had Cavour.

Under Cavour the parliamentary system had been consolidated to such an extent that Victor Emanuel realized that it was out of the question openly to oppose the wishes of the chamber. He had his own ideas of how the greatness of Italy should be achieved and as those ideas differed radically from the policy of Ricasoli, he deliberately began to plot the premier's downfall. He did not dare to attack openly, but by indirection and in the dark he commenced a campaign against his prime minister which was, to say the least, discreditable.

Victor Emanuel was anxious to annex Venetia as soon as possible, with or without the consent of Ricasoli. Using his friend Rattazzi as his agent he tried to induce Napoleon to help him. The emperor was wary and declined, openly at least, to commit himself. Rattazzi then turned to Garibaldi who had been sulking at Caprera ever since his rather pitiable attack on Cavour in the chamber, and induced him to postpone his plan to conquer Rome, in favor of an expedition against the Austrians in Venetia. Ricasoli did what he could to calm the condottiere, but Garibaldi's liking for Victor Emanuel was too great to permit him to listen to reason, and moreover he never in his life was reasonable.

When the chambers met in November 1861 the prime minister found that his majority was drifting from him. He fought as best he could to retain control but by the beginning of the new year he bowed to the inevitable and resigned March 1, 1862, after a prime ministership of a little less than nine months.

The king at once sent for Rattazzi.

Urbano Rattazzi was the antithesis of his predecessor. He was born June 29, 1808, at Alessandria, of middle-class parents, and was a lawyer. In 1848 he was elected by his native city as a deputy in the Piedmontese chamber, and held office as minister of public instruction and afterwards as minister of the interior under Gioberti. On the latter's retirement in 1849 he became head of the government and as such was obliged to bear the parliamentary responsibility for the defeat of Novara, which forced him to resign.

When in 1852 Cavour carried out his so-called "connubio," or "marriage" of the moderate groups of the left and right, Rattazzi received the presidency of the chamber as the price of his support. He was forced out in 1858 but the next year joined the La Marmora cabinet as minister of the interior, retiring in January 1861, and remaining out of office until he became prime minister.

While a man of no great force, or of firm principles, he thoroughly understood the temper of the chamber and was very successful in managing it. He had great tact, patience, and suppleness, and while at first he posed as a liberal, on attaining the prime ministership in 1862 he completely discarded his liberal professions. He had many friends, spoke well, and never hesitated to practise opportunism when opportunism could help his political fortunes.

He early won the favor of the king, and earned the latter's gratitude and affection by encouraging him to marry the Countess Mirafiore, despite the violent opposition of Cavour. He was probably the most intimate friend that Victor Eman-

uel had among the politicians, and he used that friendship without hesitation in the furtherance of his projects.

He was first of all a Piedmontese, who could not visualize a united Italy until it had actually come into being, but as a Piedmontese he was a sincere patriot. His lawyer's mind and his parliamentary instinct made him labor unceasingly for the smooth working of the constitution and for the orderly conduct of parliamentary business, and it is largely due to him that at the most critical period of its life the *statuto* was able to weather the storms which assailed it.

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## CHAPTER IX

1866

**B**EFORE his death Cavour, realizing the inevitability of war with Austria, had begun a reorganization of the army and had made such increases in military supplies and material as his extremely limited resources would permit.

The king and Rattazzi, carrying on Cavour's work, had sought to win the support of Napoleon, but the latter, hanging back, showed himself constantly more unwilling to join in an attack on his former enemy Francis Joseph. They very wisely concluded that single-handed their chances of success were of the slightest and regretfully postponed for the present their hopes of acquiring Venetia.

Unfortunately the king had suggested to Garibaldi the possibility of enlisting the emperor in the Italian cause. Garibaldi had at once assumed the certainty of the emperor's support and had begun to recruit volunteers for an expedition against Tirol, which to the horror of Rattazzi he announced would begin in the immediate future.

It required all the king's influence to induce Garibaldi to give up his purpose and return to Caprera. He had, however, been too much excited by the prospect of active service easily to calm down again. He had hardly returned to Caprera, to the infinite relief of the king and the prime minister, when in June without warning he appeared at Palermo, and called for volunteers for the purpose of attacking Rome. France and Austria immediately demanded explanations of Italy, and the long-suffering Rattazzi was hard put to it to satisfy their anxiety.

Meanwhile Garibaldi flatly refused to listen to the messengers sent by the king, who in the king's name ordered him

to desist from his utterly hopeless adventure, and continued to arouse the enthusiasm of his audiences but not to make much headway with his recruiting. None of his old lieutenants had joined him, and those who enlisted were mostly very young and very worthless.

By the beginning of August Rattazzi reached the conclusion that Garibaldi must be suppressed or that Italy might find herself involved in war with Austria and France. Accordingly on August 17, 1862, Garibaldi was denounced as a rebel, martial law was declared in Sicily, and Cialdini was put in command with instructions to restore order and arrest the condottiere.

The latter on August 24 with 2,000 very poorly equipped volunteers crossed the strait near Reggio, where he found the people very cool in their reception. Four days later on the slopes of Aspromonte he was surrounded by the Italians who opened fire, which was returned. There were a few casualties, but none was killed. Garibaldi was wounded rather badly in the foot and laid down his arms. He was imprisoned in the fortress of Varignano until October, when he was pardoned and returned once more to Caprera.

The news that Garibaldi had been wounded "by an Italian bullet" caused intense excitement throughout Italy, and aroused almost universal sympathy for the old condottiere. The facts that he had been in open rebellion against his country and that before proceeding to extremes the prime minister had treated him with great forbearance were entirely forgotten and Rattazzi was held to blame for having ordered Italian troops to fire upon the national hero.

After Garibaldi had landed at Palermo Rattazzi did everything possible to induce him to abandon his mad purpose of a filibustering attack on Rome. Had he been permitted to proceed and had he captured Rome, Italy would have found herself confronted by both Austria and France, with the probable destruction of the new kingdom as the outcome.



Garibaldi's flat refusal to disband his motley little army, which marching across Sicily gained recruits as it travelled, left the government no other course than to stop him at all costs. The five weeks' not uncomfortable imprisonment to which Garibaldi was subjected was a very mild punishment for an offense that technically at least might have earned the death penalty. It was the wound from "an Italian bullet" that appealed to the popular imagination and aroused the popular indignation. A victim was demanded and Rattazzi stood ready at hand.

Although Rattazzi had done nothing but his plain duty, the chamber turned against him, and finding his majority gone, without waiting for a vote of no confidence, on December 1, 1862, he resigned after nine months of office.

He was succeeded by Luigi Carlo Farini (1812-1866), a physician who had been director general of public health in Rome under Pius IX, commissioner of Piedmont at Modena, and afterwards dictator and lieutenant of Sicily and minister of the interior under Cavour. Farini was an able man who announced his intention of carrying out Cavour's policies. His health, which had never been good, began to break and his mind to fail and by March 1863 he was obliged to resign and retire into private life, after three months of the prime ministry. He was succeeded by Minghetti whose advent marked a radical change in government policy.

Marco Minghetti (1818-1886) was born in Bologna under the papal flag, and early entered politics as a moderate who would have been satisfied had the pope granted a small measure of home rule to Romagna. He was a member of the constitutional convention summoned by Pius, and became minister of public works under Cardinal Antonelli. When the pope declared against the Austrian war, Minghetti resigned office and received a commission as captain in the Piedmontese army. Returning to Rome at the close of 1848 he declined the pope's request to form a government after

the murder of Pellegrino Rossi, and abandoned politics until 1859 when Cavour took him into the foreign office as secretary general, from which post he was sent to Bologna as president of the revolutionary assembly, to prepare for the fusion of Romagna with Piedmont. When Cavour organized the first Italian government he appointed Minghetti minister of the interior, which post he held until after Cavour's death. Farini called him back to office as minister of finance from which post he found it easy to acquire the prime ministership on the resignation of his chief.

He had the reputation of being the most eloquent parliamentary orator of his time, and while a man of no profound convictions was a past master in handling men and in manipulating the chamber.

The first Minghetti ministry is chiefly famous for its anti-Piedmontese attitude. Under the leadership of the Tuscan Ubaldino Peruzzi there had been organized in the chamber a so-called "consorteria," which may be translated "association" or "combine," having for its purpose the exploitation of the non-Piedmontese regions at the expense of Turin. The prime minister gave only unimportant posts to Piedmontese, surrounding himself with aggressive regionalists, including Peruzzi, Visconti-Venosta at the foreign office, and Spaventa at the interior. The latter not only governed through the *prefetti* with an iron hand, but created a secret police worthy of Bourbon Naples and inaugurated a system of press control, through subsidy and what was actually censorship, that endured. In the chamber the group system became a recognized institution, so much so that for the next sixty years no one party ever had a majority of its votes.

To Minghetti belongs the doubtful distinction of having begun the degradation of Italian politics that continued until our own day.

Under Visconti-Venosta the question of the evacuation of Rome by the French garrison was once more resumed with

Napoleon, and on September 15, 1864, what is known as "the September Convention" was signed. Under it Napoleon agreed to withdraw his troops from papal territory in two years' time, in return for which Italy agreed to guarantee the papal temporal power and to remove the capital from Turin to some other city within six months.

The latter clause of the convention was a great triumph for the consorteria and a great blow to the Piedmontese. Cavour and his followers, while always hoping and intending eventually to transfer the capital to Rome, expected to retain it at Turin until that time. When the capital was moved to Florence at the beginning of 1865 great indignation was felt and violently expressed at Turin, and the charge was made, and probably with reason, that the press campaign in favor of Florence had been carried on by the lavish use of secret-service funds.

Minghetti fell, giving place to General La Marmora before the transfer was actually made.

La Marmora's principal activity was in the cause of the acquisition of Venetia, a cause which was very near Victor Emanuel's heart. While the Austrian government had made some concessions to popular feeling in the Veneto by the appointment of the Archduke Maximilian, the emperor's brother and subsequently the ill-starred Emperor of Mexico, as viceroy, and had considerably lightened its rule, the time had passed when the Venetians could be placated. The demand for inclusion in the Italian kingdom became ever more insistent, a demand expressed by unsuccessful uprisings, invariably suppressed with unnecessary brutality.

La Marmora, following Minghetti's example, approached Napoleon in the hope of winning him to the cause of Venetian annexation. The emperor, at first sympathetic to the point of nearly agreeing actively to aid Italy in the acquisition, not only of Venetia, but of the Trentino as well, found that his people were averse to war, and finally declined to

join in hostilities against Austria. He urged an alliance with Prussia whose intentions against Austria were becoming constantly more evident.

Bismarck had for some years sought to win the support of Italy as the only available ally against Francis Joseph. When La Marmora found that Austria would not consider selling Venetia, and that Napoleon was willing to keep hands off in the event of war, he signed a secret treaty with Prussia (April 8, 1866) under the terms of which the two contracting parties agreed to declare war against Austria within three months, the *casus belli* to be the latter's refusal to agree to a reform of the German federal constitution. It was agreed that neither party should make peace without the consent of the other, and that Italy should receive Venetia, and Prussia a territory equal to Lombardy and Venetia combined. Bismarck positively refused to agree to the acquisition of the Trentino by Italy.

Napoleon, at first inclined to join Prussia, was induced to remain neutral by an Austrian promise to give Venetia to Italy no matter what might be the outcome of the war.

The real cause of the so-called "seven weeks' war" was the ambition of both Prussia and Austria to acquire the hegemony of Germany. The ostensible difference that brought on hostilities was over the fate of Schleswig and Holstein, which the two powers had stolen from Denmark two years earlier. Austria insisted that they should be given the status of independent states, and charged Bismarck with wishing to absorb them in Prussia, which he ultimately did.

When the treaty between Prussia and Italy became known it was obvious that war was inevitable. Both powers began to mobilize, while at the same time playing for position so as to make it appear that each was forced into war by the other.

On June 6 a Prussian division under Manteuffel crossed the border of Holstein and the Austrian brigade in occupation

withdrew. Eight days later (June 14) Hanover, Saxony and Württemberg declared in the Bundestag that by so doing Prussia had broken the peace. Prussia replied the next day by marching her troops into Hanover and on the 15th the army of the Elba crossed the Saxon frontier.

On June 20 Italy declared war and Victor Emanuel assumed command of the army with La Marmora, who had resigned as prime minister in favor of Ricasoli, as chief of staff.

The army of new Italy was actually the Piedmontese army greatly expanded. After the war of 1859 it had consisted of five divisions of well seasoned and well disciplined men who had fought gallantly through a victorious campaign. The six intervening years had expanded it to twenty divisions, but had not yet succeeded in bringing the efficiency of the new troops to the standard of the old. The army numbered 250,000 infantry, armed with Minié rifles, 13,000 cavalry, and 480 rifled guns. On the declaration of war 110,000 combatants divided into three corps were assembled in Lombardy, under the direct command of the king, at Lodi, Cremona, and Piacenza, respectively. Seventy thousand men under Cialdini were assembled at Bologna and on the south bank of the Po, while 40,000 volunteers under Garibaldi were at Como to invade Tirol and cover the left flank of the army.

The Austrian army numbered some 75,000 effectives, and stood on a front running from Padua through Vicenza to Verona. Benedek, who had won fame during the past war, was placed greatly against his will in command in Bohemia and not allowed to return to Italy. The supreme command was given to the Archduke Albert, son of the Archduke Charles, the greatest general of his time next to Napoleon. The Archduke Albert, who was almost as great a soldier as his father, had as his chief of staff Marshal von John.

La Marmora's plan of campaign was based on the known inferiority of the Austrian force which he assumed would

necessitate a concentration in front of Verona. He proposed to cross the Mincio and, facing the Austrians in front of Verona, from a position near Custozza hold them there, so as to permit Cialdini to take them at the same moment in the rear.

Unfortunately he failed to allow for the difficulty of Cialdini's march which involved the crossing of a great number of canals and streams, in addition to the Po and Adige, and a journey of sixty miles from the Adige to Vicenza. Instead of giving Cialdini at least four days in which to bring up his force, La Marmora ordered him to move on the same day as the main army, with the result that he had only progressed a short distance when he received the news of Custozza and withdrew to the south bank of the Po without having been engaged.

As a consequence of La Marmora's inexcusable mistake, his available force was reduced to 100,000 men, of whom many left much to be desired in discipline and steadiness, with which to face 73,000 Austrians under one of the greatest generals of his day.

The three days' notice of the declaration of war expired June 23 and at 8 a.m. of that day the Italians began to cross the Mincio. Deceived by the archduke, La Marmora believed that no opposition would be offered to his concentration in front of Verona and accordingly made no adequate preparation for an immediate meeting with the enemy. On the morning of the 24th five columns of Italians unexpectedly met the Austrian army, and were at once engaged. With the exception of the position at Valegio which the Italians held with admirable courage, the Austrians were everywhere successful. Prince Humbert's and Nino Bixio's divisions were held at Villafranca and prevented from taking part in the main action, which was fought mostly in the same steep, hilly country in which had been fought the first battle of Custozza eighteen years before.

By evening Victor Emanuel ordered a general retreat across the Mincio, which was carried out without interference, as the Austrians were as exhausted as the Italians. The retreat was carried beyond the Oglio, and when the archduke began to pursue he heard the news of Sadowa and at once withdrew east of the Mincio. Eventually he received orders to abandon Venetia with the exception of the Quadrilateral, which he forthwith did.

When Victor Emanuel heard that Austria had been defeated at Sadowa he immediately prepared to take the offensive. He proposed to use Cialdini's perfectly fresh troops, with what was available of the army of Custozza, to seize Triest and South Tirol, while at the same time using the fleet to attack the island of Lissa in the Adriatic, and engage the Austrians at sea.

The day that Cialdini crossed the Austrian frontier, July 26, Bismarck, despite his agreement that neither ally should make peace without the consent of the other, had signed an armistice with Austria, which gave the latter a free hand against Italy. Determined not to yield either Triest or the Trentino, she massed upon her southwestern frontier 155,000 men, 40,000 horses, and 4,000 guns. Realizing the hopelessness of facing Austria single-handed, Italy voluntarily evacuated the line of the Isonzo and the Trentino, and peace was signed between Italy and Austria October 3, 1866.

While the main Italian army was fighting at Custozza Garibaldi was engaged in trying to win the Trentino for Italy. He was not, however, the Garibaldi of six years before. Whether it was that he had begun to grow old or whether mountain warfare did not suit him, whether the inferior quality of his volunteers handicapped him, the fact remains that his campaign was a failure.

Although he was supposed to have 40,000 men under him it is probable that not more than 25,000 were effectives, who lacked the mobility and the dash of his men of Sicily. He was

opposed by General Kuhn, an experienced mountain soldier and mountaineer with 12,000 mountain troops, the best the world had seen, or was destined to see until the Italian Alpini were subsequently developed.

Kuhn and his men knew their terrain thoroughly, while Garibaldi was not only ignorant of the country but found fighting in the high Alps a very different matter from manœuvring in the hill country of Sicily. He proposed to keep the enemy occupied on the Stelvio and Monte Tonale while leading his main army in a dash against Trent. After some slight and inconclusive skirmishes the news of the battle of Custozza caused Garibaldi to withdraw from the Tirolean frontier, but after Sadowa he renewed the offensive. On July 15, the Italians marched against Fort Ampola and occupied Storo and Condino. The next day they met Kuhn north of Condino and were defeated. As Kuhn failed to follow up his advantage, Garibaldi once more advanced and seized Fort Ampola, but was again defeated at Bececca and driven back.

Cialdini having no great faith in the volunteers had sent Medici with his division of regulars to seize Trent if possible and to open communications with the hard-pressed Garibaldi. Medici failed to capture Trent and, because of the delay of Garibaldi in moving to meet him, failed in the second part of his objective. The coming of the armistice found Tirol in the hands of the Austrians who occupied the frontier.

Kuhn's campaign had been brilliant and successful, for with 15,000 men he had against 25,000 volunteers and 10,000 regulars preserved Tirol intact for his emperor.

At sea the Italians fared as badly as they had on land. Admiral Count Persano, the Italian commander, blockaded the island of Lissa with orders to land and capture it. He had under his command thirty-four ships of which twelve were ironclads.



The attack on Lissa, begun July 18, failed and the Italians were severely punished. On the 20th the Austrian squadron from Pola arrived under the command of Admiral von Tegetthoff, consisting of fourteen ships of which seven were ironclads.

Persano began the action at 10:45 when Tegetthoff succeeded in separating the Italian ironclads from the wooden vessels, which took no further part in the battle. The Austrian flagship rammed and sank the Italian flagship and the Italian ironclad *Palestro* was blown up. By noon the battle was over, Persano retreating to Ancona, leaving the victorious Austrian in possession of Lissa.

The treaty of Vienna which was signed October 3 brought the war to a close. Austria flatly refused to consider ceding either Trent or the Trentino, as the armistice had found her in possession of both. Napoleon, who had acted as mediator between Prussia and Austria, received Venetia from the latter for the purpose of transferring it to Italy, which he did October 19.

The close of 1866 found United Italy, at long last, in being but with Rome, her logical capital, still to be won.

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## CHAPTER X

1870

**T**WO serious problems faced United Italy, the ignorance and poverty of the people and the Roman question.

The people groaned under a total per capita tax, including national and local, of 38 lire. Less than a quarter of the heads of families had annual incomes of over 250 lire, and only some 33,000 corporations and individuals had incomes of over 10,000 lire. The highest government salary was 20,000 lire, the highest judicial salary was 15,000 lire, while the average parish priest received 800 lire and the average schoolmaster 400 lire. In 1861, 75 per cent of the population was illiterate, and 90 per cent in Naples and Sicily could neither read nor write; even in Piedmont and Lombardy 33 per cent of the men and 50 per cent of the women were illiterates. In 1869, 14 per cent of those charged with crime were homicides. The vote was restricted to literates who paid 40 lire in direct taxes, and to those in business or manufacture with a small property qualification. Before the annexation of Venetia the total number of voters was less than half a million and in 1874 only 2.2 per cent of the population possessed the franchise as against 12.7 per cent in France and 10 per cent in Germany.

A succession of constantly growing deficits had increased the national debt to alarming proportions, and by 1867 it had reached nearly 4,000,000,000 lire. Succeeding prime ministers, whatever may have been their mistakes in other directions, faced the financial situation with courage and success, so that by 1875 the budget had been balanced and Italy could at last see daylight in financial improvement.

The Roman question presented an equally difficult problem, and Ricasoli strove for the realization of Cavour's dream, "a free church in a free state." It was unfortunate that, while negotiations were under way with the Vatican looking to a better understanding, he should have chosen that particular time for the sequestration of the property of the religious orders. What he did was no more than had already been done in almost every other Catholic state in Europe, but he could not expect the Holy See to feel very amiably toward him after having been despoiled. His action showed a remarkable lack of tact, and the consequences were on his own head.

During the autumn of 1866 he forced through parliament an act dissolving almost all the religious houses, their property passing to the state, subject to charges for the payment of pensions to the evicted monks and nuns of from 250 to 600 lire a year, the maintenance of former church charities and the betterment of the parochial clergy.

Apparently to Ricasoli's surprise, Rome received the news of the act of dissolution with intense indignation which tended to widen still further the already existing breach between church and state.

The prime minister's efforts to induce the pope to consent to an accord consisted of two alternative suggestions, either that the pope should retain the Leonine City and a strip of land to the sea, yielding the rest of his possessions to Italy, or that Rome should become a sort of "parade capital" under the nominal suzerainty of the pope, where future kings of Italy should be crowned, the political and actual capital remaining at Florence. In both cases the Church to have absolute freedom, with the guarantee of financial help from the state, the latter yielding its claim to nominate the bishops, the clergy to be under the civil and criminal law, like all other Italians, and the Church to recognize civil marriage.

While Antonelli was inclined to consider Ricasoli's suggestions at least sympathetically, Pius at length decided to reject them finally and absolutely.

Rebuffed by Rome, Ricasoli determined to proceed with the enactment of a free church bill, which would place the Church in exactly the same position as any lay corporation. His bill pleased only the moderates, for it went too far to win the support of the friends of the Church and not far enough to placate its enemies.

After a violent scene in the chamber in which Ricasoli by his usual want of tact and abuse of his opponents alienated many of his friends, a vote of censure was passed by 136 to 104 and the prime minister appealed to the country. Because of the group system which dominated Italian politics, the prime minister was unable to hold the majority he had secured by "making" the election by bribery and intimidation.

On April 4, 1867, the king forced Ricasoli to resign and for the third time called his friend Rattazzi to power.

On October 11, 1866, Napoleon had kept the letter of the September Convention by withdrawing the French garrison from Civitavecchia, but had at the same time deliberately violated it in spirit. The papal army was largely officered and manned by Frenchmen, the French government holding service under the pope to be equivalent to service under the emperor. The papal army was nothing but a section of the French army in everything but name.

Rattazzi never learned the danger of playing fast and loose with Garibaldi, whose simple and straightforward mind was unable to grasp the subtleties of political intrigue. The condottiere, undoubtedly encouraged by the prime minister, announced that, as the September Convention had been violated by France, he proposed to capture Rome and add it to Italy as her capital.

Whereupon, Napoleon protesting, Rattazzi changed front, and washing his hands of the ex-dictator and his plans deter-

mined to have nothing more to do with him. The latter with great wrath denounced the prime minister as the pope's "sbirro" and sought to arouse the country against him, and to raise a force with which to march on Rome.

Rattazzi's reply was to order the immediate arrest of Garibaldi, who on September 23, 1867, was carried back to Caprera. Rattazzi insisted that Garibaldi had given his parole not to leave the island, while the latter stoutly denied that such was the case. Be this as it may, on October 14 he escaped and landed on the Tuscan coast, where he was joined by an incongruous crowd of some 4,000 volunteers.

When Napoleon heard the news he forthwith dispatched an expedition which landed at Civitavecchia twelve days later and joined hands with the papal troops, while at the same time he sent an ultimatum to Italy demanding the dispersal of Garibaldi's little army.

After Garibaldi had reached the mainland Rattazzi, believing the opportunity worth using, had almost openly encouraged the enlistment of volunteers and had made no secret of his intention of letting them join a Roman uprising, if it should occur. The receipt of Napoleon's ultimatum had the contrary effect upon the premier from that intended by the emperor. Instead of arresting Garibaldi and stopping his adventure, he ordered the Italian army to the papal frontier, which was almost equivalent to declaring war against the pope.

War with the pope would have meant war with France as well, and Italy could not possibly have survived. Once more the king showed himself wiser than his prime minister, and ignoring his constitutional limitations as a ruling but not governing sovereign, he interfered and forbade the troop movement.

Rattazzi's last prime ministership had been anything but a bed of roses, for during the year that it had lasted he had been faced with the constant necessity of managing Napo-

leon, Garibaldi, and the king. Managing any one of them would have been very difficult, managing all three at the same time was almost hopeless. Garibaldi was obsessed with the purpose of capturing Rome, while Napoleon was equally determined to protect the temporal power of the pope. At the same time the king, while desiring Rome as the capital of his kingdom, very sensibly hesitated to incur the enmity of Napoleon by forcibly seizing it. Rattazzi who was by nature an intriguer found himself involved in a web of intrigue of his own spinning, between Napoleon and Garibaldi. He was the king's man, who owed his place to his friend and sovereign. As long as Victor Emanuel supported him, his efforts against Rome had some possibility of success. As soon as that support was withdrawn he was bound to fall. There was no course left him but to resign, and after Cialdini had failed to form a government, Menabrea succeeded him.

Meanwhile Garibaldi had been hard at work recruiting. Before crossing the papal frontier he had increased his force to nearly 7,000, but of these over 2,000 deserted on learning that no help was to be expected from Italy. He entered papal territory at the head of some 5,000 ill-equipped and undisciplined volunteers with which to meet a vastly superior force of French and papal troops, and moreover his status was that of a filibuster and an outlaw.

His first effort against the obsolete fortress of Monte Rotonda was successful although it was held only by a garrison of 300 and the Garibaldians required a whole day's fighting for its capture.

Refusing to believe the information sent him by friends in Rome of the French plans, on November 3, 1867, Garibaldi was surprised at the village of Mentana by a greatly superior force of French and papalists, defeated and forced over the frontier where he was arrested and sent back to Caprera.

He had failed miserably as a general, as a leader and as a strategist. It is unfortunate for his memory that he did not die, or at least that he did not retire after his triumphant entry into Naples seven years before. Thereafter almost every public appearance that he made was accompanied by either political or military mistakes.

The defeat of Mentana was a triumph for the papacy and a serious blow to the prestige of Italy. France refused to withdraw her troops, the French prime minister, Rouher, announcing in the chamber that she would never allow Italy to take Rome.

The ill feeling against France aroused throughout the peninsula was used by Bismarck to keep the two countries apart, so as to ensure Italian neutrality in the war between Prussia and France, which he knew to be inevitable.

Victor Emanuel had listened to the suggestion of Beust, the Austrian prime minister, of a triple alliance consisting of France, Austria, and Italy. He found support in Menabrea, who agreed to favor the triple alliance provided France evacuated Civitavecchia, demanding that Austria should cede the Trentino and that Italy should be permitted to occupy Tunis as a naval station. Beust not only agreed to Menabrea's terms but even offered to extend the Italian frontier in the direction of Triest.

Napoleon, however, was obdurate and flatly refused to abandon the pope, and the plan for a triple alliance was perforce given up.

Count Luigi Federico Menabrea, who had been born in Savoy, was so ardent a patriot that he had remained Italian when his native province had been ceded to France. He had begun life as a liberal but had gradually turned to the right, so that by the time he became prime minister he had become a reactionary.

His cabinet was chosen from the extreme right and was faced with the task of restoring the national prestige so

greatly damaged by the defeat of Mentana. What he might have eventually accomplished is problematical, for he was by no means a man of either great ability or force. He had the support of the king, but found that in view of Napoleon's attitude his favorite project for the triple alliance was impossible. He had weathered a defeat during the closing days of 1867, but during the whole of 1868 he retained office only by a constant rearrangement of parliamentary groups, so that early in 1869 it became constantly more evident that it would be impossible for him to survive a concerted attack of the opposition brought at a propitious moment, and the moment arrived with the breaking of the so-called "tobacco scandal."

The finance minister proposed to sell the government tobacco monopoly for 180,000,000 lire to a bank whose shares had, on the publication of the news, risen 70 points. Lanza and Sella had at once organized a vigorous opposition, despite which the bill became a law on August 8, 1868.

There were rumors that the bill had been passed by the use of money, and that not only deputies, but also members of the cabinet were involved in a most shocking scandal. In June 1869 Crispi and a fellow deputy Lobbia openly charged that certain specific members of the chamber had been given shares in the favored bank to influence their votes. Shortly afterwards Lobbia was murderously attacked in Florence, but not killed. He and his friends charged that the partisans of the government were responsible, while the government replied that Lobbia had wounded himself for the purpose of furthering his cause.

He was arrested and tried for "fraudulent simulation of crime," convicted, but acquitted on appeal.

The scandal would not down, and despite Menabrea's desperate efforts to keep his office he was obliged to resign in November 1869. There followed almost a month of crisis. The chamber by a large majority wanted Lanza as prime



minister. He was one of the outstanding politicians of Italy, and had led the fight against the tobacco monopoly bill. The king, however, did not like him, and did all that he could to retain, if not Menabrea, at least some of the latter's ministers. Lanza was elected president of the chamber by a majority of forty, against the candidate of the outgoing ministry, strongly supported by Victor Emanuel. Lanza declared himself in favor of rigorous retrenchment in all departments including the army and navy, and once more the king vigorously opposed him, even hinting that rather than see Lanza prime minister he would either abdicate or suspend the constitution. The chamber declined to be terrorized and in December 1869 Lanza became prime minister, with Quintino Sella at the treasury and Visconti-Venosta at the foreign office.

Take it all in all these three men gave Italy a very efficient government, far better than most of those that were to follow.

Giovanni Lanza (1810-1881) was the first self-made man to be prime minister of Italy. The son of a Piedmontese blacksmith, with no great amount of education, he entered politics as a democrat but gradually became conservative, becoming one of Cavour's most faithful followers. By no means brilliant, he was painstaking and hard working, and even by his enemies conceded to be scrupulously honest and sincere. He was no orator, but won and retained the respect of the chamber and the trust of his friends by his uprightness and integrity. He was a devout Catholic, but nevertheless a strong supporter of Cavour's doctrine of "a free church in a free state."

Quintino Sella (1827-1884) came from a family of professional men and was himself a geologist. In his early days he also had belonged to the left in politics, but had gradually moved to the right center. He became a financial expert and ere long was respected and consulted as the leading financial

authority in the chamber. He was first of all a financier who thought more of the finances of his country than of anything else on earth. He was one of those treasury watchdogs whose breed, especially with us, has become almost extinct, whose one and only ambition in life is a balanced budget, and who care little whom they may offend, or what interests they may antagonize in the accomplishment of their purpose. An honest man through and through, invaluable to his country, but neither lovable nor loved.

Unlike his two colleagues, Marchese Emilio Visconti-Venosta (1829-1914) came from an old Milanese family that had been distinguished for centuries. He began life as a Mazzinian but, realizing the impracticability of his leader, left him, and being expelled from Lombardy went to Turin, where he took service under Cavour. He was a diplomatist by profession, as well as by nature and inclination. A brilliant man of great charm, he served his country many times and in many posts, and always served her well.

Each of the trio had already held cabinet office, Lanza under Cavour as minister of public instruction in 1855 and as finance minister in 1858, and again under La Marmora in 1864, Sella under La Marmora as finance minister, when a quarrel with Lanza forced the latter's resignation, and Visconti-Venosta as minister of foreign affairs under Minghetti in 1863 and under Ricasoli in 1866.

The new cabinet took office pledged to the economy that the disordered condition of the finances imperatively required. It was proposed to cut the army and navy estimates 23,000,000 lire, whereupon a violent opposition developed headed by the king himself. Lanza found that he was not only faced with the open antagonism of the militarists in the chamber but with the far more insidious opposition of Victor Emanuel who, working behind the scenes and relying upon his royal immunity, could not be openly rebuked. Finally

after weeks of finessing a majority was induced to vote for a reduction of 15,000,000 lire.

Economic conditions throughout the country were very bad; in fact, they could not have been much worse. The taxes were cruelly high, and Lanza was unwilling to consider any reduction, convinced that national bankruptcy must at all cost be avoided. In the south many of the people were close to starvation, and social unrest followed almost as a matter of course. It took the form of republican revolutionary agitation having as its object the deposition of the king.

Mazzini assumed the leadership under the impression that his opportunity had at last arrived, and even induced Garibaldi to lend him an academic support. Lanza, acting promptly, arrested Mazzini and imprisoned him at Gaeta, whereupon the dangerous phase of the agitation collapsed.

Almost as important as the settlement of the economic problem was that of the government's relations with the Church. The victory of Mentana had given the papacy great political prestige, which was soon reinforced on the moral side by the outcome of the Vatican council.

On June 28, 1868, the Holy Father issued the bull *Aeterni Patris* convening the 20th Ecumenical Council to meet at Rome December 8, 1869. The purposes of the council were not stated in the bull, and it was not until the following spring that it was semi-officially announced that the question of proclaiming the papal infallibility would be discussed. The council was opened by the pope according to schedule, and began to debate the question of infallibility.

On July 18, 1870, the dogma was approved by 535 votes in the affirmative to 2 in the negative, and was at once proclaimed by the pope. On October 20, the council was prorogued.

The dogma was expressed by the council as follows: "The Roman Pontiff when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when as head of the Church and in virtue of his supreme apostolic

authority he states that a doctrine on faith or morals is binding on the Universal Church, possesses that same infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer thought fit to endow His Church, to define its doctrines with regard to faith and morals; and consequently that these definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable in themselves and not in consequence of the consent of the Church."

Whatever may have been the political effect of the proclamation of the dogma of infallibility, its effect upon the Church itself was far-reaching. It not only consolidated the Church and centralized its power in Rome in the hands of the Holy Father, but it made the latter supreme, reducing the church councils to the position of merely advisory bodies completely under the control of the pope, and it definitely destroyed the doctrine of Gallicanism which had for seventy years been a thorn in the flesh of Rome.

Under the concordat of 1801 Napoleon, then first consul, had after long negotiations reached an agreement with the Holy See under which the latter, spurred by the fear that Jansenism would dominate France, had yielded virtually all control of the French Church, except the investiture of bishops upon the nomination of the French government. The Holy See acquiesced in the seizure of church property and the expulsion of certain religious orders by Napoleon, while the latter agreed to support financially the Church in France.

Shortly afterwards a similar concordat was negotiated between the cisalpine republic and the Vatican.

The example of France was felt far and wide, and the tendency toward national churches became ever more marked, so that Rome had been obliged constantly to defend herself from the inclination of Catholics in many parts of the world toward national independence in everything but name.

As a necessary corollary to the doctrine of Gallicanism it was held by its supporters that the Church was superior to its head, who could be limited in his authority at any time

by a church council, and could even be deposed should he exceed the authority thus granted him.

The acceptance of the dogma of infallibility, making the pope the only source of all power and all authority, once and for all destroyed Gallicanism, and freed the Vatican from a serious menace to its ascendancy.

On July 19, 1870, the day before the council adjourned, France declared war against Prussia. Nine days earlier Napoleon had once more suggested to Victor Emanuel and Beust the forming of a triple alliance. Both welcomed the suggestion, and agreed to join France against Prussia provided Italy were permitted to annex Rome, Beust agreeing to cede the Trentino and part of the Triestino to Italy. As soon as it was known that war was possible, anti-war demonstrations occurred all over Italy as well as in Austria and Hungary. These utterly failed to influence either the Italian king or the Austrian prime minister, who stood fast to the project of an alliance, provided Italy were permitted to occupy Rome. Again Napoleon declined under any circumstances to abandon the pope, and refused absolutely the proposed terms.

August 7, after the defeat of Wörth, Napoleon begged Italy to send him help. Lanza under the urging of Victor Emanuel might have complied had he not received a message from the Italian ambassador in Paris informing him that the empire was doomed.

After the defeat of Gravelotte, Napoleon offered to sacrifice the pope if Italy would send him help, but now even the king had become convinced that to ally himself with France would mean suicide for Italy, and Austria also determined to remain aloof; France went alone to meet her fate on September 3 at Sedan.

The French garrison was withdrawn from Civitavecchia on August 19 and the very next day the chamber began to debate the question of occupying Rome. When the French republic was proclaimed two days after the battle of Sedan,

Italy assumed that the September Convention was dead, as having been negotiated with Napoleon personally, and, the powers having consented, began the march on Rome September 11, 1870.

The 50,000 troops that had been mobilized were under the command of General Raffaele Cadorna, the papal army being under the command of the Bavarian General Kanzler. It had been hoped that Pius would consent to a peaceful occupation of the city, as Antonelli had favored such a course. The pope, however, refused to yield except to force, and Cadorna was ordered to take the city. On the 12th Viterbo and Civita Castellana were occupied, on the 16th Bixio occupied Civitavecchia, on the 17th Cadorna reached Rome, and on the 20th began the bombardment of the city. He easily breached the wall near Porta Pia and entered at the head of his men, twenty-one years after Garibaldi had marched out.

Lanza had striven hard to bring about an accord with the papacy, but entirely without success. The Italian troops did not enter the Leonine City until September 21, when the pope asked them to do so for his protection. Pius retired to the Vatican which he never again left, preserving the fiction that he was a prisoner in Italian hands. From his new home he excommunicated all who had been involved in the capture of Rome, and declined to accept the subsidy that the Italian government offered.

The so-called "Law of Guarantees" was forced through parliament by Lanza March 21, 1871, and strove to realize Cavour's theory of "a free church in a free state." It gave the pope the immunity of a sovereign in his person, the right to maintain the Swiss and Noble Guards, full freedom for the exercises of his religious ministry, with freedom of speech for the clergy and freedom of the press, and the right to send and receive diplomatic representatives. Bishops were not any longer required to swear allegiance to the king, nor be nominated by the government. The pope was given the

palaces of the Vatican, Lateran, and Castel Gandolfo, with quasi-rights of extraterritoriality, and the government agreed to pay him 3,225,000 lire annually. On the other hand civil marriage had already been made compulsory, the clergy had been subjected to the civil law, and religions other than the Roman Catholic had been permitted to enter Italy. On May 15 Pius refused to accept the law and called upon all Roman Catholic states to join in a restoration of the temporal power.

On July 2, 1871, Victor Emanuel moved from Florence to Rome, using as his residence the Quirinal Palace which had been taken from the pope, and on November 27 parliament met for the first time in the new capital.

The occupation of Rome, necessary as it was as a matter of domestic politics, raised an international question which required years for settlement. While the Protestant powers viewed the matter coldly and without interest, the Catholic powers and Catholics everywhere were furious. Refusing to recognize the necessity which impelled Italy to seize Rome as her capital, they supported the pope in his demand for the restoration of the temporal power, and preserved toward the Italian government an attitude of at least veiled hostility that did not disappear for a generation.

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## CHAPTER XI

### THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT

**B**OOTH Cavour and d'Azeglio had expressed the same thought in saying "we have created Italy, it now remains to create Italians."

The new kingdom of "Italia Unita" had been brought into being by the genius of its leaders and the patriotism and heroism of their followers who, never discouraged in the face of obstacles that seemed almost insuperable, had striven unselfishly and constantly for the realization of an ideal.

The vast majority of the inhabitants of the peninsula during the period of the risorgimento were illiterate and profoundly ignorant. As the result of centuries of oppression and misrule they were incapable of political thought or of any intelligent desire to better their condition. The movement for the risorgimento was not in the broad sense popular, for it was the work of a handful of intellectuals, members of the aristocracy and the learned professions, followed by the middle classes in the cities and the larger landholders, who for political purposes constituted "the people," for in 1871 the franchise was restricted to less than 500,000, in a total population of 28,000,000.

United Italy included seven different states whose people spoke some twelve dialects, that had their own literature and might fairly be classed as languages, and a vast number of minor dialects, offshoots of the principal languages. A Venetian was as unable to understand a Neapolitan as was a Roman a Sicilian. Italian in its purity was spoken only in parts of Tuscany, and was in no sense a general medium of communication. In many parts of Italy the aristocracy spoke



French among themselves and the local dialect for general use.

After the union of Italy the leaders and the electorate of the component states continued to think of themselves as belonging not to Italy but to the region of their birth. Until quite recently, although an Italian might when abroad call himself an Italian, he always spoke of himself when at home as a Venetian, or a Neapolitan or a Roman, as the case might be.

In the beginning this spirit of regionalism or particularism was greatly exaggerated by a general jealousy of Piedmont. The charge was constantly made that Piedmont had absorbed Italy, which was true to the extent that Piedmont had led the *risorgimento*, had furnished many of its leaders, had been the focal point of the movement, had given her king to the new state as its first sovereign, and her *statuto* as its constitution.

It speaks well for Ricasoli's broad-mindedness that, Tuscan though he was, he was willing to disregard regionalism and to adopt the Napoleonic system of centralization. Yet centralized as the government became, the local spirit still flourished and it was not until our own day that the Italians were born who had been hoped for by Cavour and d'Azeglio, Italians speaking the same language and united in their devotion to the nation as a whole.

Giovanni Lanza, the first prime minister of new Italy, was faced with a task that was almost beyond the possibility of accomplishment. The welding together of seven heterogeneous states into one homogeneous whole, the education and development of an ignorant and poverty-stricken people into an intelligent and patriotic Italian nation, the expansion of total financial resources of less than half a billion lire into ten times that amount without ruining the country by overtaxation, were tasks that might perhaps have been performed in a generation had Cavour been spared to live out

his life. But Cavour was dead, and none of his followers or successors, not even Lanza, measured up to his greatness.

Lanza and his immediate successor Minghetti did their best and accomplished much, but their best was not enough and it required more than half a century of government, sometimes good, sometimes bad, sometimes very bad indeed, to people the Italy of the *risorgimento* with the Italians of Cavour's and d'Azeglio's dreams. The chamber of deputies never understood party government any more than any Latin race has ever understood democracy. In no country on earth except in those of Nordic peoples has party loyalty or party discipline existed in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the terms.

It is true that three well organized parties have emerged in Italian politics during the last thirty years: the socialist, which when faced with its first great opportunity broke into factions bitterly opposed to each other, neutralized itself, and died; the *popolari*, who were nothing but the supporters of the Holy Father, who, having attained great influence under the leadership of Don Luigi Sturzo, at the command of Pius XI disbanded and disappeared; and the fascisti who are essentially the loyal and devoted supporters of the great man who called them into being.

The curse of Italian politics, as it has been the curse of politics in every great continental state, has been the group system. The natural tendency of all Italian politicians has been not to belong to a great political party but to follow some individual political leader. These leaders might and usually did profess to belong to a party bearing a distinctive name, such as the right, the left, the old left or whatever it might be, but their followers were held together not by party ties but by the hope that some day their chief might become prime minister and that they would be able to share in the resultant spoils, either for themselves or for their constituents.

In no country on earth has politics been so personal as in Italy. Governments have always been formed by the combination of a number of groups, sufficiently numerous to assure a majority to the prime minister of the moment. Governments have remained in office as long and only as long as the leaders of the component groups remained loyal to the prime minister. As this loyalty depended largely on the gratification of the personal ambitions of the group leaders and the prime minister's ability to satisfy the lesser ambitions of their parliamentary followers, it necessarily followed that governments were short lived. During the half century between 1871 and 1922 there were thirty-five governments, averaging one year and five months of life, and nineteen prime ministers averaging two years and seven months of office. Of the prime ministers three totalled a service of twenty-seven years, or an average of nine years, Depretis serving for nine years, Crispi for six years and Giolitti for twelve years; the other sixteen prime ministers averaged a service of one year and five months. That Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti were in power off and on for so long was due to their extraordinary ability in manipulating the groups, by constantly changing the personnel of their cabinets. The politicians who ruled Italy during the first half century of her life were opportunists in the crudest sense, frankly and unashamed.

The early parliaments of Italy were divided rather vaguely into two main groups called euphemistically the "parties of the right and of the left." To the right belonged the close friends and followers of Cavour, the men who had been responsible for shaping the policies that had brought the *risorgimento* into being. They were the "elder statesmen" of new Italy, and while none among them measured up to the intellectual greatness or the marvellous ability in handling men of their former leader, they included Ricasoli, Lanza, Minghetti, La Marmora, Visconti-Venosta, Peruzzi, Sella,

and Spaventa, a group of able and honest men of which any country might well be proud. Most of them were aristocrats by birth; they were in the best sense the aristocracy of Italian politics, and were in power in Piedmont and later in the new Italian kingdom, with short intervals of temporary eclipse, from 1849 to 1876.

To the left belonged the young men and the new men, the men of action, the ex-Garibaldians and the ex-republicans. They were those who, being excluded from the close corporation that was the right, were determined at all cost to attain power, and power could only be attained by the destruction of the ruling group. For the moment, this common ambition gave the very discordant elements that constituted the so-called left a certain unity of purpose and a certain homogeneity of action. Realizing that their interests lay in constant opposition, they opposed the government in season and out of season on every question and in every possible way. Policies and measures were bitterly fought, only to be adopted and carried to completion, after the fall of the right, by the very men who had opposed them.

The foreign policy of Visconti-Venosta, who was foreign minister during the governments of Lanza and Minghetti, advocated friendly relations with the great powers, especially with those of Central Europe; the left signed the triple alliance. The right, while insisting on an absolutely secular state, strove to improve relations with the Vatican; the left, on the death of Pius IX, persuaded the college of cardinals to hold their conclave in Rome. The right strove to balance the budget by decreasing expenditures and greatly increasing taxes, against the frantic objection of the left, who were charged with constantly endeavoring to increase expenditures and reduce taxation. On assuming office, the first prime minister of the left, Depretis, announced that he would not yield a single lire of revenue, or do anything to disturb the balanced budget. The left charged the right with being re-

actionary, and yet the right enacted more progressive legislation during its five years of office in the new kingdom than did the left in a generation. The truth was that the policy of the left was demagogic, seeking power at any price, while the leaders of the right, who were mostly elderly men, made the fatal mistake of distrusting their opponents and of refusing to absorb the leaders of the left as they might very probably have done. It was perfectly obvious that sooner or later the right would be driven from power and its leaders from public office.

The Lanza government began the life of united Italy faced with national bankruptcy. Sella, the finance minister, found a net deficit of 212,500,000 lire with taxation apparently at its maximum. With great courage he faced the difficulty by forcing through the chamber a tax on flour, usually called the grist tax, which raised 80,000,000 lire of revenue, and by drastic economies he was able to reduce the deficit to 50,000,000 lire at the close of 1871.

In France the attitude of Thiers, who viewed with undisguised suspicion the growth of the new Italian state, the increase of clericalism, and the anti-Italian attitude of the French press convinced the Italian government that the sooner the army was reorganized and made efficient, the better chance would Italy have to withstand the possible outcome of French ill will.

Accordingly, reversing their early efforts for possible military economy, the cabinet charged General Ricotti, minister of war, with the task of army reform, but the first steps in that direction resulted in swelling the deficit to 200,000,000 lire by 1872.

Sella succeeded in tiding over the emergency by increasing taxation and by refunding government loans at a lower rate of interest.

Meanwhile Minghetti had quarrelled with Lanza and, forming a coalition of his own followers, the Tuscan group

under Correnti and the left under its new leader Depretis, Rattazzi having died June 5, 1873, he succeeded in overturning the government, June 23, 1873, and himself became prime minister. Visconti-Venosta was retained in the foreign office, and Lanza's policies were generally carried out; there was really no change, except that the new prime minister became finance minister in place of Sella and that the cabinet depended for life on the votes of the prime minister's former enemies.

Visconti-Venosta found relations with France becoming constantly more strained. He realized that in the then condition of Italian finances, with the army not yet reorganized and with the navy practically non-existent, a breach with France would be fatal to Italy. To offset this weakness he sought, if not an alliance, at least an understanding with some other power. Britain because of her policy of isolation was out of the question. There remained only Austria and Germany, and a rapprochement with these two powers was accomplished in 1873. Victor Emanuel visited the two emperors, who subsequently returned the visits, although not going to Rome on account of papal susceptibility.

When Marshal MacMahon succeeded Thiers the tension with France relaxed. Nevertheless General Ricotti continued his efforts in army reform and on June 7, 1875, parliament enacted a comprehensive plan that he had prepared while at the same time the creation of a new navy was undertaken.

Despite the great cost of army and navy building, and the purchase by government of the railroads, Minghetti succeeded in gradually rehabilitating the finances so that his last budget, that for 1876, showed a surplus of 18,000,000 lire.

The opposition had for some time been bitterly fighting the government on its policy of high taxes and large expenditures. The attitude of the anti-governmental leaders was, to say the least, inconsistent, for while conceding the necessity

of army and navy reorganization they vigorously objected to its cost.

Depretis, the leader of the left, was assisted by Cesare Correnti, an able and thoroughly unscrupulous parliamentarian. Born in Milan January 3, 1815, a newspaper man by profession, he devoted his early years to a very courageous opposition to Austrian rule, not only with his pen but, during the Five Days, with his sword. Moving to Turin, Cavour sent him to the chamber of deputies in 1849, where he faithfully served his patron. From having been a radical he changed to conservatism under Cavour, became councillor of state in 1860 and minister of education in 1867 and 1869. He was part author of the Law of Guarantees and helped to organize the occupation of Rome in 1870. His personal following in the chamber, especially among the Tuscan deputies, was considerable. A bitter quarrel with Lanza, whom he charged with ingratitude, caused him to join Minghetti in the former's overthrow, while a subsequent quarrel with Minghetti drove him into the arms of Depretis and the left. He now became an extreme radical and ardent supporter of Depretis.

The government found itself steadily losing ground. Minghetti, by his flirtation with the left, had made himself thoroughly suspect among his former friends of the right. Lanza never forgave him for what many called his treason, and was not over-anxious to save him from destruction. On the other hand, still calling himself a conservative of the right, Minghetti had never succeeded in winning the confidence of his new friends and lived from day to day by their sufferance. On March 18, 1876, Depretis, believing that his hour had come, turned on the man whom he had placed in office and with Correnti's help voted a solid left against the government. The right gave but a half-hearted and partial support to the man whom they disliked, and so fell Minghetti, the last conservative prime minister.

The right had passed, never as a party to resume power. Some of its leaders formed alliances with this or that left politician, some formed groups of their own, and in certain cases held office again. But the right as the party of the elder statesmen, joined together in public office, had gone forever.



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## CHAPTER XII

### DEPRETIS

THE right had held office, with a few brief interludes, ever since 1849. With its passing went the only semblance of party government that Italy has known, for the advent of the so-called left inaugurated that era of personal and opportunist rule that lasted until our own day.

Theoretically liberals, the men of the left had violently opposed almost every constructive proposal of the right, only to follow haltingly and inefficiently in the latter's footsteps on attaining power.

In the new cabinet Depretis took the ministry of finance, giving that of foreign affairs to Melegari, a former Mazzinian and minister to Switzerland, the interior to Nicotera, a former Garibaldian with anything but a spotless past, and public works to Zanardelli, who had been one of the most violent radicals in the chamber.

Agostino Depretis (1813-1887) was born a Piedmontese near Stradella, January 31, 1813. In early life a Mazzinian, a republican and a member of Giovane Italia, he became a deputy in 1848, when he threw aside his republicanism and started a newspaper, *Il Diritto*, which was monarchist but radical. He was a member of the Rattazzi cabinet of 1862, and of the Ricasoli cabinet of 1866, and on the death of his chief, Rattazzi, in 1873 he became the leader of the left groups. He was a man of fair ability and conveniently unfixed principles, not a statesman, but a trimming politician who was willing to sacrifice his opinions of today, if by so doing he could attain office tomorrow.

Foreign affairs did not interest him, and he was content to leave their conduct in the hands of his foreign minister,

provided the latter did not entangle Italy in her dealings with other countries. He was quoted as having said, "When I see an international question on the horizon, I open my umbrella and wait until it has passed."

He is chiefly remembered for being the joint author with Minghetti of the policy of "trasformismo" that did so much to corrupt and debase Italian politics. Under trasformismo majorities in the chamber were made by uniting men of the most diverse opinions, from the left and from the right, by the "cohesive power of public plunder."

Depretis began his administration by adopting practically all of the policies of his predecessors, including army and navy reform, purchase of the railways, financial readjustment, and even the grist tax that had been so loudly denounced by his supporters. The only real change which he advocated was the extension of the franchise, which was not accomplished until five years later.

Nicotera proved himself at the interior far more despotic than had any of his predecessors. He forbade radical or republican meetings and imprisoned their authors, suppressed or suspended newspapers, dissolved labor unions and sent recalcitrant strikers to the penal settlements on the islands. The rights of free speech, free assembly, and free press were all limited or denied by this self-styled liberal member of a self-styled liberal cabinet.

The general election of November 1876 was a triumph for the left. Nicotera, by the unblushing use of corruption and intimidation, "made" the election with such success that 421 supporters of the government were returned and only 87 supporters of the right. Nicotera had overplayed his hand and returned a majority that was so large as to be unwieldy and soon gave signs of breaking up.

By the following year Nicotera's past had begun to plague him. Much scandal was created by Zanardelli's refusal to authorize the construction of a railway in Calabria, on the

ground that Nicotera held the controlling financial interest. When the latter was charged with tampering with private telegrams, the storm burst in the chamber and Depretis, bowing before it, reconstructed his cabinet by dropping Nicotera, Zanardelli, and Melegari, he himself assuming the foreign office and placing Magliani in finance and Crispi in the interior.

Crispi had at last attained cabinet rank. This old Mazzinian, Garibaldian, and republican plotter had become one of the strongest supporters of the monarchy. While he called himself a liberal, his liberalism never hampered him in pushing his own fortunes or in accomplishing the purpose that he had immediately in view. At the interior he proved himself to be even more arbitrary and more drastic than had Nicotera.

While the left during the years of the right had favored a rapprochement with the central powers, Depretis was extremely Francophil, which aroused the undisguised suspicions of Germany and Austria. The increasing influence of the latter in the Adriatic led the prime minister to send Crispi on a species of "goodwill tour" to Paris, Berlin, and Vienna in the effort to obtain some compensation for the Austrian success, but Crispi who fancied himself as a diplomat accomplished nothing whatever.

In the beginning of 1878 both Victor Emanuel and Pius IX died, and Crispi was successful in not only assuring the peaceful accession to the throne of Humbert, but also in convincing the cardinals of the desirability of holding their conclave at Rome. He gave them the choice of either holding the conclave abroad, in which event he frankly told them that they would not be permitted to return, or of holding it in Italy under his guarantee of independence. They wisely chose the latter course and elected the greatest pope of modern times, Leo XIII.

In March 1878 a rearrangement of the groups in the chamber resulted in Depretis' fall, the premiership being assumed by Cairoli with Count Corti, former Italian minister to the United States, at the foreign office.

The first Cairoli ministry, which lasted only nine months, was marked by the enactment of some exceedingly unsound financial legislation and the holding of the Congress of Berlin. The occupation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, authorized by the congress, an occupation that had been voted for by Count Corti, not only marked Cairoli for defeat but greatly increased the anti-Austrian feeling throughout Italy and stimulated the spirit of irredentism. The secret committees that existed in the north, pledged to the redemption of the Trentino and Triest, began openly to agitate, and Austria charged that the government, led by an ex-Garibaldian, did nothing in the matter except apologize.

In December 1878 Depretis succeeded Cairoli and on July 12, 1879, Cairoli returned to power, to reorganize his government with the help of Depretis in the following November.

The second and third Cairoli administrations were notable for the demoralization of the finances and the affair of Tunis.

The finances fell into a condition bordering on anarchy. The surplus disappeared, and although revenue was sadly needed the grist tax was abolished and a loan of 650,000,000 lire was placed abroad, ostensibly to permit the withdrawal of the unprotected paper money, actually to meet the expenses of government. The financial condition of the larger cities, especially Rome, Florence, and Naples, required direct national help and the deficit increased unchecked.

While Cairoli inexcusably muddled the finances, his mis-handling of the Tunisian question dealt the severest blow to her prestige ever received by new Italy.

With Tunis actually his for the taking, a plum ripe and ready to fall into his lap, with the importance of its acquisition evident to all, it is inconceivable why Cairoli should have deliberately refused the greatest opportunity ever given or to be given his country for colonial expansion.

The story of the loss of Tunis by Italy begins with the close of the Russo-Turkish war.

Having dictated the peace of San Stefano at the war's close, Russia bitterly resented the outcome of the congress of Berlin, under which she saw herself deprived of practically all the political and territorial advantages she had proposed to seize from Turkey. She was particularly incensed that Austria should be rewarded for her pusillanimous neutrality by being allowed to annex, under the fiction of an occupation, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, and that in carrying out the delimitation of the Austrian accessions the German representatives should have always voted against Russia. Moreover, just before the beginning of the Turkish war, Germany had declined to pledge herself to neutrality in the event of Russian hostility against Austria.

The anger of Russia was directed not only against Austria, but even more so against Germany. While in the spring of 1879 Cairoli and Waddington, the Italian and French prime ministers, were unsuccessfully approached on the subject of joining Russia in a war against Austria, Russian regiments were mobilized on both the Austrian and German frontiers.

Bismarck realized that while the league of the three emperors, the Dreikaiserbund, still existed in theory at least, it was so sorely damaged that Germany stood in great need of reinsurance against her Russian ally.

Accordingly he approached Andrassy, the Austrian foreign minister, with the view of joining with Germany in a defensive alliance against Russia, and if possible against France as well. Andrassy was quite willing to protect Ger-

many against Russia but was unwilling to agree to proceed to extremities against France, unless the latter were supported by the Tzar.

Bismarck found an unexpected obstacle in the unwillingness of the German emperor to ally himself against Russia or even to believe that the latter had any but the kindest feelings toward Germany. It required all his power of persuasion and address and the threat of his resignation to convert the old man to his point of view, and it was not until October 7 that the treaty was signed, to be ratified nine days later.

Both powers declared in a protocol their friendship for Russia, their intention to negotiate new commercial treaties with her, and their determination to abide by the results of the Congress of Berlin. They announced that they had no intention of ever changing their purely defensive attitude into one of aggression.

In the treaty proper they agreed that were either attacked by Russia the other would join its ally, and that peace would be concluded only in common; that should either be attacked by another power, the other would "observe at least benevolent neutrality. Should, however, the attacking party be supported by Russia, either by active cooperation or by military measures which constitute a menace, the other shall aid," this obviously referring to France. The treaty was to run for five years, and to be further extended for a period of three years unless notice to the contrary were given one year before its expiration. It was to be kept secret except in the event of some menacing act on the part of the Tzar, whereupon he was to be informed, confidentially, that an attack on one of the allies would be considered an attack on both.

While the terms of the treaty were not published until 1888, its general tenure was very soon known. Although in the beginning a shock to Russia, it did not by any means produce the ill feeling that might have been expected. In fact,

relations became increasingly friendly so that by 1881 it was possible to revive the Dreikaiserbund, which was done in a secret treaty signed June 18 and which was to last for three years.

The three powers agreed that if one of them should go to war with a fourth power the other two would preserve a benevolent neutrality and try to localize operations; they recognized the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles; while Russia and Germany agreed to respect the interests of Austria acquired under the treaty of Berlin.

At the close of 1881 Bismarck found himself insured against possible attack by France, by treaties with Russia and Austria, and by the friendship of Britain, due largely to the latter's tension with the French republic.

Four years earlier Crispi, then president of the chamber, during his goodwill tour had felt out Bismarck as to whether Germany would make a treaty with Italy to join with the latter in case of attack by either France or Austria. Bismarck replied that he would support Italy against a French attack but not against an attack by Germany's ally Francis Joseph.

For the moment the negotiations came to nothing, but four years later they were renewed under very much altered circumstances.

Tunisia is Italy's nearest African neighbor, the distance from Cape Bon to Cape Feto in Sicily being only 85 miles and from the city of Tunis to Marsala only 145 miles. It has a superficial area of 49,000 square miles, almost half that of the Italian peninsula, and more than twice that of Sicily, with a cultivable area of nearly 7,500,000 acres, 10 per cent larger than the entire area of Sicily, with a population of only about 1,500,000; rich in phosphates, iron, zinc, and lead, and with an equable climate not unlike that of Sicily, it was admirably adapted for colonization and exploitation by Europeans.

As early as 1862 Italian statesmen began to think of Tunisia as a possible if not probable Italian colony in the not

distant future. Far-sighted Italians realized that if population should continue to grow it would only be a question of time when some outlet would be required for their nationals who were finding it constantly more difficult to make a living at home. Tunisia was the ideal Italian colony, for not only was it the nearest undeveloped and available territory, but what was of even as much importance it commanded with Sicily the narrowest part of the Mediterranean.

In 1869 Tunisia became bankrupt and Italy joined with Britain and France in administering Tunisian finances, and in 1880 bought from the British the railway from Tunis to Goletta. By this time a large number of Italians had settled in Tunisia and constituted the majority of the foreign population in the capital, where Italian was the foreign language generally in use. The time seemed to have arrived for the formal acquisition of Tunisia, an event that public men throughout the world expected to occur at any moment.

At the Congress of Berlin Germany, Austria, and Russia had suggested that in return for Austria's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Italy should compensate herself in Tunisia, but for some unaccountable reason the suggestion failed to impress either Cairoli or his foreign minister Corti and it was declined. Immediately thereafter and almost under the eyes of Corti, Bismarck smoothed out the difficulty between France and Britain, due to the taking over of Cyprus by the latter, by bringing Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington together in an agreement, later reduced to writing, that when she might see fit France should seize Tunisia with the approval of Great Britain, this agreement being subsequently ratified by the Gladstone government.

So secretly were the negotiations conducted that although Corti was in almost daily association with the principals at Berlin, he never had the slightest suspicion of what was going on.



France proceeded to make ready for the capture of Tunisia while Cairoli lived in a fool's paradise, convinced that Britain would through friendship for Italy never permit France to cross the Tunisian border.

In the early spring of 1881 France began to move troops into the Kroumir, on the border between Algeria and Tunisia. On May 11 the French foreign minister, Barthelemy St. Hilaire, solemnly assured the Italian ambassador in Paris that France had no intention of occupying any part of Tunisian territory except some points in the Kroumir for the purpose of protecting Algeria from native raids.

When this assurance was given the French expeditionary force had already reached Tunis, where the next day, May 12, the bey was forced to sign the treaty of El Bardo giving to France the protectorate of his country.

The repercussion of the news upon the Italian public was immediate and violent. They saw the colonial hopes of Italy in Tunis shattered, the ruin of the Italian settlers, and the permanent occupation of land almost within gun-range by a power that had grossly and meanly deceived them.

Very naturally Cairoli was held largely responsible. Corti had boasted that he had returned from Berlin with "clean hands," which was quite true, but they were also empty hands while they might have brought back the protectorate of the regency now lost to Italy forever.

On May 14 Cairoli resigned and sank into well deserved obscurity, Depretis succeeding him and carrying on with the same cabinet except the former prime minister, whose place at the foreign office was taken by Mancini.

When the French troops, returning from Tunisia, landed at Marseilles the event was celebrated by the murder of a number of Italian workmen. Depretis, despite his strong Francophil attitude, found himself obliged to protest by the mobilization of some of the army reserves, which was

very embarrassing as he was in the process of negotiating a commercial treaty with the French government.

The Third Republic had failed signally to carry on the friendship for Italy that had existed under Napoleon III, and despite Depretis' every effort toward a good understanding it became constantly more evident that if Italy was to live in security she must find friends elsewhere than in France, the only alternative being the central powers.

Among Italian politicians the line was very clearly drawn between those who were Francophil and those who favored an alliance with Germany and Austria. Among the former were Lanza, Bonghi, and Peruzzi, while among the latter were Crispi and Minghetti. Depretis favored an alliance with the central powers, provided it could be accomplished secretly so as not to imperil the commercial treaty with France that was so near to his heart.

At first the central powers remained cold to the suggestion of an alliance. Depretis' irredentism had antagonized Austria, while the constant appeals of the Holy See for help touched the Catholic Austrians and influenced Bismarck, who was trying to bring to his support the Catholic center party in Germany. Besides, as a military power Italy was singularly weak.

After months of negotiations Mancini succeeded in inducing Bismarck to agree to an alliance and, the latter bringing pressure on Kalnoky, the Austrian foreign minister, the treaty was finally signed May 20, 1882, five days after the ratification of the Italian commercial treaty with France.

Under the terms of the treaty, which was to last for five years, it was agreed that should any of the contracting powers be attacked the other two would join in resistance "within the limits of their own interests"; should anyone be menaced and be obliged to declare war the other two would preserve a benevolent neutrality, but should anyone be menaced by two or more powers then all would join in the war. It was

further agreed by Austria and Italy that if possible the status quo should be maintained in the East, but if this should prove to be impossible then neither should occupy any territory temporarily or permanently, without the consent of the other and adequate compensation.

Kalnoky was anxious that the treaty should be kept secret, but both Bismarck and Mancini repeatedly hinted of its existence and finally a year after its signature Mancini openly acknowledged it.

Mancini's announcement was received with very mixed feelings by the Italians. As it allied the best friend of the papacy with its worst enemy, the Catholics saw in it a serious setback to their hopes of a restoration of the temporal power; the Francophils, who included most of the radical ex-republicans, deplored it, as alienating their country from republican and more or less liberal France; while on the other hand the majority of Italians welcomed it as rescuing Italy from her isolation and giving her needed support in case the tension with France should become more acute in the future.

The alliance between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other did not tend to flatter Italian pride, and during the first period of the triple alliance, at least, relations among its members while correct were never anything warmer.

Mancini did his best to smooth the ruffled feelings of France, and ostentatiously declined Britain's invitation to join with her in restoring order in Egypt.

In the effort to neutralize the bad impression caused by Cairoli's loss of Tunisia, Depretis on February 5, 1885, occupied Massowah, a small seaport on the African coast of the Red Sea, and was immediately defeated in the chamber.

Sacrificing Mancini, he reconstituted his cabinet with Count di Robilant at the foreign office.

Robilant showed himself to be the best foreign minister Italy had had since Visconti-Venosta. He showed firmness and tact in handling foreign relations, succeeded in reaching a diplomatic understanding with Britain for common naval action in the Mediterranean in case of war, and in 1887 renewed the triple alliance for a further term of five years.

While Depretis reestablished the gold standard, his financial management was so bad and his extravagance so great that a budget surplus of 25,000,000 lire at the beginning of his rule was turned into a deficit of 250,000,000 at its close.

Public works were undertaken with neither coherence of plan nor actual necessity, roads were built to please political followers, and the railways were leased to three private companies on terms that made it certain that sooner or later the government would be obliged to resume their operation.

Yielding to the demand of his more radical followers he liberalized the franchise and increased the number of voters from half a million to two million.

The extension of the franchise brought into being a new element in politics, the so-called "grand' elettori" or great electors. These were really petty bosses, controlling groups of voters. They were in some cases employers of labor, either landed proprietors or owners of small industrial enterprises, or as was more often the case men of political instincts who recruited small followings whose loyalty they retained by the use of money or political favors handed down to them by the prefetti or the deputies.

They became an element that had to be reckoned with, for upon them very largely depended the delivery of the vote on election day.

While to a certain extent the work of the prefetti was simplified, as they were now able to do much through the grand' elettori, they were at the same time faced with a great increase of those demanding governmental favors, and in many instances direct money payments. Nevertheless in the

hands of competent prefetti, elections continued to be "made" satisfactorily as they always had been.

The occupation of Massowah was a step forward in the policy of colonization which Italy had inaugurated five years earlier, when the crown colony of Assab had been established in and around the Red Sea port of that name, which had been bought with government money in 1869 by Rubattino, the same Genoese shipowner whose vessels Garibaldi had used in his Sicilian expedition.

The colonial projects of Italy caused the Abyssinian negus great anxiety, and convinced him that the Italian government had equivocal intentions against his throne. There was a certain amount of fighting between Italian and Abyssinian troops, the latter under the command of Alula, ras of Tigre, in which the Italians were more or less successful.

On January 25, 1887, a small Italian expedition of 547 officers and men, commanded by Colonel de Cristoferis, was surprised by Ras Alula at the head of a greatly superior force at the village of Dogali and annihilated, only one enlisted man escaping to tell the story.

When the news of the disaster reached Italy the excitement was intense. The chamber at once voted no confidence in the government, which resigned on April 4, 1887, only to be followed by a "transformed" government with the recently defeated Depretis at its head, but with Robilant eliminated and Crispi at the interior.

On July 29, 1887, Depretis died after what had been a virtual dictatorship of Italian politics of eleven years, during nine of which he had been prime minister, and Crispi succeeded him in office.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### CRISPI

OF THE three men who dominated Italian politics between 1876 and 1922, Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti, Francesco Crispi was the ablest, the strongest and the most attractive. He was no more scrupulous and far more arbitrary than the other two, but at least he was straightforward and perfectly frank in his unscrupulousness and in his despotism.

Born at Ribera, Sicily, in 1819 of Albanian ancestry, by profession a lawyer, he early fell under the spell of Mazzini and devoted himself until 1860 to conspiring with his leader for the creation of an Italian republic. He was expelled in turn from Sicily, Naples, Malta, Piedmont, and France, and was one of the first of Garibaldi's Thousand, being one of the organizers of the expedition. On the capture of Palermo, Garibaldi placed him in virtual charge of the civil government, a charge he filled so badly that he was soon forced to resign. In 1861 he entered the Italian parliament as an aggressive, uncompromising republican, but three years later abjured republicanism and declared for the monarchy, and was ever after one of its strongest supporters.

He was largely responsible for preventing the proposed alliance with France in 1870, and for forcing Giovanni Lanza to move the capital from Florence to Rome. On the passing of the right in 1876 he was elected president of the chamber, and a year later succeeded Nicotera as minister of the interior under Depretis. During his seventy days of office he showed himself a forceful administrator and a good executive.

After the fall of the second Depretis government, Crispi was charged with having committed bigamy, and while the charge was never legally proved it was sufficiently serious to force him into the background and keep him out of office until 1887, when he returned to the ministry of the interior in the last Depretis government and, as we have seen, succeeded the latter on his death.

On assuming the prime ministership Crispi retained the interior and also assumed foreign affairs.

Taken as a whole, Crispi's two governments, covering a total of six years, were probably the most efficient that Italy has had until our own day.

At home, public order was well maintained, irredentist and radical agitations being mercilessly suppressed, while new penal, sanitary, and commercial codes were adopted. Under Giolitti at the treasury the finances were very badly managed, and but little was done to reduce the deficit of nearly a quarter of a billion lire.

In foreign affairs Crispi drew away from France, and worked unceasingly to increase cordial relations with Germany and Austria.

On December 15, 1886, the prime minister denounced the commercial treaty with France, the treaty that had been negotiated by Depretis with so much care and trouble. His action was the culmination of a series of unpleasant incidents that had occurred to accentuate the long-standing friction between the two countries, and the result was altogether to the prejudice of Italy.

Ill feeling greatly increased, for Italy not only lost her best customer for her wine but, when France began a campaign against Italian securities, conditions became serious.

Germany had some time previously awakened to Italy's economic possibilities, and German capital had founded the Banca Commerciale which soon became the largest and strongest non-governmental bank in Italy.

It was to the Banca Commerciale and to German capitalists that Crispi turned in his hour of need. Help was forthcoming, and German finance seized the opportunity of establishing itself on the peninsula to its own great profit and undoubtedly to the profit of Italy as well.

The ill will between France and Italy engendered by the seizure of Tunis was increased by the denunciation of the commercial treaty, and did not die down until after Crispi had passed away.

An earnest practitioner of the policy of *trasformismo*, when the prime minister found his supporters of the left becoming lukewarm he did not hesitate to ally himself with what remained of the right, although he had hitherto bitterly fought them.

On January 31, 1891, Crispi, who was a brilliant and impassioned but often indiscreet orator, lost his temper and in debate attacked his friends of the right, who at once joined his enemies of the left and voted him out of office, replacing him with Marchese di Rudini, the leader of the right, who formed a typical *trasformismo* cabinet of the right and the extreme left.

While Rudini accomplished very little at home in reducing expenditures or in balancing the budget, his foreign policy was marked by several notable accomplishments. Although a Francophil, he recognized the importance of the triple alliance, which he renewed in June 1891 for a term of twelve years, at the same time informing Russia that its purpose was strictly defensive. He also brought to a successful conclusion the negotiations for commercial treaties with Germany and Austria which Crispi had begun, and agreed with Great Britain in fixing the British and Italian spheres of influence in northeast Africa.

On May 5, 1892, he was defeated in the chamber and succeeded by Giolitti who had been minister of the treasury under Crispi.



Giovanni Giolitti was born at Mondovì in Piedmont, October 27, 1842. Like most Italian politicians he was a lawyer, and had held various minor offices when in 1882 he was appointed to the council of state and elected to the chamber from Cuneo, a constituency that he continued to represent until his death in 1928.

He was prime minister five times, covering a total period of twelve years, and from 1903 to 1922 was undoubtedly the most influential of Italian politicians, being for all practical purposes during that time the national political "boss."

Lacking the fiery eloquence of Crispi, with no transcendent ability as an administrator, with no profound knowledge of either finance or of government, he was endowed with a real genius for the handling of men, for the manipulation of the chamber, and for the smaller sort of politics that dominated his period. He had a personal following that clung to him through thick and thin, and that stood by him in the face of scandals that would have wrecked any one of his contemporaries.

He was an opportunist, a time-server and a trimmer, and yet so low had Italian politics fallen that at the close of his career admirers were not lacking to call him great. He lived to be eighty-six years old, and as the end drew near, the mistakes, and weaknesses, and scandals of his past forgotten, he became a sort of legendary though tarnished hero for those who opposed the new régime.

Giolitti's first ministry was composed entirely of members of the left. The chamber was dissolved and in November 1892 the new election was held with the usual result of an overwhelming majority for the prime minister in power. Giolitti had proved himself a worthy successor of Crispi and Depretis in the art of "making an election."

The foreign and domestic policies of the new government were equally weak. The failure of the French commercial treaty had brought on a tariff war with France that, accentuated

ated by the killing of some Italian workmen near Marseilles, caused much anti-French sentiment throughout the kingdom and a great deal of disorder in Sicily which the authorities failed to suppress. Times were hard and there was an acute crisis in the building trade.

Giolitti was allowing matters to drift as best they might when without warning the Banca Romana scandal broke upon the chamber, through an interpellation of a member. It was charged that Tanlongo, the director of the bank, had issued for the profit of his friends and himself some 62,500,000 lire of duplicate bank notes. The prime minister replied by denying the charge, by whitewashing the management, and by appointing Tanlongo a senator.

The chamber refused to accept the answer as satisfactory, demanded an investigation and the prosecution of Tanlongo and his associates. To save his political life Giolitti was obliged to order the prosecution of his friends and to consent to an investigation of the national banks of issue by a parliamentary commission.

On November 23 the parliamentary commission reported that not only Giolitti but also his two immediate predecessors had been fully aware of Tanlongo's peculiar methods of conducting the affairs of the bank, that Tanlongo had loaned money right and left to members of the chamber and of the government, without adequate security and without expectation that the loans would be returned, that he had bought the support of the press by the payment of direct bribes to those newspapers willing to accept them, and, most serious charge of all, that Giolitti had deliberately deceived the chamber in reference to the bank, and had suppressed the most incriminating documents bearing upon the case, after the prosecution of Tanlongo had been ordered.

After having made these charges the commission proceeded to acquit Giolitti of any personal dishonesty, although it deeply regretted the course that he had followed.

The next day the government resigned and Giolitti judged it wise to visit Switzerland for a "rest cure."

Criminal proceedings were brought against him in the ordinary courts, but were quashed, on appeal, on the ground that a minister could not be held responsible for his official acts outside of the chamber.

As the important evidence against Tanlongo and his accessories had been destroyed it is not surprising that their trial resulted in an acquittal.

The Banca Romana scandal was by far the dirtiest that has ever arisen in modern Italy. It unearthed a condition of political corruption almost passing belief, but its most sinister feature lay in the fact that not only was no one ever punished, but that of its two chief actors one died in the odor of sanctity, a rich man and a patron of art and charity, while the other not only lived down the scandal but was afterwards four times prime minister of Italy.

The unrest in Sicily which had reached the proportions of an insurrection, the bank scandal, and the constant and huge budget deficit all called for a strong man at the head of affairs, and the chamber turned almost as a matter of course to Crispi, as the one man with force enough to face the situation.

The disorders were ruthlessly suppressed and under Crispi's heavy hand public order was maintained throughout the kingdom. With Sonnino as finance minister, Crispi undertook a general reorganization of the state finances, including the banks of issue.

The affairs of the insolvent Banca Romana were wound up, and a supreme national bank, the Banca d'Italia, was organized, with the banks of Naples and of Sicily as subsidiaries. The volume of the bank-note currency was limited, the banks were forbidden to make loans on real estate, and rigorous governmental supervision was inaugurated.

To meet the budget deficit expenditures were reduced by some 90,000,000 lire and revenues increased by nearly the same amount, chiefly by drastically raising the income-tax rates.

The end of Crispi's government came with startling dramatic suddenness, and was the logical conclusion of his colonial policy.

Realizing that Italy had entered the game of land-stealing in Africa too late to accomplish very much, Crispi nevertheless determined to pick up whatever crumbs might still be left. Accordingly in 1890, during his first government, he organized the colony of Eritrea, which consisted of a number of small Italian settlements on the coast of the Red Sea. As its capital and harbor he seized the town of Massowah, which had formerly belonged to Turkey and latterly to Egypt. His high-handed action was possible in virtue of an understanding with France and Britain, which was really nothing more than a concession to Italy of the right to acquire territory within certain rather vague limits, from the native tribes and from Abyssinia either by agreement or by force of arms. Acting on this understanding, Italy began a penetration of Abyssinia by fortifying the caravan route from Massowah to Kassala which was held by the Mahdists then at war with Britain.

In 1894 General Baratieri, governor of Eritrea, captured Kassala, and by so doing incurred the ill will of Kassai, the chief of the northern part of Abyssinia. On Kassai's death his lieutenant, Ras Alula, assumed the feud and began a guerrilla war against the Italians. Baratieri succeeded in winning the friendship of Menelek, chief of the southern part of Abyssinia, who proclaimed himself "Negus Negusti" or "king of kings."

A treaty had been signed at Ucciali on May 2, 1889, by the new negus and by Count Antonelli acting for Italy, which was the cause of untold trouble.

The Italian copy, which was published in Rome, provided that Italy should control the foreign affairs of Abyssinia, which meant, of course, that Italy had acquired a protectorate and had won a great diplomatic and colonial triumph. On the other hand, the Abyssinian copy of the treaty provided that Abyssinia might, if she saw fit, conduct her foreign affairs through the Italian foreign office. According to the Italian copy Abyssinia *must* deal with other states through Italy, according to the Abyssinian copy she *might* do so.

A French agent called the attention of the negus to the discrepancy between the two copies of the treaty, whereupon Menelek in a great rage announced that Italy had betrayed him, and forthwith repudiated the treaty.

In return for a railway and mining concession he was able to borrow 4,000,000 lire in Paris with which he repaid the Italian loan for the same amount. The French government and private contractors sold him some 80,000 Gras rifles, with ammunition and equipment, as well as a considerable number of Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns. By the beginning of 1895 he was ready to undertake hostilities against Italy, and on January 14 a raiding expedition was driven back, badly beaten by Baratieri. While Baratieri prepared to invade Tigre, Menelek, with the aid of some French instructors, organized an aggressive campaign.

General Arimondi was ordered to hold the town of Makalla, while Major Toselli with 2,000 native troops under Italian officers was sent forward to Amba Alazi, where on December 7 he was surprised and driven back with a loss of 1,300 men and 20 officers.

Menelek then besieged Makalla, which on January 20, 1896, surrendered.

The negus released his prisoners and proposed a peace conference, which Crispi vetoed, informing Baratieri that he must at once wipe out the disgrace of the two reverses he had suffered.

Menelek had fallen back, and stood on the crest of the hills behind Adua, while Baratieri stood on the road to Adi Cajè a few miles to the east. Menelek had under him some 120,000 men, of whom 80,000 were armed with Gras breech-loading rifles, he had some 10,000 cavalry, and 40 Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns. Baratieri had 25,000 men under him, but of these 8,000 were doing garrison duty along the line of communication, so that he had present and fit for duty only some 17,000 men, of whom 10,000 were Italian regulars, the rest being natives. He had 56 guns, including 44 light mountain guns, and 12 rapid fires. He had great difficulty with his supplies, for he was obliged to bring them up from the sea-coast over a very rugged mountain trail, constantly harassed by enemy raiders.

He was told by his scouts that the enemy was suffering from lack of provisions and likely at any moment to disband. As his position was extremely strong, it seemed to the Italian commander that Menelek must either attack, in which case Italian victory was certain, or retire for lack of supplies when the Italian army would have no difficulty in defeating a hungry and demoralized enemy. He therefore very wisely decided to stand fast and await events.

Unfortunately, as has so often been the case in other wars and other lands, the civilians in the capital, knowing nothing of conditions at the front, demanded immediate action. As no immediate action was forthcoming, Crispi sent out General Baldasera to take over the command.

Baratieri determined to risk everything in an effort to win a victory before Baldasera's arrival.

His scouts reported that Menelek had begun to retreat, a report which was untrue, for it subsequently developed that Baratieri's native scouts were in the pay of the enemy to whom they told the truth, reporting to Baratieri exactly what Menelek told them to report.

Believing that Menelek was already beaten, Baratieri determined to advance against him on the night of February 29.

His force was divided into four brigades. The first, under General Arimondi, consisted of a regiment of bersaglieri of two battalions, a regiment of infantry of three battalions, and 220 natives, or 2,493 men in all, with two batteries of 12 guns. The second, under General Dabormida, consisted of two regiments of infantry of three battalions each, and 960 natives, or 3,600 men in all, with three batteries of 18 guns. The third, under General Ellena, consisted of five line battalions, one battalion of alpini, one native battalion, and 70 engineers, or 4,150 men in all, with two batteries of 12 guns. The fourth, under General Albertone, consisted of four native battalions, or 4,070 men in all, with one and one-half native batteries and two Italian batteries of 14 guns.

Baratieri's plan was to advance against the enemy during darkness in three columns, the second brigade on the right, the first in the center, the fourth on the left, with the third in reserve. He expected that at dawn the army would be in position on the heights of Mount Belah dominating Adua, with Albertone on the hill of Kidane Meret guarding the left flank of the main position. When his army had reached Mount Belah he intended to reconnoiter, and be guided by the reports of his scouts.

The route to the new position lay up three steep mountain paths, separated from each other by mountain ridges, as were the proposed positions of the three brigades. To ensure the success of Baratieri's plan required the most exact co-ordination among his battle units. Unfortunately, because of the false information of his scouts and the utterly faulty sketch map of the terrain, which had been prepared by his staff, coordination was impossible.

When at dawn Albertone reached the point marked on the staff map "Kidane Meret," he found it to be a hollow and not a hill, and was told by his native scouts that the place

he sought was some two miles further west. He accordingly marched forward and soon found himself engaged with Menelek's main army.

Baratieri, hearing firing well to the west of what should have been the position of his left, at first supposed that it was Albertone's skirmishers in advance of the main body. He finally concluded that something had gone wrong with the fourth brigade and ordered General Dabormida to go to its support.

Dabormida led his men into the valley in front of his position and, also deceived by the sketch map, turned downstream instead of up, which would have brought him into touch with Albertone. He only discovered his mistake when he was surprised by an overwhelming force of the enemy.

The enemy now attacked the first brigade in the center, and the battle became three separate actions, each brigade fighting for its life against overwhelming odds, each brigade separated from the others by mountain ridges, and utterly unable to go to each other's support. The first brigade under Arimondi did not have the advantage of the help of the reserves who were isolated in trying to join him.

By early afternoon both Albertone and Dabormida were doomed, but kept on fighting gallantly to the last, for they were entirely surrounded.

Baratieri determined to fight his way out if possible, and sent orders to both Albertone and Dabormida to save what was left of their commands. While the orders were never delivered, the few survivors of both the second and fourth brigades escaped to the hills and later drifted into camp.

Menelek found it impossible to hold his army together so as to follow up his victory, and so Baratieri was able to escape with what was left of his command. Had he been permitted by Crispi to bide his time before advancing, it is altogether probable that Menelek's army would have broken up because of lack of food.



The Abyssinians are supposed to have lost at least 7,000 killed and 10,000 wounded; of the Italians, 261 officers and 2,981 men were killed, 3,436 wounded, 954 missing, 3,000 prisoners. Total casualties, 10,632 out of 17,000 engaged. Generals Arimondi and Dabormida were killed, and Albertone was wounded and taken prisoner. Of the two Sicilian batteries attached to Albertone's brigade, the third lost 3 officers and 60 men out of a total of 4 officers and 62 men, and the fourth lost 4 officers and 69 men out of a total of 4 officers and 73 men.

Adua was a crushing defeat, but the honor of the Italian troops came through unstained, for never have men fought a forlorn hope more gallantly or well.

The importance of Adua lay in its results. It was the first instance in modern times of a dark-skinned force defeating a white army with lasting consequences. Had Menelek been beaten, Italy would undoubtedly have conquered Abyssinia. He destroyed the Italian army and by so doing saved the independence of his country.

The Abyssinian expedition had never been popular in Italy, and after its failure there was no desire to try again. The news was received with great anger by the Italian public, but the anger was directed against Crispi and Baratieri, and not against Menelek. It was thought that the prime minister should never have undertaken the campaign, and that Baratieri had mismanaged it.

After Baratieri had been court-martialled and cashiered and Crispi had resigned, the public was satisfied to abandon for the time at least all colonial ambitions.

By the treaty of Addis Ababa signed October 26, 1896, the treaty of Uccialli was annulled, Italy acknowledged the absolute independence of Abyssinia and paid an indemnity of 10,000,000 lire to Menelek, in return for which the Italian prisoners were released.

For some months before Adua Crispi had been heading for disaster. His efficient maintenance of public order and a public safety law that he had forced through parliament, designed to stop anarchist propaganda, had infuriated the members of the extreme left. Cavalotti, their leader, and the prime minister had a quarrel so serious that the former began a campaign against the latter with the avowed purpose of driving him from public life.

Joining forces with Giolitti who had returned from Switzerland, Cavalotti commenced an attack on Crispi's personal character that absolutely beggars description. The old bigamy charge was revived, and no member of the Crispi family was spared. Giolitti accused Crispi of being implicated in the Banca Romana scandal, but when Crispi began criminal proceedings for libel against the accuser, the latter thought it wise to take another "rest cure," this time at Berlin, where he remained until his enemy had fallen.

In 1895 Crispi succeeded in the usual way in winning the general election with a majority in the chamber of 200. Nevertheless Cavalotti's campaign of defamation continued and when in the following spring the news of Adua was received Crispi, on March 5, 1896, resigned without waiting for the inevitable adverse vote.

He was succeeded by Rudini, with the support of Cavalotti, bought by the promise of Crispi's prosecution for embezzlement. A parliamentary commission, to which were referred in 1897 the charges against the former prime minister, dismissed them all with one exception. It held that Crispi had replenished the secret-service fund by borrowing 300,000 lire from one of the banks, which he had repaid through the treasury. The chamber, while refusing to prosecute, censured Crispi, who thereupon resigned to be reelected in 1898 by his Palermo constituents by an enormous majority.

Crispi was now seventy-nine years of age, had led a life of great strain and excitement and was beginning to break.

On his return to the chamber he took but little part in affairs, and even the attacks of Cavalotti, whose hatred continued to the end, failed to rouse him. Toward the close he became an invalid and on August 12, 1901, he died at Naples.

Italy has been led by far bigger and better men than Crispi, but to her sorrow she has also been led by far smaller and worse men. He was not a great man in the ordinary meaning of the term, but he was an able man and a patriot, and when compared with the pettifogging politicians who preceded and followed him he stands out as one of the few men of his time who deserved well of Italy.

Crispi's chief constructive achievement was in making the triple alliance a real world force. He had never been particularly friendly with France, returning with interest that country's dislike of Italy, so that it was not difficult for Bismarck to win the warm support of his Italian colleague in making the alliance something more than a name.

Actually the alliance was self-contradictory, for by the terms of its renewal in 1887, for which Crispi was responsible, Austria and Italy agreed to maintain the status quo, not only in the Balkans and the Aegean but also on the Adriatic. This was equivalent to an abandonment on the part of Crispi of Italy's irredentist hope of some day recovering Trieste and the Dalmatian Islands, a hope which no patriotic Italian ever for a moment forgot. It is true that there was a proviso in the treaty to the effect that should the maintenance of the status quo prove impossible, Italy and Austria should inform each other in advance of what they intended to do, a proviso that Austria calmly ignored when it suited her to do so twenty-seven years later. In return for their yielding of irredentist ambitions, her two partners in the alliance gave Italy what was really a free hand in the acquisition of colonies at the expense of France.

Crispi believed, and probably rightly, that the prestige of being associated thus intimately with the greatest war power

of the world, and with that power's closest political friend, was worth any temporary sacrifice of irredentist hopes. Italy was struggling up from the position of a small power to that of one of importance. Her membership in the triple alliance, signed in 1882 and really implemented in the renewal of 1887, gave her a factitious appearance of national greatness, warranted neither by her economic or military strength, but extremely flattering to national pride. It gave Crispi the moral support, and in certain contingencies the physical, of his two allies and greatly increased his importance when dealing with other powers.

Austria, the hereditary enemy of Italy, was in a paradoxical position as an ally. The Italian people never concealed their hope of some day depriving the dual monarchy of a large part of its territory, while in the Balkans Austrian and Italian national ambitions were in sharp conflict.

With Germany the case was different. From 1866, when Bismarck had won for Italy the annexation of Venetia, he had maintained toward the Italians an attitude of sincere if somewhat condescending friendliness. He had urged Cairoli to annex Tunisia while the possibility still existed, he had supported succeeding prime ministers in their differences with France, and had flattered Crispi into the belief that the latter was a great diplomatist.

The first period of the triple alliance from 1882 to 1887 was really experimental. Its renewal made of it an actuality to be reckoned with by other nations as a more or less permanent world institution.

Crispi would have preferred an alliance of Italy, Germany, and Great Britain, but the foundation of any understanding with Germany was the preexisting alliance between that country and Austria. Such being the case, Crispi did his best to have Britain invited to join the three allies. At that time and for years afterwards relations between Britain and France, and Britain and Russia, were greatly strained, and it

was not until the triple entente came into being in 1904 that the possibility of including Britain in the triple alliance vanished. Crispi found Austria willing to include Britain, but Bismarck absolutely opposed. He was unwilling to ally himself with Britain because, he said, it was a country whose foreign policy depended upon the changes of party majorities, although he was well aware that Italian foreign policy was liable to change from moment to moment. Membership in the triple alliance was undoubtedly of great advantage to Italy. There were times when it was popular at home, and times when it was unpopular, there were times when it was a real and active force and times when it was almost a dead letter, but it gave Italy a confidence in her foreign policy and a support in her dealings with France that were invaluable to her during the period when she was developing into a great power.

As the years passed the enthusiasm of Italy for the alliance gradually cooled, so much so that at Algeciras her representatives, abandoning Germany, voted with the entente powers. From then until 1914 it became evident that the feelings of Italian statesmen toward the alliance were no longer what they had been, and that while the alliance was still regarded as a convenience that might be made use of, it was very doubtful if it would or could withstand any severe strain. In 1914 the strain came, when the dual monarchy, ignoring the terms of the treaty, occupied Serbia without notice to Italy, and subsequently refused to grant the compensations called for by the treaty. The treaty, which had been dying for some time, died at last after thirty-two years of life, Austria-Hungary having given it its death blow.

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## CHAPTER XIV

### GIOLITTI

THE lustrum immediately following the passing of Crispi saw three prime ministers of extreme mediocrity, Rudini, Pelloux, and Saracco.

Marchese Antonio Starabba di Rudini (1839-1908) was, like Crispi, a Palermitan, but unlike his predecessor an aristocrat by birth and inclination. After a short experience as a member of a revolutionary committee in his native town, he drifted to Turin, and became an attaché in the foreign office. Returning to Palermo in 1865 he was elected sindaco, or mayor, and afterwards appointed prefetto of the province of Palermo, and in 1868 prefetto of Naples. The next year Menabrea made him minister of the interior and on the death of Minghetti he became the leader of the right. While nominally a conservative he was an apostle of the doctrine of trasformismo and never hesitated to forget his principles when it was convenient for him to do so.

Luigi Pelloux (1839-1924) was born of Italian parents in Savoy. He entered the Piedmontese artillery in 1857 and was promoted through grades to the rank of general of division, after a creditable but not particularly distinguished career. He was minister of war in the first and second Rudini and first Giolitti cabinets, and was made a senator by Rudini. He was first of all a soldier, and but a poor politician. He was honest, obstinate, and dull. At the close of his political career, which lasted from 1891 to 1901, he was placed in command of the Turin army corps, where he remained until his retirement.

Giuseppe Saracco was a Piedmontese lawyer who had been a deputy of no great importance belonging more or less to the right. His fame was largely derived from having as a

deputy secured the construction of an unnecessary railway through his constituency, which was thereafter known as "the Genoa, Saracco, Asti line." He had been made a senator by Minghetti and had after long service become president of that body. He was nearly eighty when he became prime minister, and owed his selection for the post chiefly to the importance of the office he held.

Beginning with Rudini, the successors of Crispi gradually abandoned the latter's policies until by the beginning of the present century an entirely new orientation was established, both in domestic and foreign affairs. Colonial expansion was for the time at least given up, not to be resumed for more than a decade. The disasters under Crispi had chilled the ardor of Italy for territorial acquisitions beyond the seas, and moreover the condition of Italian finances did not permit of any foreign conquests.

Rudini, who was a Francophil, negotiated a treaty with France in 1898, and so brought to a close the utterly unnecessary and foolish tariff war with that country, which had lasted for nearly ten years.

He was the leader of what was left of the right and, while nominally a conservative, depended for his political existence upon the support of the extreme left, under his friend and ally Cavalotti, Crispi's arch enemy. Cavalotti, who was a much abler and stronger man than his friend, made the latter pay a long price for radical support. Not only was the prime minister obliged to pursue Crispi to the point of persecution for the gratification of Cavalotti's personal revenge, but the radical leader virtually controlled the government without assuming the responsibility of office.

In March 1897 Rudini, much against his will, was forced by his master to dissolve the chamber and to "make" the election in favor of the groups of the left. The result of the election was the emergence for the first time of the socialist party as a political factor to be reckoned with. Two months

after the election, organized disturbances of the peace occurred in most of the larger cities, nominally as a protest against the increase of the price of bread. In Milan, from May 7 to 9, the mob ruled the town and Rudini, breaking away from Cavalotti, decreed martial law in Milan, Naples, and Florence. The disorders were suppressed with the loss of a number of lives, and as a result on June 29 the government fell, its left supporters turning against it.

The governments of Pelloux and Saracco were weak and inefficient and lived only because of the complaisance of the groups of the left. The administration of Saracco is remembered chiefly because, during it, on July 29, 1900, King Humbert was murdered and succeeded by his son Victor Emanuel III, born November 11, 1869.

Italy and the whole world were stunned by the crime, not only because of the high esteem in which the king was universally held, and the brutality of the murder, but because it soon appeared that it might have been prevented.

The assassin was an Italian named Bresci who was the agent of an anarchist lodge in Paterson, New Jersey, where he had been living for some time. The Paterson police had received a letter giving the plans for the proposed murder but, believing the letter to be a hoax, paid no attention to it, not even notifying the Italian authorities of its receipt. Bresci was allowed to leave the United States unmolested and travelled to Monza near Milan, the king's summer home. There in the park, as the king drove by, he fired his revolver from behind a tree, killing his victim instantly.

While Humbert was by no means as able a man as his father, he was an ideal constitutional monarch. Born at Turin March 14, 1844, educated under the direction of d'Azeglio and Mancini, he fought with gallantry at Custozza where he commanded a division. In 1868 he married his cousin, the beautiful Princess Margherita, daughter of the Duke of Genoa. On the death of his father (January 9, 1878)



he ascended the throne, and assumed the title of "Humbert I of Italy," although he was "Humbert IV of Piedmont," thus breaking the precedent set by his predecessor, who continued to call himself "Victor Emanuel II," although he was the first king of Italy of that name. Victor Emanuel could never forget that he was a Piedmontese; Humbert on the other hand was first and always an Italian. To emphasize his nationalism he ordered that the body of his father should be buried in the pantheon at Rome instead of in the family tomb at Superga.

His conception of his duty as king was almost British in its regard for constitutional limitations. Unlike his father, he obeyed the constitution in spirit as well as in its letter, and never tried to influence government or to develop a policy of his own, in opposition to the prime minister of the day. His strict adherence to his duty as a constitutional king was of invaluable service to Italy in educating the leaders of the people in the working of a constitutional government. If the lesson was never completely learned, it was through no fault of the king. He was a brave and kindly man who loved his people and was loved by them.

During the second Rudini ministry Giolitti had returned from Berlin, on the assurance that the prosecution against him for criminal libel had been dropped. He spent the next three years winning back the position he had lost by the bank scandal. That unfortunate affair had been very quickly forgotten, and Giolitti was able to pose as an upright man who had been grossly deceived by his friends. In a surprisingly short time he had surrounded himself with a group of devoted adherents, who were ready to follow wherever he might lead. He determined to resume office as soon as possible and only waited a favorable opportunity to put his plans into effect.

The opportunity came sooner than he had expected, for he was not quite ready to take the prime ministership him-

self, although he easily controlled a majority of the chamber. On February 9, 1901, Saracco unexpectedly fell and Giolitti put in the prime ministership, as his understudy, Zanardelli who had been minister of public works in the first Depretis government and of the interior under Cairoli. Eight months later Zanardelli retired and Giolitti at the age of sixty began his second ministry.

With the exception of the period of the two Sonnino governments of three months each, for the next thirteen years Giolitti ruled supreme, either as prime minister, or through a dummy whom he had placed in office and controlled. During this time he was actually prime minister for eight years, and practically so for the remaining four and a half years. Whenever he grew tired of the work of public office, whenever the result of his policies became personally annoying, he would resign in favor of some one of his followers who would carry on as the master might direct.

During the World War his power suffered an eclipse, only to be resumed more complete than ever at the war's close, and to be maintained without question until the coming of fascism.

Of the three "bosses" of so-called "democratic" Italy, Giolitti was by far the least able and the smallest as a man, and yet his power was by far the greatest and his control of Italian politics the most complete.

During the pre-war period of Giolitti's rule the foreign office was in the able hands of Tittoni and San Giuliano, which ensured a continuity of policy and conservatism in action. Relations with France had been gradually improving, so that by 1898 a new commercial treaty was signed, and in 1900 an Italian squadron visited Toulon, and in 1903 the king and queen visited Paris officially, their visit being returned the next year by President Loubet.

In 1900 France announced that Tripoli and Cyrenaica were without her sphere of interest, while Italy made a similar

announcement in reference to Morocco. Two years later both countries repeated their announcements more explicitly, while Italy declared that she would remain neutral were France to be attacked or were she to go to war to protect her honor or her interests.

While Italy was approaching France with the offer of her friendship, she had not been idle in the opposite direction. In June 1902 the triple alliance was renewed for a further period, this time, as the last, for twelve years, but there was a marked and constantly growing coolness between Austria and Italy.

The Austrian government, the official ally of Italy, showed not only an entire lack of tact, but actual brutality in dealing with the inhabitants of the "unredeemed" provinces of the Trentino and Triest. Not only did the imperial government refuse the request of its Italian subjects for an Italian university, but with increasing frequency violent anti-Italian demonstrations occurred, that were scarcely suppressed by the authorities. Luigi Villari quotes Fortis as saying, when prime minister, "Now there is only one power of which we must beware and it is an ally."

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria, without warning to Italy and with no suggestion of compensation, in direct violation of the terms of the treaty of the triple alliance, caused a wave of anti-Austrian sentiment to sweep over Italy that never receded. Tittoni protested and perhaps, if left to himself, might have secured some compensation, but the prime minister, following his usual policy of caution, refused to allow matters to go to extremes. Tittoni succeeded, however, in inducing Austria to abandon her occupation of the Sandjak of Novibazar, and to yield her somewhat questionable right to police Montenegro. The concessions amounted to very little in themselves, but were enough to save the face of the government.

The tenure of the treasury by Luzzatti, a distinguished economist and man of affairs, was the most creditable phase of Giolitti's rule. Under Luzzatti the nominal surplus which existed at the beginning of his administration was increased to 65,000,000 lire at its close. Two debt conversions were carried out with great success, the interest rate being reduced in the one case from 4 per cent to  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent and in the other from  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

It was in home affairs that Giolitti was particularly unsuccessful. Realizing the tremendous power of the minister of the interior who, through the prefetti, could not only "make" elections but govern the country almost as he might see fit, he always reserved that portfolio for himself. While perfectly willing to resort to any methods, equivocal or otherwise, to carry out his purposes, he preferred to accomplish them through indirect and subterranean channels rather than by the forceful means of a Crispi. When a question arose that obviously required force for its solution, he usually hesitated, lacking the moral courage to employ it.

During the first seven years of his dictatorship he was constantly faced with unrest and disorder that could have been suppressed or prevented had a strong man been at the helm.

The socialist party, which had been making great progress during the previous decade, was the only political party in Italy in the English-speaking sense. Had its members remained united and had they been willing to submit themselves to party discipline, it is quite conceivable that, sooner or later, as a party they might have ruled the state. But union and discipline were as abhorrent to the socialist as to any other Italian politician. By 1902 the party had broken up into three new and violently antagonistic groups, each claiming to be the only real socialist party. There were the Marxian or revolutionary socialists under the more or less recognized leadership of Enrico Ferri, the riformisti or possibilists under Filippo Turati, and the revolutionary syndicalists.

The Marxians were willing to take part in elections but only for the purpose of overturning the monarchy and the state, preferring direct action as a means to the attainment of their end. The riformisti sought to bring about the socialistic state by peaceful means, taking part in elections and striving to amend the constitution in their own interest. The syndicalists, like those in other countries, refused to have anything to do with elections or parliament, basing their hopes of changing the government upon "direct action," a euphemism for revolution.

The Marxians and the syndicalists employed similar methods, and tolerated each other for the moment in putting those methods into practice.

Labor conditions in all parts of Italy were very bad, wages were low, not only in industry but also on the land, working hours were long, and the hold of the employer and the landlord was difficult to break. Trade unionism had made much progress and the beginning of the century ushered in a condition of acute labor unrest that lasted until the revolution.

Taking advantage of the desire of labor to better the really deplorable conditions under which men worked, the Marxians and syndicalists strove to give a political and revolutionary aspect to every strike and labor demonstration that occurred.

In 1902 a strike was called on the Mediterranean Railway, all the men walking out. Giolitti showed, for him, remarkable decision. All the hands who were reservists were mobilized and ordered to operate the road. As they were under the articles of war, it is needless to say that they obeyed. Eight years later Aristide Briand in France followed Giolitti's example, and obtained great glory by so doing.

This first railway strike, which was finally settled five months later, was followed by a general strike all over Italy in 1904, by a general railway strike in 1905, by an agrarian strike in the provinces of Rovigo and Ferrara in 1907, by a

general strike in Milan in 1907, and by agrarian strikes in the north in 1908. All of these strikes were frankly revolutionary in their purpose, although predicated on just grievances of the strikers. In every case there was fighting with bloodshed and loss of life, not only among the strikers, but also among the police and troops.

In addition to the ordinary strike, the syndicalists invented what was called the "sciopero bianco," or white strike. This was an adaptation of the Scottish "ca canny" or of the French "sabotage." Work was not entirely stopped, or property actually damaged. The men were instructed to do only a minimum of work and to do it as badly as possible. For example, on one of the railways under a decree of sciopero bianco one train a day in each direction was permitted, taking twice the schedule time for the run. It was not, however, until after the Great War that the sciopero bianco reached its zenith.

Had Giolitti shown more initiative in meeting the just demands of labor for a redress of grievances, and more firmness in dealing with the illegal methods adopted by the revolutionary parties for their enforcement, Italy would have been spared much loss of both capital and life. As usual, however, he followed a policy of drift and really welcomed the coming of the Turkish war as a way out of his domestic troubles. Yet the Turkish war and the Great War proved to be only truces in the industrial struggle that began with the present century and was destined to continue with ever-increasing violence until a far stronger national leader than Giolitti appeared upon the scene.

The war for the acquisition of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica had been long expected, for the pressure of her rapidly increasing population had caused Italy to consider the question of a colonial outlet one of vital importance. Eritrea had proved to be no white man's country and Tunisia, the logical Italian colony had, as Italians believed, been stolen from them

by French sharp practice. Algeria was French, Morocco in process of becoming so, and Egypt was under British influence. Of the Mediterranean coast of Africa only Tripolitana and Cyrenaica remained available for European exploitation. It is true that they belonged to Turkey, that their people were content under Turkish rule, and were even more devout Mohammedans than their owners. The only excuse that Italy had for the absorption of Libya was the need or fancied need for its possession, which after all has been the excuse of other European powers in their partition of Africa.

Turkey, as "the sick man of Europe," saw herself despoiled of her African empire, as well as of her European, piece by piece because she was not strong enough successfully to resist. In the days of her strength she lived by the sword, in the days of her weakness she fell by the sword. As a European and a colonizing power she had become an anachronism, and the lands and the peoples taken from her by conquest have from the point of view of modern western civilization profited greatly by the change.

Italian big business, having invested a certain amount of capital in Libya, sought greater security for its investments than that offered by the very lax and corrupt Turkish governors.

Giolitti, always averse to positive action, at first held back and it was not until pressure was brought to bear from two different sources that he was finally induced to make the plunge.

As early as 1901 and 1903 France and Italy had recognized each other's rights in Morocco and Tripoli respectively, rights which France had already begun to enforce in the former country. After the conference of Algeciras both Great Britain and France had agreed that Italy might if she chose annex Tripoli. As time passed and Italy failed to take advantage of British and French complaisance, Germany began to feel out the British and French foreign offices as to whether compen-

sation for the defeat of Algeciras might not be obtained in Tripoli. The Italian ambassador at Paris informed his chief that unless Italy moved against Tripoli in the immediate future it was altogether probable that she would find herself forestalled by Germany.

On the other hand the Italian banks that were deeply involved in Libyan investments served notice on the prime minister that unless he came to their help they would be obliged to appeal to France. Giolitti realized that if he did not move at once there was every prospect of Tripoli going the way of Tunis, and being lost to Italy forever.

Accordingly the great powers of Europe were formally consulted and agreed to remain neutral, provided the war was localized in Africa. Having received this assurance Italy approached Turkey with the suggestion that the latter should peacefully surrender her last African possession. On Turkey's refusal, an ultimatum was delivered giving her twenty-four hours to accept an Italian occupation, and on September 29, 1911, war was declared.

On October 3, Tripoli was bombarded by an Italian squadron and two days later occupied. Off Epirus the Duke of Abruzzi, the king's cousin, had destroyed a Turkish torpedo-boat flotilla, but further action in European waters was stopped by the veto of the powers.

Although the Italians controlled the sea, it was not until October 20 that the first Italian force of 9,000 men with their equipment had been landed. A month later General Caneva arrived to take command, bringing with him 25,000 men and 16 batteries of artillery, his total force numbering some 35,000 men and 20 batteries.

The entire Turkish garrison in the whole of Libya numbered at the outbreak of the war less than 10,000 Turkish regulars under the command of Enver Pasha, a very able young officer who had been educated at the German general staff college.



It was impossible for Enver to receive reinforcements from home in either men or materials, for not only was the sea closed to him, but Britain forbade the crossing of Egypt, although in theory the sultan was the suzerain of the Khedive.

Enver retired to the interior and with the help of the native tribes carried on a very gallant struggle for over a year against a greatly superior enemy. He showed himself to be a master of guerrilla warfare, and it was not until his little force of regulars had been greatly reduced that his resistance began to give way. In May 1912 the Italians seized the island of Rhodes and the Dodecanese, twelve small islands of the Sporades, which under pressure from the powers they agreed to return after the peace, an agreement which was never kept. A naval demonstration at the mouth of the Dardanelles resulted in a storm of protest from the powers, so that thereafter Italy confined herself to the African seat of war.

Toward the close of the summer Caneva won two important victories over Enver who still had the remains of his little army well in hand, and with the help of his native troops might have continued to fight on almost indefinitely, had it not been for conditions that arose in the Balkans.

Turkey found herself faced by the Balkan league and the necessity of fighting for her very existence. The task of defending herself against a union of the Balkan States was sufficiently difficult without having Italy also on her hands, so as soon as the organization of the Balkan league became a certainty Turkey began negotiations with Italy for the best peace terms possible, and on October 15 the negotiations were concluded in the signing of the Peace of Ouchy, the same day that the league declared war.

Under the terms of the treaty Turkey agreed to withdraw her troops from Tripoli and cease hostilities, although not formally recognizing the sovereignty of Italy over the lost provinces. Italy agreed to recognize the religious authority

of the sultan as kalifa over his former subjects, and to evacuate the Dodecanese on the departure of the Turkish army from Tripoli.

The Italian forces were subjected to much unjust criticism. The men, as always, fought well, whatever fault there may have been lay with the home government and the high command. Caneva, who had no experience in desert warfare, was obliged to face a far better man, who was not only a very able soldier, but had the faculty of uniting the Arab and Berber tribes, and of inspiring their enthusiasm and loyalty. The home government was slow in sending reinforcements, and hampered the field commander by counsels of caution and delay that greatly prolonged the war.

The Peace of Ouchy, while eliminating Enver and his regulars, left Italy with a war against the natives still to be won. It was years before the country was pacified, and when that much desired end had been attained it was an open question whether the cost in men and money in the acquisition of Libya had been worth while.

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## CHAPTER XV

### THE COMING OF WAR

THE Peace of Ouchy left the Giolittian government in a far from enviable position.

While it was true that possession of Libya had been transferred to Italy, peace in the new colony had not been restored, only a narrow strip along the coast being actually in Italian hands. Ouchy marked the beginning of a desert war of the most trying sort, in which Italy was obliged to maintain an army of occupation of 25,000 men for a generation before the Libyan hinterland was finally pacified.

The management of the war had been so inefficient, the interference of Freemasonry in the matter of appointments had been so blatant, the differences among generals so evident, and victory had been so long and unaccountably delayed, that while Italians took a proper pride in the gallantry of the enlisted men their disgust of the high command made the war far from popular.

As a political asset to Giolitti the war was almost negligible.

The social unrest that had been more or less dormant during the war reasserted itself at the war's close with increased vigor, and during the following year strikes managed by the syndicalists and accompanied by grave disorder and bloodshed followed each other with scarcely any interval.

The finances left much to be desired and the surplus had once more given place to a deficit.

For the purpose of helping the treasury, the prime minister greatly increased the income tax, and to minimize tax dodging required all bonds of private corporations to be registered in the name of the holder. The abolition of bearer bonds raised a storm of protest throughout the kingdom, as did

also the law making all forms of insurance a government monopoly, which not only drove out the foreign corporations, but caused the liquidation of all the domestic insurance companies.

He found his position distinctly weakened and his hold upon the middle class gradually loosening. Believing that the masses were loyal to him he determined to call them to his support.

During the summer of 1913 he forced through parliament a law increasing the number of voters from three to eight millions. As a sop to the chamber for its complaisance in the matter, he permitted it to provide salaries for members.

Hitherto deputies had been unpaid, the only perquisites which they received being passes and reserved carriages on the railways and the use of a free buffet maintained in the lobby of the chamber where light refreshments were served. A good deal of scandal had resulted from the non-payment of members, for it was an open secret that certain favored government supporters were in the receipt of subsidies from the secret-service funds, and there was one authentic case of two poverty-stricken members who for some weeks took all their meals at the buffet and spent their nights sleeping on government trains.

As soon as his legislative program was complete Giolitti dissolved the chamber, and from October 26 to November 3, 1913, held the first elections under the new franchise.

Much to his surprise he found that the "making" of an election under the new conditions was a far more difficult task than it had been in the past. The increased suffrage had brought three new factors into Italian politics.

The socialists appealed directly to the proletarians and the peasants, many of whom were now enfranchised. The carefully encouraged revolutionary industrial unrest had done its work, and seventy-nine socialist deputies were elected, despite the fact that at the reformist socialist congress of the

previous June, Bissolati, Bonnomi, and their friends having been expelled for supporting the war, the party had split in two, adding a fourth socialist party to the three already in existence.

The pope having cancelled his "non expedit" order, for the first time in Italian history Catholics as a party voted at an election. Not only were thirty-three Catholics elected as such, but a number of Giolittians owed their seats to Catholic support.

Giolitti had made an arrangement with the Catholic leader, Count Gentilomi, called the "patto Gentilomi," under which government supported a certain number of Catholic candidates, while in return the Catholic voters supported those government candidates who agreed not to vote for legislation opposed by the Church.

The election also saw the appearance of another new party destined eventually to play a leading part. In 1912 the Nationalist Association which had existed for some years, but without either large membership or influence, was entirely reorganized under the able leadership of Luigi Federzoni. It became the Nationalist Party and at the election of 1913 elected five of its candidates to the chamber.

The new chamber consisted of the old groups that were more than ever estranged from the life of the nation, groups whose names had long since lost all significance, and three new parties that did actually represent concrete ideas and opinions; the socialists, divided fundamentally among themselves, the Catholics, and the nationalists.

The prime minister faced the new chamber with a safe majority on paper, but it was a majority that was by no means as loyal to him as had been his majorities in the past.

His opposition had shifted from the right, which he had long since absorbed, to the extreme left. Among his own followers those who opposed the Vatican bitterly resented the "patto Gentilomi" by which they insisted, and with some

show of reason, that Giolitti had tied his hands in dealing with religious matters in return for Catholic votes.

A new trouble, and a very serious one, was added to Giolitti's fear of losing an important part of his following.

The union of railway workers, the *sindacato ferroviari*, was one of the most openly revolutionary in the kingdom, and an adherent of the syndicalist party. In January 1914 it made a demand upon the government for a general increase of wages. With a constantly increasing deficit, a general increase in pay was out of the question, and Giolitti tried to compromise by offering a slight advance to the lowest-paid men. The union refused the offer and announced that unless its demands were met in full it would order a general strike. Whereupon, faced with what promised to be an industrial battle of great bitterness, Giolitti shirked the responsibility and on March 10, 1914, resigned.

The Giolittian succession passed to Antonio Salandra with the somewhat platonic goodwill of the outgoing premier. Salandra was born in Puglia in the south in 1853, and was a moderate liberal. He had been under-secretary at the treasury in the Crispi cabinet of 1893, finance minister and minister of the treasury in the two short-lived Sonnino governments; otherwise he had never held office.

The new government faced the threatened railway strike with firmness, refusing any greater concessions than those made by Giolitti, whereupon the railway men's leaders accepted and the preparations for the strike were abandoned.

But no sooner was the railway strike out of the way than a revolutionary general strike was called in the march of Ancona and Romagna, under the leadership of the anarchist Enrico Malatesta, and of Benito Mussolini, editor of the socialist official organ, *Avanti*, as a revolutionary protest against the stopping by the authorities of an anti-militarist demonstration in Ancona on June 7, 1914.

In a number of towns so-called "republics" were organized and for over a week the strikers ruled the two provinces, which were restored to law and order only at the point of the bayonet.

On June 28 Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered at Serajevo and on July 23 Austria presented her ultimatum to Serbia.

San Giuliano, who had been retained at the foreign office, joined with Britain in the effort to keep the peace. While he, as well as his compatriots, realized that should a *casus foederis* arise under the terms of the triple alliance Italy would be obliged in honor to stand by Austria, he had no illusions as to the real friendship of the latter, and was at one with Italian public opinion in dreading such an eventuality. But Austria, like Germany, made one diplomatic mistake after another and, handling the situation with neither tact nor sense, made it inevitable that Italy should refuse to support her.

It is very doubtful whether if a perfectly correct *casus foederis* had arisen any government would have been strong enough to have brought Italy into line with her allies. The cry for help from unredeemed Italy against Austrian oppression, becoming ever louder, had as the years passed made the triple alliance increasingly unpopular. So much was this the case that very few Italians, even among the pronounced Germanophiles, would have been willing to fight in behalf of the tyrant who ruled over their exiled countrymen.

Actually Austria by her conduct placed herself outside the terms of the treaty. The treaty of alliance in Article I provided that the three signatory powers should discuss with each other all economic and political questions that might arise concerning their mutual interests. This the central powers had failed to do.

But more than this Austria had directly violated the terms of Article VII, under which Austria and Italy agreed "to

use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the powers signatory of the present treaty," to this end "to keep each other informed of their intentions. Should, however, the case arise that in the course of events Austria-Hungary in the Balkans or Italy should be obliged to change the status quo for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

Austria had acted against Serbia and had occupied Serbian territory without notice to or consultation with Italy. The treaty provided for mutual help in the event of a defensive war, and in this case Austria was the aggressor, and finally it was declared that because of the treaty of 1882, which had never been abrogated, there could be no *casus foederis* for Italy, in a war in which Austria was opposed by Britain, and Britain was of course deeply involved.

San Giuliano lost no time in calling the attention of Austria to the latter's violation of the spirit and letter of the treaty, and also earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's efforts for an international conference.

On July 25 the prime minister, Salandra, and San Giuliano called on the German ambassador, von Flatow, and submitted the Italian case, a summary of which was at once telegraphed by San Giuliano to the Italian ambassador at Vienna as follows: "Salandra and I called the special attention of the ambassador to the fact that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the triple alliance treaty, to make such a move as she has made at Belgrade without previous agreement with her allies. Austria, in fact, from the tone in which the note is conceived and from the demands she makes—demands



which are of little effect against the pan-Serb danger, but are profoundly offensive to Serbia and indirectly to Russia—has shown clearly that she wishes to provoke a war. We therefore told Flatow that in consideration of Austria's method of procedure, and of the defensive and conservative nature of the triple alliance, Italy is under no obligation to help Austria if as a result of this move of hers she should find herself at war with Russia. For in this case any European war whatever will be consequent upon an act of aggression and provocation on the part of Austria."<sup>1</sup>

After the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, San Giuliano on July 27 and 28 sent notes to Berlin and Vienna in which he again invoked Article VII of the treaty, protested against its violation and declared that should Italy fail to receive the compensation to which she was entitled the triple alliance would be ended.

From the very beginning Italy placed herself in a perfectly correct position and never for a moment either yielded her rights or failed to insist on what was her due under the terms of the treaty.

In addition to the sentimental and legal arguments in favor of refusing to join Austria, was the very practical argument of unpreparedness. As the result of the strain of the Turkish war the Italian army was in a most unsatisfactory condition, and stood in need of drastic reorganization, especially among the higher officers. With the fall of Giolitti, General Spingardi had been succeeded at the war office by General Grandi, with General Cadorna as chief of staff, who at once began the reconstruction of the army and reported that it would require at least a year of the hardest kind of work before it would be in condition to take the field.

Influenced by these various considerations the Salandra government followed the only course possible under the circumstances, and on August 3, 1914, declared Italy's neutrality.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in *The Nations of Today*, "Italy," by W. K. McClure, p. 181.

As the World War dragged on its weary way it became ever more plain that no matter what course Italy might follow in the future, she would never under any circumstances align herself with the central powers. The most for which any Austrophil or Germanophil could hope was that the Italian government would resist the constantly increasing pressure for intervention on the side of France and Britain and remain neutral. The efforts of German and Austrian diplomacy were therefore concentrated in favor of Italian neutrality, without any hope of armed or even economic Italian support.

The Italian people were sharply divided between the neutralists and interventionists. The former had as their chief mouthpiece Giolitti, who spoke constantly of Italian "sacro egoismo" which would be satisfied to remain neutral on the receipt of "alcuni compensi." They included many of those at court and in diplomacy, a large part of the army, the Catholics because of their sympathy with Catholic Austria, and the "official socialists" who were frankly pacifists.

The dislike of France was as strong as ever and many people who had no particular desire to see the Italian army fighting beside the central powers, were equally unwilling that it should fight as the ally of France. Germany had flattered the national pride of Italy by accepting her in the triple alliance at her own valuation as a great power, and made every effort to win the support of those in authority by conferring honorary commissions in the Prussian Guards on certain of the royal princes, and by the general distribution of decorations, in which latter activity it is only fair to say that France was equally generous.

The nationalists, irredentists, and the Mussolinian syndicalists were in favor of joining Britain, Russia, and France because they believed it to be a golden opportunity to recover the "unredeemed" provinces and finally to unite the country as a first-class power, while the reformist socialists, the Free-

masons and the various groups of the left favored the cause of the allies, because of their admiration for France.

On the death, October 16, 1914, of San Giuliano who had been a neutralist, Salandra reconstructed his cabinet with Sonnino as foreign minister.

Sidney Sonnino was born in Florence in 1847, was the son of an Italian Jewish merchant with large English connections and of an English gentile mother, who had brought him up as a Protestant. He spent his early years in diplomacy, but resigned in 1872 and was elected to the chamber of deputies in 1880. He became an authority on finance and foreign affairs and had been prime minister in 1906 and again in 1909, each time for a little over three months. He was a man of much ability and force and easily dominated the three successive cabinets in which he was foreign minister.

Being half a Jew he naturally viewed with little favor the anti-Semitic attitude of the central powers, while his English blood and British connections naturally made him an Anglo-phil. It is no wonder that in his heart he favored the allies and, all things being equal, preferred intervention to neutrality.

Sonnino, however, was first of all an Italian and a patriot who was determined to serve his country at all costs. He believed that for the future security and greatness of Italy not only must the unredeemed provinces be redeemed, but that new strategic frontiers must be acquired which would make Italy safe against attack. He hoped that these very desirable ends might be achieved peacefully, and accordingly invited the attention of Austria to the fact that her occupation of Serbia involved, under Article VII of the treaty of alliance, the giving of compensation to Italy.

On April 8, 1915, he formulated his request as follows:

1. Cession of the Trentino up to the boundary of 1811, and the towns of Rovereto, Trent, and Bozen.

2. Extension of the eastern frontier along the Isonzo, including Tolmino, Gorizia, Gradisca, and Montefalcone.
3. Triest to be made an autonomous state.
4. Cession of several Dalmatian islands.
5. Recognition of Austria-Hungary's disinterestedness in the Dodecanese.

Germany, fearing the ineptitude of Austrian diplomacy, had in December 1914 induced Prince von Bülow, the former chancellor, to take over the embassy at Rome. Bülow, who had married an Italian wife, had since his retirement spent his winters at his home, the Villa Malta, in Rome where he was one of the most popular men in the Roman world.

He realized that if Italy was to be kept neutral Austria must waste no time in accepting Sonnino's request, which was nothing but a diplomatically worded ultimatum.

Austria, however, flatly refused all of Sonnino's demands except the first, from which she excluded the cession of Bozen, and declined to transfer any territory until after the end of the war.

Having given Austria her chance, having made his demand and having been refused, Sonnino now turned to the allies. After some negotiation he succeeded in inducing Britain, France, and Russia to agree to the treaty of London, which was signed April 25, 1915, to be subsequently completed and implemented by naval and military arrangements.

Under the terms of the treaty, which was kept secret until after the war, the allies, in the event of victory, were to cede to Italy the Trentino and upper Adige as far as the top of the Brenner Pass, Gorizia, Gradisca, Triest, Istria, Dalmatia as far south as Cape Planka, Valona, and if Albania were given its own government it to be under Italian influence, the islands of Lussin and Cherso in the Adriatic, Rhodes and the Dodecanese and a part of Asia Minor, when and if it should be partitioned, as well as a share of the German

colonies in Africa. In addition it was agreed that the Holy See should be excluded from the Peace Congress.

The terms offered by the allies far exceeded Italy's demands upon Austria, for it was a simple matter for them to be generous in the disposal of property belonging to someone else, especially as their part of the treaty could only be carried out in the event of victory.

Although on May 3 Italy denounced the triple alliance, Bülow worked desperately for neutrality as the representative not only of his own country but of Austria, whose ambassador had been withdrawn on the abrogation of the treaty.

Under Bülow's insistence Austria agreed to Sonnino's terms but refused to pay the price until after the peace at the war's end. On Sonnino's demand for immediate payment, Francis Joseph, the Austrian emperor, forbade his foreign minister to agree, whereupon Bülow offered Germany's guaranty for Austria's good faith, but Sonnino replied that in the event of the defeat of the central powers, a guaranty from Germany would not be of any avail. On the other hand, he argued, should the central powers win it was quite within the bounds of possibility that Austria would fail to carry out her agreement. In either event there was no certainty of Italy receiving what she asked, and the only way in which she could be sure of gratifying her ambitions was by immediate possession, without waiting for the end of the war.

Giolitti and his associates had done their best in favor of neutrality, and in a very vigorous press campaign strove to influence the government in the direction of agreeing to the Austrian offer. The interventionists, however, had not been idle, and the demand for war constantly grew in volume under the influence of d'Annunzio's speeches and Mussolini's articles in his newspaper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*.

Had Austria at the last moment accepted Sonnino's terms it is doubtful if he could have controlled the public, for so effective had been the interventionist propaganda that the

war spirit, sweeping the country, would in all probability have either carried the government with it or turned it out of office. Austria's only chance of preserving the neutrality of Italy lay in a prompt and definite acceptance of the Italian demands when they were first presented, and before the intensive interventionist propaganda was well under way. By the time the Ball Platz was permitted by the emperor to accept, it was too late and the opportunity had gone forever.

Giolitti's hold on the chamber seemed unshaken and despite the evident opposition to him in the country he determined to force out Salandra.

Realizing that the chamber was against him, on May 13 Salandra resigned. The same evening the king sent for Giolitti who, unwilling to assume the responsibility of office himself, advised his sovereign to appoint Marcora, the president of the chamber, as prime minister, and on Marcora's refusal to accept, the king sent for Carcano, minister of finance, also at the suggestion of Giolitti, and on Carcano's refusal of the prime ministership, the king invited Salandra to resume office.

Although a majority of the chamber was undoubtedly against Salandra, public opinion was so strongly for him that enough deputies of the opposition, fearing the wrath of their constituents, voted against their inclinations and assured him a majority.

Villari calls attention to the fact that throughout the war the divorce between parliament and country was so complete that each cabinet was really extra-parliamentary without a majority to count on, although having the enthusiastic support of the country, and that the king in summoning Salandra in the face of an adverse majority in the chamber, really carried out the popular will.

On May 20, 1915, parliament granted to the government full powers with which to face the emergency, on May 23 mobilization of the army was ordered, and on May 24 war

was declared against Austria, to be followed later by declarations against Turkey, Bulgaria, and Germany.

At the time Sonnino was charged by the neutralists and by the central powers with having acted in bad faith to Germany and Austria. It was said that he had played with Austria and had continued to negotiate with her after he had definitely committed himself on the side of the allies. Time has, however, vindicated his good faith and Prince von Bülow in his memoirs goes far to justify the course followed by the Italian foreign office.

Bülow says that he called upon Sonnino the day after his arrival at Rome, December 16, 1914. That Sonnino "made no bones about giving me his views of the position and set them forth with clarity and candor. As war objective, the allies had promised Italy all Austrian territory peopled by Italian subjects. Should Austria wish to be assured that Italy would not enter the war against her, she must, in her turn, be willing to propose definite concessions, giving formal engagements to abide by them." Sonnino then stated Italy's minimum terms upon which she would be willing to remain neutral.

Bülow summarizes the situation by saying, "I could never manage to learn the exact extent of Italian commitments, made before my arrival, to the allies; nor, above all, could I be certain that she had not definitely and finally pledged herself. My instinct told me that, though preliminaries might already have reached their final stage, there had been, as yet, no binding official promise. It was therefore a question of giving Italian statesmen the speediest possible guarantee that Austria would acknowledge, without *arrière pensée*, the minimum at least of Italian aspirations and demands."<sup>2</sup>

It is obvious that had Bülow not believed Sonnino to be free to negotiate with him he would at once have demanded his

<sup>2</sup> *Memoirs of Prince von Bülow*, Vol. III, pp. 245-63.

passport and gone home. On the contrary he remained and did all that was humanly possible to keep Italy neutral.

It was not until more than four months after Bülow's arrival in Rome that the treaty of London was signed, and during that interval the field was free as between Bülow, on the one side, and Sir Rennell Rodd, the British ambassador, and Camille Barrère, the French ambassador, on the other, with the support of Italy, either active or passive, as the prize.

With no disparagement to either, Bülow was far abler than his two opponents, but unfortunately for his cause, he was weighted with a very heavy handicap.

While Sonnino was an Anglophil his friendship for Britain would never have swayed him from his duty to Italy, could he have served the interests of his country best by an accord with the central powers, reached before the Italian war spirit had been aroused.

It was not the antagonism of Sonnino that hampered Bülow in his efforts, but the opposition of his own alleged supporters. Not only was the emperor, Francis Joseph, obstinately unwilling to yield an inch, but Bülow charges that his personal enemies, including Bethmann-Hollweg the chancellor, Jagow the foreign minister, and Flatow his predecessor as ambassador, did all in their power to make his mission a failure. He says that against all diplomatic precedents Flatow remained in Italy, after leaving office, and continued to inform Berlin that Italy had no intention of joining the allies, and that he, Bülow, exaggerated the situation for the purpose of self-aggrandizement. Jagow, believing his friend Flatow rather than Germany's regularly accredited representative, failed to bring the necessary pressure on Vienna to make the Austrian emperor listen to reason. Without support from Berlin, Bülow was obliged to play a lone hand, and that he lost the game was due not so much to the ability or the finesse of his opponents, as to the failure of his superiors at the German foreign office to support him whole-heartedly.



The inference to be drawn from the Bülow memoirs is that had Austria frankly met the Italian terms, at any time during the first four months of 1915, Italy would have remained neutral and that Sonnino acted in good faith, not closing his arrangements with the allies until he became convinced that Austria could not be induced to accept his demands.

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## CHAPTER XVI

### THE WORLD WAR

**G**ENERAL LUIGI CADORNA was appointed chief of the general staff of the Italian army July 10, 1914, and given the task of army reorganization.

The Giolittian government had done very little to repair the damage to the morale and matériel of the army caused by the Turkish war, and it was greatly to Cadorna's credit that, in the eleven months that intervened between his appointment and Italy's declaration of war, he should have accomplished so much.

Italy's industrial resources were extremely limited, and in fact never reached a sufficient expansion to give the army all the material or supplies it needed. Although there was enough man power, artillery, aircraft, and transport were always below requirements.

When the Italian army faced the Austrians, who had had a year's war experience, while still leaving much to be desired, discipline in it had been restored, many incompetent officers had been weeded out, and it had become an efficient fighting machine.

The task that faced Cadorna was one of extreme difficulty. Friuli and Venetia, the northeastern part of Italy, formed a salient thrusting into Austrian territory, bounded on the south by the Adriatic, on the west by the Italian hinterland, and on all other sides by the Austrian Alps, beginning with the Ortlers on the northwest, extending through the Dolomites, Cadore, and Carnia, and finally striking the plain near Monfalcone, the mountains degenerating into high and steep hills near the coast, and swamp land on the seashore. The

summits of the ranges were all in Austrian hands, the frontier running considerably down the slope toward Italy.

To the north, Tirol formed a wedge driven into Italian territory, the point resting at the northern end of Lake Garda some twenty-five miles north of Verona.

For the moment Austria was Italy's only enemy and it was necessarily against her that the Italian efforts were directed, without regard to the other central power, or to any cooperation with the allies, for unity of command was still two years in the future.

The plan of the Italian general staff was therefore predicated entirely upon the local Italian situation. As the least of two evils Cadorna determined to strike the enemy on the Isonzo frontier to the east. An attack to the north, in the Trentino, up the mountain passes in the face of very elaborate defenses, was for the untried Italian army much too hazardous an undertaking.

Thanks to Mackensen's successes against the Russians and Serbians, Austria was able to transfer five divisions from the Serbian front to the Isonzo, where she opposed the Italian advance with some eight divisions.

Cadorna organized his forces in four armies, the first under Brusati, later succeeded by Pecori-Giraldi, of five divisions, the second under Capello, of eight divisions, the third under the Duke of Aosta, the king's cousin, of six divisions, and the fourth under Robilant, later succeeded by Giardino, of six divisions. The first army was ordered to stand on the defensive in the Trentino to block a possible attack of the enemy in the rear, the fourth army was sent into the Pusterthal to cooperate with the eastern advance and at the same time to cut, if possible, the enemy's communication with the Trentino, while the second and third armies, with fourteen divisions, were ordered to advance against the Isonzo. As seven of these divisions were not yet ready, Capello and Aosta on

reaching the Isonzo were obliged to intrench and await reinforcements.

By June 23 these had arrived and the first battle of the Isonzo was fought until July 7, with no decisive results. A second battle was fought ten days later and in October a third battle was begun, which lasted until December when further operations were postponed until spring.

While the Italians had outnumbered the Austrians two to one, they were lacking in artillery and experience and lost 280,000 men, as against the Austrian loss of 140,000.

In December 1915 Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Austrian chief of staff, had proposed to von Falkenhayn, his German colleague, a joint German-Austrian attack against Italy through the Trentino front in the direction of Vicenza and Bassano. Falkenhayn had declined on the ground that it would be impossible to collect the twenty-five divisions which he considered essential, and that railway facilities were inadequate. On Falkenhayn's refusal to cooperate, Conrad determined to make the attack alone, with a total force of fourteen divisions.

When rumors of the proposed attack reached Cadorna in April he at once visited the Italian lines and found that Brusati had failed to select the strongest available defensive positions, despite repeated orders to do so. Brusati was promptly relieved from his command and replaced by Pecori-Giraldi, the commander of the seventh corps.

Before new positions could be prepared, on May 14 the Austrians attacked, and began what is known as the battle of Asiago.

The Italian force consisted of 130 battalions of regulars, 45 of customs troops, and 45 of territorials, these latter of no great value, with which to oppose 180 battalions of Austrians. The Austrians were not only stronger in infantry than the Italians but were much superior in artillery.

By May 19 the Italians had been driven back from their defective defensive positions with great loss, and the outlook was extremely serious.

Meanwhile a fifth Italian army under Morrone had been organized with divisions taken from the second and third armies, and had been moved up in reserve to the Trentino.

The Italian left, comprising the divisions of Berlotti and Ricci-Armani, had stood firm, and by June 8, after the fifth army had been brought into action, the Austrian offensive was checked.

Cadorna now began a counter-attack, driving the Austrians out of the positions they had captured, but determined to abandon his first intention of an offensive on a large scale, as he had neither the men nor the artillery for the purpose.

The Austrian casualties amounted to over 100,000, the Italian to 110,000. The Austrian attack had been well conceived and well executed, but failed because of the admirable resistance of the Italians.

As soon as the battle of Asiago had been won, Cadorna was once more free to resume his attack on the eastern front. The Duke of Aosta with sixteen divisions kept up a constant hammering at the Austrian line between Monte Sabotino and the sea, while during the night of August 8 Capello's men with extraordinary gallantry captured the supposedly impregnable fortress of Monte Sabotino, crossed the river under a withering artillery fire, and captured the city of Gorizia.

Three further but unsuccessful drives were made against the Austrians and the year closed with Italian losses of 483,000 and Austrian of 260,000.

On August 27, 1916, war was at last declared against Germany.

The year 1917 was the most disastrous for the allied arms; it was the darkness before the dawn of the entrance of the United States into the war, a darkness that but for that dawn would have seen the triumph of the central powers.

Cadorna had begun the year with a renewed attack in the east in May, but without decisive results, what little progress he made being soon after lost. In August he began what has been called the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, during which Capello captured the greater part of the Bainsizza plain to the north of Gorizia. As no further progress was made after four weeks of fighting, the offensive was stopped.

Cadorna appealed to the allies for cooperation but without success, while the Austrians were reinforced by six German divisions.

Austria was beginning to weaken as the Italian army gained in experience. While at first the Italian losses almost always doubled those of Austria, by the beginning of 1917 the losses were usually equal. The great gallantry of the Italian troops was being used to better advantage by officers who were beginning to learn their profession. As it was becoming more and more evident that Austria unhelped could not long resist the terrific pounding of the Italians, the German general staff determined that every effort must be made to defeat Italy or Austria would collapse.

On the other hand, Cadorna had undoubtedly driven his men too hard. While defeatist propaganda in the rear may have had some effect, the loss of morale was chiefly due to the unbearable strain to which the men had been subjected. They were kept in the trenches and in active fighting month after month with neither relief nor leave, besides which they had suffered heavily from malaria and an epidemic of intestinal disease. Gallant and uncomplaining as they were, it is no wonder that they began to crack. The Italian losses were proportionately greater than those of any other army on either side. The men were kept in the fighting line more constantly than on the western front, the fighting was incessant and terrific, while with the exception of the successes of Capello the gains were negligible. The fault was not with the men, but chiefly with the general commanding.

Late in October, nine Austrian and six German divisions under the German General Otto von Below were concentrated at the extreme northeast of the Italian left, while two Austrian armies under Boroëvic were concentrated near the Adriatic. Because of inefficient air scouting the concentration was not discovered by the Italians.

Capello had called his chief's attention to the difficulty of defending the advanced positions taken by the army and had earnestly urged an attack on the Austrian right flank. He was in position to continue the offensive that had been stopped in the previous month and did not believe it possible to turn his offensive into a defensive with any great prospect of success. Although many of the staff agreed with him he was overruled.

Cadorna had under him the second and third armies on the eastern front, with the fourth cooperating to the west. Although many battalions were short-handed, his force was sufficient. He was weak in heavy guns, but otherwise had enough artillery. The Austrian force consisted of fourteen divisions, including nine Austrian and seven German, with 2,500 guns and 500 trench mortars, under Below, while Boroëvic had twenty divisions in his two armies, with his left close to the Adriatic.

On October 24, after five hours' bombardment with gas and high-power shell, the attack began. The weakest point in the Italian line was in the Tolmino sector between the 19th and 46th divisions of the second army, and it was here that the Austrians broke through. The severest fighting was north of the line where for a time the second army bore the brunt. Capello had been seriously ill and on the 25th was so near collapse that he was forced by his surgeon to relinquish his command and was succeeded by Montuori.

Both on the 24th and 25th matters went badly for the Italians; the line was broken not only near Tolmino but also in the south and near Caporetto.

By the afternoon of the 25th, the line became untenable and the Italians began their retreat; the morale of the second army and its left wing became entirely demoralized and commenced to crumble.

The enemy pursued with such vigor that by October 28 Below had reached Udine, the former Italian general headquarters, and by the 31st the river Tagliamento. Although Boroevic was slower in his movements than Below, he nevertheless drove the Italians before him and Cadorna was only able to save his army from capture by retreating precipitately behind the Piave, where his entire force arrived November 9 with a loss of 320,000 killed, wounded, and missing, 265,000 prisoners, 3,000 guns and 1,700 trench mortars.

The fourth army was called in from the Cadore and, with the third army and what was left of the second army joined to the third, held the new and much-shortened line which ran along the west bank of the Piave, from the sea to Quero, whence it turned west over Monte Grappo, meeting the first army at Rovereto.

The next day Cadorna was relieved from his command and General Armando Diaz, the commander of the 23rd army corps, put in his place.

It must be said in justice to Cadorna that the new alignment was entirely his work and that when Diaz took over the command he found the troops in their new positions, and the morale of the men greatly improved.

The victors of Caporetto were unable to follow up their success. The German-Austrian general staff had neither foreseen nor prepared for so complete a triumph, consequently the pursuing army outmarched its transports and its supplies and was obliged to await their arrival. When in a position to move again, the opportunity to destroy the Italian army had passed, for the defense of the new line held unshaken, and unshakable.



Throughout the month of November the Austrians and Germans kept up an incessant series of attacks all along the Italian front from the sea to Tirol, but while they scored some slight successes it soon became evident that the new line was firmly established.

Early in November the British and French began to send reinforcements to the Italian front and by the middle of December there were in all five British divisions under General the Earl of Cavan, and six French divisions under General Duchesne.

These were not put into the battle area until the beginning of December and had nothing whatever to do with the remarkable restoration of Italian morale and confidence.

The British took position to the left of the third army, with the French on their left.

The enemy now concentrated his attacks against the west of the line on the Brenta and the Asiago plateau, and all through December kept up a merciless hammering at the mountain positions of the Italians. By the end of the month the enemy had spent his force and by Christmas, when the snows brought the fighting to an end, the Italians had begun successfully to counter-attack.

During the winter the work of reorganizing the army, and of supplying the losses in munitions and equipment due to Caporetto, was carried on so successfully that by the end of February Diaz found himself at the head of a first-rate fighting force.

To meet the threatened offensive on the western front, four French, two British, and two Italian divisions were sent to France, leaving with the Italians of foreign troops only two French and three British divisions and one American regiment.

The Germans and Austrians determined to attack on the Brenta, and against the Piave line. The Austrians had on each front fifteen divisions with nineteen in reserve, while the

Italians had twenty-five divisions on both fronts with nineteen in reserve, the forces on the Brenta being roughly equal, the Austrians outnumbering the Italians on the Piave by some six divisions, and having a 40 per cent superiority in artillery.

The general attack began early on July 15. By evening of the 16th the attack against the Brenta positions was definitely and finally checked.

Against the Piave line the Austrians were at first successful and crossed the river at three different points. As Diaz threw in his reserves, the Austrian advance was checked and by the 24th the enemy had been driven back across the river. The Austrian losses were killed and wounded 200,000, prisoners 25,000, guns 70, against Italian losses of 90,000.

The moral effect of the Italian victory was tremendous. It not only greatly heartened the Italians, but correspondingly depressed the Austrians and hastened the fall of the Habsburg empire.

It was not until the end of October that Diaz considered the time had come for a final drive against the enemy. He had waited until conditions in Austria gave promise of political and economic collapse, and had used the interval in reorganizing his army and increasing his matériel.

Having concentrated forty-one divisions on the Piave front, against thirty-three of the Austrians, on October 24, the anniversary of Caporetto, Diaz ordered the fourth army to attack in the Grappa sector. By the 27th the crossing of the river had begun, and the next day the enemy's line was broken at the village of Vittorio Veneto, and on the 29th he was in full retreat, which soon became a rout.

October 30 Austria asked for an armistice, which was signed November 4, 1918, after consultation with the allies, and required the Austrian army to retire behind the frontier, established by the treaty of London, which was to be occupied by Italy.

The Italian loss had been 33,000, of whom 20,000 had fallen in the Grappa sector. The Austrians had lost 600,000 prisoners and 7,000 guns, and the Austrian-Hungarian empire had passed away.

As the result of the early reverses in the Trentino, Salandra had been forced to resign on June 10, 1916. His successor was the venerable Paolo Boselli, president of the chamber, who formed a national cabinet in which all groups but the socialists and neutralists were represented. Orlando was moved from justice to interior, while Sonnino remained at the foreign office.

Because of Caporetto, Boselli fell, Orlando succeeding him, with Nitti at finance and Sonnino remaining at the foreign office.

Vittorio Emanuele Orlando was born at Palermo March 19, 1860, was a lawyer by profession and professor of law at the University of Palermo until he took office. Elected a deputy in 1898, he became an ardent supporter of Giolitti under whom he served as minister of education, and later as minister of justice. He declined to follow his chief in the latter's neutralist campaign and, becoming an interventionist, was made minister of justice by Salandra and minister of the interior by Boselli. While a man of conceded integrity, he was not over-forceful, and was too much inclined to compromise and in an emergency to let matters drift.

It fell to the lot of Orlando to negotiate the terms of peace, a task for which he was ill equipped, both in character and ability.

A week after the signing of the armistice with Austria, on November 11, Italy signed the armistice with Germany, the same day that Marshal Foch signed on behalf of the allies.

Italy had made a glorious fight, for despite lack of equipment and mistakes in generalship, under Diaz she had turned defeat into victory, and had to her credit the final destruction of the Austrian army. The price that she had paid had been

terrific, 600,000 killed, 1,000,000 gravely wounded of whom 220,000 were "mutilati" or permanently disabled, while the budget showed a deficit of 6,271,000,000 lire.

When on January 1, 1919, the government declared the war at an end, Orlando found his cabinet much divided on the question of territorial acquisitions from Austria. Sonnino, who had negotiated the treaty of London, stood firmly by it, insisting that it not only gave to Italy all that she had ever claimed as "unredeemed" but that it secured for her the strategical frontier demanded by the general staff. The prime minister felt that Italy should not only have the concessions granted by the treaty of London but also Fiume on the ground that its Italian majority had petitioned for annexation. Bissolati, the very mild socialist minister without portfolio, opposed both positions. He opposed the annexation of Fiume on the ground that it contained a very large population, perhaps a majority, of Slavs, who wanted to belong to Yugoslavia, and that it would be unfair to deprive that country of its chief seaport and trade outlet. He opposed the annexation of the Alto Adige on the ground that its population was entirely German and that apart from the injustice of forcing them unwillingly under Italian rule, Italy would by so doing be unnecessarily creating for herself a problem similar to the German problem of Alsace and Lorraine.

The differences in the ministry became so acute that a crisis resulted, during which Bissolati, Nitti, and four other ministers resigned. Orlando reconstituted his cabinet on January 18, 1919, the very day that the peace conference met in Paris.

The delegates to the conference were Orlando, Salandra, Sonnino, Barzilai, and Salvago-Raggi, Italian ambassador to France. For the next three months but little progress was made toward settling the claims of Italy. President Wilson, who had taken Yugoslavia under his wing, was unwilling to yield to Italy any of the claims of his protégé, which in-

cluded a "rectification" of the former Italian-Austrian frontier to the disadvantage of Italy. Wilson, who had made a triumphal progress through Italy early in January, astounded the world on April 23 by making a direct appeal to the Italian people urging them to support his attitude on the question of Italian claims.

The American president, who had never been on the Continent until he went to the peace conference, showed by his appeal his utter ignorance of the Italian character. He addressed the Italians in exactly the same way that, when president of Princeton University, he had addressed the alumni over the heads of the board of trustees, with which he was at odds. To his intense surprise his appeal was received with vociferous indignation by an almost unanimous Italian nation.

Orlando at once hurried to Rome and asked of parliament an expression of its confidence, which he received by a vote of 382 to 40.

Had Orlando possessed any force of character he could undoubtedly have secured Fiume for Italy, scored a great triumph for his country and himself, and avoided for the former the years of disturbance that followed.

Wilson was so deeply committed to his project for a League of Nations, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were so anxious that the treaty of peace should be signed by all the allies, that Orlando with his country solidly behind him had it in his power to exact almost any price for his signature. Instead of firmly insisting on the cession of Fiume and refusing to adhere to the League of Nations or to sign the treaty unless Fiume were given him, he allowed the three dominant figures in the conference to ride over him roughshod, and accepted what they were willing to give him.

On June 19 a thoroughly disillusioned and disgusted chamber refused him a vote of confidence, and Nitti succeeded him.

Nitti replaced Sonnino at the foreign office with Tittoni, gave Schanzer his own portfolio at the treasury, and himself took the interior.

On June 28, 1919, the treaty with Germany was signed at Versailles by Sonnino, the same day that the new Italian delegates headed by Tittoni left Rome.

Early in July serious rioting occurred in Fiume which resulted in a number of deaths among the soldiers of the French garrison. A commission of inquiry appointed by the peace conference recommended that the council which had been governing Fiume be dissolved, that new elections be held under allied auspices, and that the city be policed by British and Americans, the Fiume volunteers to be disbanded.

Before the recommendations of the commission could be carried into effect, on July 12 d'Annunzio arrived at Fiume at the head of a force of Italian soldiers and volunteers, while most of the Italian soldiers and sailors in the town fell in behind him. He easily took over the government of the city, and on the departure of the allied garrisons, Nitti found it impossible to dislodge the poet without resorting to a minor war. As Italian public opinion seemed to be favorable to d'Annunzio, who declared that he was holding Fiume for Italy, Nitti concluded to allow matters to drift.

On September 10, 1919, the treaty of St. Germain was signed with Austria under the terms of which Italy received the territory assigned to her by the treaty of London, with the Sexten Thal and Tarvis thrown in.

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## CHAPTER XVII

### AFTER THE WAR

**F**RANCESCO SAVERIO NITTI was born at Melfi in the Basilicata in 1868, was by profession a lawyer, and had been for some years before he entered politics professor of economics at the University of Naples. He entered parliament in 1904, was minister of agriculture, industry, and trade under Giolitti from 1911 to 1914, and minister of the treasury under Orlando from October 1917 to 1919. Intriguing against his chief, he brought about the fall of the government and succeeded Orlando as prime minister. As an economist Nitti stood high. As prime minister he was a failure, for he was lamentably weak and vacillating.

He took over the direction of affairs at a time that required a very strong hand at the helm, and his hand was painfully feeble. The war had left behind it domestic, economic, and political problems of great seriousness and difficulty. The budget prepared under Nitti but presented by his successor showed a deficit of 14,000,000,000 lire. Wheat had been made a government monopoly and was commandeered from the home producer for a less price than it was bought abroad in the open market. There was a bread subsidy and an unemployment dole, both of which made great inroads into the treasury. The number of government employees had been almost doubled for the purpose of providing work for political henchmen, and in the railway service the number had been increased from 154,000 to 240,000, and the men had become completely demoralized.

The repercussion of the Russian revolution was strongly felt and communist propaganda was carried on without governmental hindrance in all parts of the country and in all

the public services. Revolutionary strikes were almost endemic, and the revolutionary parties were rapidly becoming a serious menace to the stability of the state.

The old Catholic group had been reorganized under the able management of Don Luigi Sturzo, a Sicilian priest, into the Partito Popolare Italiano, with a so-called Christian socialist program, but with a left wing scarcely distinguishable from out-and-out socialists.

Under the urge of the popolari and the socialists, Nitti consented to the enactment of a proportional election law, and at the elections held under it November 16, 1919, there were returned 156 socialists, 101 popolari, and 30 "combattenti" who were nominated by groups of war veterans, the rest of the deputies being divided into the usual groups more numerous than ever before.

When parliament met the socialists withdrew from the chamber, and were received by the crowd outside with such vigor that several of the deputies were wounded, whereupon a general strike was called and lasted for twenty-four hours, with serious rioting in several cities.

The railway situation was to say the least anomalous. The union of the railway men, whose members were government employees, was frankly revolutionary, having for its main purpose the overturning of its employer, the government. The men were paid by the state, and yet sought the state's destruction. They were ruled by a committee of six hundred, popularly known as "the little railway parliament," and ruled despotically and capriciously. They terrorized succeeding prime ministers, who until the coming of the revolution never dared to oppose their will.

On January 22 "the little railway parliament" formulated a series of demands on the government, including higher pay and shorter hours, and at once ordered a general strike, without giving the government an opportunity to deal with



them. Nitti immediately granted all their demands and agreed not to punish the strike leaders.

In the beginning of March, the hands of the Mazzonis' cotton mills, having been refused higher pay, seized the plant and threatened to destroy it. As government declined to help the owners, they were obliged to yield, and Nitti forthwith amnestied all who had taken part in the disorders.

Meanwhile the railway men refused to carry troops or police in the direction of any place where there was a strike or industrial disorder, refused to transport munitions to the frontier lest they be used against Russia, and refused to transport wine or food from one province to another lest the price of living might rise, and Nitti made no effort to curb them.

Finding the situation more serious than he could face, Nitti resigned March 12, 1920, but as no one could be found who could form a government, he reconstituted his cabinet and carried on. Two months later he was defeated in the chamber, but again was obliged to reconstitute his cabinet and remain in office.

For another month the Nitti government lived a precarious life, making one political mistake after another. The amnestying of war deserters caused a violent outcry, as did the government's failure to solve the Adriatic question, and its refusal to hold a ceremony in honor of the Unknown Soldier on the ground that it would revive memories of the war.

In June the prime minister decreed the reduction of the bread subsidy, only to withdraw the decree five days later when faced with the protests of the socialists. His supporters had fallen away from him so that he found himself deserted by all the groups, even the popolari, and on June 9 resigned and passed finally from the political scene.

A week later Giolitti succeeded in forming his fifth government and took the premiership for the last time, with Sforza at the foreign office.

One of Giolitti's first acts was to withdraw the Italian garrison from Albania at the demand of the socialists. At the conference of Spa, however, held in the month of July 1920, Sforza redeemed this loss of prestige by inducing the allies to raise Italy's share of the German indemnity to 10 per cent and of the other indemnities to 25 per cent.

At a conference with Yugoslavia held at Rapollo in August the independence of Fiume was recognized, Italy yielding Dalmatia to Yugoslavia, with the exception of the city of Zara and four islands off the coast, and also Porto Baros, part of the port of Fiume.

D'Annunzio having declined to accept the treaty or to leave Fiume, pressure was brought to bear and the poet, deeming discretion the better part of valor, at the beginning of 1921 surrendered and left the city.

It was in his handling of the domestic situation that Giolitti showed a most astounding weakness and absolutely broke down.

The inflation due to the war had run its course, and signs were not wanting that a serious depression was coming. Employers felt that they could no longer continue to meet the demands of labor for increased wages, and labor directed by the revolutionary groups declined to modify their demands.

The general strike as a weapon of class warfare was of almost daily occurrence in some part or other of the peninsula. A general strike might be called in support of an existing economic strike for higher wages or shorter hours or the like, or in protest against some act of the authorities, or merely as a revolutionary gesture. It would be called in one or more of the cities, for a fixed period of one or two or three days as the case might be. While the strike lasted, every single wage-earner in the affected area stopped work, including factory hands, cab-drivers, railway men, and the employees in the markets, newspapers, hotels, restaurants, and theaters.

The only restaurants allowed to stay open were those frequented by the strikers, while in the hotels the proprietors and their families, with the aid of their guests, made shift to keep body and soul together.

Encouraged by the inaction of the authorities, the trade unions became bolder, and in Piedmont and Lombardy seized the factories and tried to operate them. Failing to do so they kidnaped the managers and forced them to supervise the work in the interests of the men.

In Bologna and Sardinia there were meetings held in favor of separating from Italy.

The situation in the rural districts was as bad as in the towns. The laborers struck for conditions beyond the power of their employers to grant, and emphasized their demands by rioting and murder.

The government, thinking only of its parliamentary majority, and unwilling to antagonize either the left-wing popolari or the socialists or even the communists, did nothing to check disorder, and in fact showed evident sympathy with the authors of unrest.

The prime minister, calling together the owners and leaders of the workers in the north, induced the former to agree to a proposed law increasing wages and providing for the control of industry by the men, a measure worthy of bolshevik Russia. Whereupon the factories were handed back to their owners by the workers who had been in possession, and work was half-heartedly resumed.

It might have been supposed that Giolitti's surrender to communism would have brought industrial peace, but what the leaders of the agitation wanted was not peace but revolution in government, and the agitation went on.

Thinking men in Italy realized that if conditions continued as they were it could only be a short time before the revolution would come, and Italy follow in the footsteps of Russia.

The proprietary class began to put pressure upon the prime minister in the hope of stiffening his attitude, but Giolitti did not have it in him to rise to the occasion. As usual he was willing to compromise and to give a free hand to the bands of fascisti, who had been organized by Mussolini, in their effort to restore order.

Giolitti was under the impression that he could use Mussolini as Cavour had used Garibaldi—use him to do the work which he was both unwilling and incapable of doing himself. He thought that in case of failure Mussolini could be easily repudiated, and in case of success he could be shelved. What Giolitti failed to understand was that he was not Cavour, and that he was dealing with a very different type of man than Garibaldi.

Cavour was a great statesman and a great man, of whom Garibaldi stood in awe, for all his intense dislike. When Italy had been won, and Garibaldi's part had been played, Cavour had little difficulty in sending him back to Caprera. The old hero went with a heavy heart and much resentment, but not a hand was raised to stay his departure.

Giolitti was the antithesis of Cavour. A small and weak man, he was utterly incapable of controlling Mussolini. When order had been finally restored and the threat of bolshevism conjured, thanks to Mussolini and not to Giolitti, the power of the former had become so great and so generally recognized that he completely overshadowed and dominated the latter.

During the summer and autumn of 1920 and the winter of 1921 Giolitti preserved the attitude of an interested spectator and allowed the communists and fascisti to fight it out without government even keeping the ring.

In Bologna the anarchist Malatesta secured control of the city government and a virtual reign of terror began, which was finally ended by the fascisti driving out the reds and reorganizing the administration. From then on the fascisti

carried war into all the communist strongholds, and usually with success, for public opinion, fearful of a bolshevik revolution and disgusted with the supineness of the government, vigorously supported Mussolini.

It is possible that the socialists might have made much headway had they held together, but at their congress of Leghorn, January 13, 1922, they once more split, and the left wing, breaking away, strove to emphasize its position by bomb outrages in Florence. The fascisti interfered, there were killings on both sides and for once the troops were allowed to restore order.

During March the bread subsidy was at last abolished, but Giolitti's pet bill for the control of industry by the trade unions was defeated. Accordingly on April 7, 1921, the chamber was dissolved and the elections returned 107 popolari, 122 right-wing socialists, 16 communists, 35 fascisti, 10 nationalists, 4 Germans from Tirol, and 5 Slavs from Trieste, leaving only 236 out-and-out supporters of the prime minister.

Times had changed since the days when governments could "make" elections at will. There was too much unrest, too much excitement, especially among the peasants, to allow the prefetti to handle the electorate as they had done in the past. Moreover, the grand' elettori on whom Giolitti had relied, found their followers had developed an unexpected spirit of independence.

Giolitti had extended the franchise to eight million voters in the belief that by so doing he would ensure his continuance in office. The result was precisely the opposite of his expectations, for the people whom he had enfranchised were those who turned against him and eventually drove him from power.

For the first time the fascisti appeared in the chamber as an organized party, and with the nationalists formed a mili-

tant group that carried on an unrelenting war against the socialists.

On June 11 parliament met, and a fortnight later on a vote of confidence raised by Federzoni, the nationalist leader, on the foreign policy of Sforza, the government majority being negligible, Giolitti resigned. He was succeeded by Bonomi, who had held office in various Giolittian cabinets, and was as hesitating and weak a prime minister in the face of industrial unrest as had been his chief. He formed a government that depended largely on the popolari, and during its tenure of office the real power behind the throne was Don Sturzo who proved himself almost as radical as the socialists.

Largely as the result of the failure of the Banco di Sconto the government fell after eight months of office and was succeeded by Luigi Facta, probably the weakest of the many weak prime ministers with whom Italy had been burdened.

Disorders and strikes continued as they had under the Bonomi government, and reached a climax when on August 1, 1922, a general strike was called in all Italy by the *Allianza del Lavoro* as a protest against the fascisti. The fascisti retaliated by issuing a proclamation giving the government forty-eight hours in which to assert its authority, threatening to take over governmental powers in the event of a continuance of the disorders. The workers walked out of most of the factories, and the railways, the mails and the telegraph were seriously crippled. The fascisti met and engaged the communist forces in Milan, Genoa, Ancona, and other cities, and by August 5 the strike was over, again thanks to Mussolini and not to the prime minister.

Facta offered several unimportant posts to Mussolini who replied with an ultimatum, "either immediate dissolution or a new cabinet with the important posts in fascista hands." Facta tried in vain to resign his office but could find no one to take his place. It was evident that his government was

ceasing to function, and it seemed doubtful if it would be possible to constitute a cabinet that could govern.

On October 24 at the fascista congress at Naples, 40,000 well drilled fascisti in their black-shirted uniforms marched through the streets, and two days later some 10,000 marched on Rome in four columns, the actual march starting at Civita-vécchia. The revolution had begun.

On October 27 Facta presented to the king for the royal signature a decree proclaiming martial law, and, on the king's refusal to sign, at once resigned.

An attempt by Salandra to form a government resulted in failure, and on Salandra's and Giolitti's advice the king sent for Mussolini.

The fascisti reached Rome October 30, 1922, and occupied the city with very little bloodshed. The same day Mussolini arrived and was received by the king to whom he submitted the list of his government. October 31 Mussolini, fearing disorder, wisely ordered his followers to leave the city and two days later all had left.

The revolution had been won and Mussolini was in absolute control of the state.

There has been a good deal of idle speculation as to whether, had he wished to do so, the king could have nipped the revolution in the bud. It has been suggested that had he followed the advice of Facta and signed the decree for martial law the army would have had no difficulty in suppressing fascismo.

While unquestionably the black shirts would have had no chance against the military in a pitched battle, it would have required a far stronger man than Facta at the head of affairs to have made such a procedure successful. Had the decree been signed the army would of course have obeyed orders, but with a weak prime minister the campaign would at best have been carried on half-heartedly, for the great industrialists, the aristocracy, and the middle classes, those, in short,

who made public opinion, sympathized with a movement intended to change the existing conditions of semi-anarchy.

It is not supposable that Facta or any of his possible parliamentary successors would have had the courage, or the persistence, or the energy to have carried on a long-drawn-out struggle, as it undoubtedly would have been.

The king in refusing to sign the decree showed himself to be a man of wisdom and a patriot, for by so doing he undoubtedly saved his country from the horrors of civil war.



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CHAPTER XVIII

REVOLUTION

TO UNDERSTAND the ease with which the fascista revolution succeeded, it is essential to study it objectively, to disassociate oneself entirely from the Anglo-Saxon point of view, and to try to grasp the phenomenon with the mentality of an Italian.

We English-speaking peoples have dogmatically asserted that a democratic government is the best government, not only for ourselves, but for all the other peoples of the world, that it is the ideal for which all peoples and nations ought to strive, and that failure to achieve it shows a civilization inferior to ours.

It is undoubtedly true that for us democratic government is the best and only possible government. But it has come to us as the gradual development of a thousand years during which our ancestors worked and struggled and lived and fought and died for the realization of an ideal that they never forgot and never betrayed.

That democracy has its shortcomings, in lack of efficiency and in cost, we concede, but we cheerfully pay the price, as we would cheerfully pay any price rather than surrender our right to self-government, for the concept of democracy is so ingrained in us that we can think in no other terms.

While many of the Germanic peoples have followed in our footsteps, for most of the South Europeans this devotion of ours to democracy is an unfathomable mystery. Nations with just as high as and far older civilizations than ours have never grasped the real meaning of democracy.

While Italy, carried away by the doctrines of the French Revolution, loudly preached democracy she never really

practised it, and it is absurd to think that had her leaders understood its spirit and sincerely desired to adopt a democratic government they could have succeeded.

A form of government, that results from a condition of mind, that is the growth of centuries, cannot be created overnight. The vast majority of the Italian people at the time of the birth of Italia Unita were illiterate and desperately poor. The struggle for existence was so hard that it left them neither leisure nor desire to think of other things. They were quite incapable of political thinking and were perfectly content to allow their betters to do their thinking for them, which their betters never hesitated to do, and the "making" of elections, which was the corruption and intimidation of the electorate by the political group or groups in power, became a recognized institution. Until the last general election, before the revolution, there was no case of a prime minister failing to "make" an election in his own favor. Because of the group system and the tendency of deputies toward disloyalty he might ere long lose control of the majority, but invariably at the beginning of a new parliament the outgoing prime minister was sure of a vote of confidence.

The suffrage was never universal, or ever granted to all grown men. Even Giolitti's last extension of the vote had property qualifications that limited it to less than eight million out of a total population of nearly forty millions. Under Cavour the total number of voters was less than half a million, and after his time was on several occasions increased to two million where it remained until 1912.

These limited numbers of voters were easily handled by the prefetti and grand' elettori, who were the election agents of the groups in power. The vast majority of the deputies belonged to the so-called learned professions and followed some personal leader in the chamber, with whom they formed a group.

In the early days when the so-called right was in power, there was real statesmanship in Italian politics. Cavour was a truly great man, while Ricasoli, Visconti-Venosta, Sella, Lanza, and Minghetti were all men of high character and great ability.

On the passing of the right, Italian politics fell into the hands of smaller and cheaper men, professional office-holders who were willing to go to any lengths to retain their places. There was a gradual deterioration in public life after the time of Crispi, who with all his faults was a man of strength and character and by far the ablest of the three men who dominated Italy during the greater part of the time between 1876 and 1922.

As time passed, inefficiency and corruption in the public service increased to such an extent that they were generally acknowledged and condoned. Shortly before the World War a former minister, Nasi, was tried by the chamber for stealing the public funds and expelled. He was promptly reelected by his constituents, his election declared invalid by the chamber, again elected and unseated, and again elected, whereupon the chamber accepted him and he continued to sit until his death some years later.

The Banca Romana scandal had not the slightest lasting effect on Giolitti's career, and was entirely forgotten by his admirers.

A government rotten with graft and pitifully inefficient was obviously unable to face a serious crisis. If the World War ended gloriously for Italy it was because of the army, the organizing ability of the high command and the gallantry of the rank and file, and not at all because of the civil government.

When the peace came and the government was called upon to face the menace of falling revenues and increasing expenditures and of bolshevism, it sank deeper and deeper into

the slough of despond, and threatened to cease functioning altogether.

The thinking people of Italy, the hard-headed middle class and the intelligent peasants, who together constitute wellnigh a majority of the population, had for some time realized that only drastic measures could save the state from anarchy or communism.

Parliament was out of touch with the country, and had ceased truly to represent public opinion. It was made up entirely of professional politicians who owed their seats to the support of group leaders, prefetti, and prime ministers of the past or the future, who kept them in office to do their will.

During the last decade of its existence Giolitti nearly always controlled a majority, and if at times that majority got out of hand and voted against his wishes, it was because public opinion was so aroused that deputies feared to run counter to it.

At the outbreak of the war a large majority of the chamber was neutralist, and never viewed the war with any particular favor, so much so that only one deputy, Count Brando Brandolin of Venice, was killed. Yet against its will, the chamber not only declared war, but supported, although unenthusiastically, the various prime ministers who carried on during hostilities.

Because of the group system a minority of the chamber, if sufficiently active and persistent, could usually defeat almost any legislation to which it objected, by bargaining with other minorities for the undoing of the government. It was not that able men were lacking in Italian politics, but the necessity of constantly intriguing for group support, of constantly bargaining for the loyalty of members, made of the intriguer a far more outstanding figure than the statesman.

That Giolitti controlled the chamber for so long was due not only to his great ability in intrigue, but to his invariable

willingness to drop legislation that he had proposed, and to jump from one side to the other of a question with lightning speed, when the exigencies of a vote required.

The idea of a dictator was not repugnant to a people who had never known real democracy. The quasi-democracy of Crispi had degenerated into the mob lawlessness permitted by Giolitti, which if allowed to continue could only have resulted in the shipwreck of the state.

It became more and more evident that the only hope for Italy lay in a strong man at the helm. There was no one among the professional politicians who was other than a weakling. Had the king been willing to pattern himself upon his grandfather, it would have been logical for him to have seized control and to have saved the state. But the king was too scrupulously constitutional a monarch for the emergency. Fortunately for Italy there was one strong man available, who had behind him the force needed to work his will.

Conditions were ripe for revolution; the car of state had fallen so deep in the mud that only dynamite could put it back upon its road.

In 1922 Italy was faced with the alternative of collapse and communism, or of a dictatorship in the opposite direction. In any event the government, as it then was, was doomed and revolution either of the left or of the right was inevitable. Nothing could have saved the nation from communism but a strong man and at the most critical period of her life the strong man appeared.

Mussolini is the only creator of a revolution in history who was both its apostle and its messiah.

Born July 29, 1883, at Varano di Costa in Romagna, the son of a blacksmith, he became a schoolteacher, resigned to study at the University of Geneva, became a newspaper man, and in December 1912 the managing editor of *Avanti*, the official socialist organ. At that time he was an extreme syndicalistic

and revolutionary socialist. In 1914, because of the anti-war policy of *Avanti*, he resigned and started his own paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, with a capital of 4,000 lire lent him by prospective advertisers.

While still a socialist he advocated Italy's entrance into the war, and when she entered joined the colors. He fought with gallantry, was wounded and discharged as a sergeant.

The war over, he resumed the editorship of his paper and on March 23, 1919, organized in Milan what he called "il fascio di combattimento," which may be freely translated "the fighting group." It consisted of some one hundred and fifty of his friends, who before the war had worked with him as syndicalists and for intervention. Most, if not all, had been soldiers, and while their political ideas were somewhat nebulous, they leaned toward socialism and republicanism and were all extreme nationalists.

Mussolini was unceasing in spreading his belief in nationalism, and by voice and pen called on his countrymen to repair the damage done the national cause by the weakness of the government. In every town in which he found adherents he organized a fascio, and soon had his units of organization spread all over the country.

The movement at first made slow progress. In the election of 1919 the fascisti made no impression whatever, although in the following year, in union with other anti-red groups, they were heard from in the municipal elections. After the suppression of the Bologna riots in November 1920 when the local fascisti, numbering not more than two hundred, played an important part, the first armed bands called "squadre" or squadrons were organized.

These were recruited from the existing fascii, from d'Annunzio's "legionari" who had recently been forced out of Fiume, from ex-soldiers and adventurous lads who sought excitement. They were armed, all with clubs, many with

rifles, revolvers, and automatics, and used as a favorite weapon castor oil, which they forced their victims to drink. They were uniformed in black—black trench cap, or fez, black cotton shirt, and black breeches and gaiters, and were usually known as “camicie nere,” or black shirts, the black uniform being derived from that of the arditi or shock troops at the close of the Great War.

They roamed the country without let or hindrance from the authorities, breaking up communist meetings, sacking communist newspaper offices and headquarters, and engaging communist bands whenever and wherever met, and usually giving their opponents better than they received. Many of their historians would have us believe that they were entirely actuated by “outraged patriotism”; it is probable, however, that the force that impelled most of them was the love of adventure that is inherent in every normal boy.

Atrocities were committed on both sides; the fascisti killed many communists, but on the other hand the communists killed many fascisti, yet it is probable that the total death list did not exceed a thousand. This death list seems not excessive when it is remembered that the black shirts were not only doing the work that the police should have done, but were at the same time bringing about one of the most complete revolutions in history. When it is compared with the death lists of the French and Russian revolutions it sinks into insignificance.

Who financed the movement is not known. The cost of arming, equipping, and maintaining in the field thousands of black shirts must have been very great, and it is probable that the paymasters were the industrialists whose interests required the restoration of order.

The success of the fascisti against the communists, who had been repudiated by the right-wing socialists, brought many recruits to the fascista cause, especially from organized

labor, many trade unions in the north joining fascismo bodily.

At the election of May 1921 fascismo was strong enough to elect 38 deputies, including Mussolini himself, who abandoned republicanism and declared for the monarchy September 29, 1922. In November 1921, a national congress was held in Rome, where Mussolini reviewed his black shirts, and the Partito Nazionale Fascista, or national fascista party, was formally organized.

The platform of the party expresses in brief the doctrine of fascismo that Mussolini had evolved. "The nation," it says, "is not merely the sum total of living individuals, nor the instrument of parties for their own ends, but an organism comprising the unlimited series of generations of which individuals are merely transient elements; it is the synthesis of all the material and non-material values of the race."

In foreign affairs the nation should "reaffirm her right to complete historic and geographic unity, and fulfil her mission as the bulwark of Latin civilization in the Mediterranean."

In home affairs the functions of parliament should be limited to dealing with the state as the instrument of the nation and the individual as a citizen. The citizens as producers should be dealt with by technical councils. The right of private property should be protected, unions both of employers and employed should be created and supervised by the state. The finances should be put in order and the state restored to a position of respect and importance.

From this beginning has gradually been evolved the present philosophy of fascismo, with its doctrine of the corporate state and its prime insistence on the state as the be-all and do-all of the nation.

That Mussolini was personally ambitious no one can deny, but that he was influenced by a patriotism quite as great and even greater than his ambition is equally evident.



He dreamed a dream of making Italy, his Italy, the greatest nation of the earth. But to do this he realized that he must entirely modify the character of her people. Never quite forgetting the socialism of his youth, he thought of the individual as a mere atom in the cosmos of the state. The government that he conceived is governmental socialism in which, although capitalism is recognized, it is controlled and regulated by the state. To produce such a government was possible, but to ensure it required a discipline among the people that did not exist. That he has succeeded in making his countrymen not only accept his benevolent despotism in politics, but accept willingly the interference of government in almost all their daily affairs, is because of the historic experience of Italy and because of the man himself.

The Italians have never known political self-government. The imposition of fascismo on the surface changed democracy into dictatorship; actually it changed a corrupt and inefficient travesty of the one into an honest and efficient actuality of the other. Except among those who had lost their means of political livelihood and those dreamers who honestly believed that the former government had really been democratic, the change was welcomed as a great improvement.

State interference with the daily life of the individual was a different matter, and to bring about a condition of discipline among the people which would cause them to acquiesce, was the task to which Mussolini devoted himself.

No other man than he could have succeeded, for he understands the psychology of his people better than almost any other Italian who has ever lived. He has known how to raise the patriotic fervor of the people to the boiling point by a word and to calm them with a gesture, he has known just how far to go in making changes and just when to stop, he has kept the people interested in national affairs and in himself, and has won their devotion and their admiration. He

has developed his people physically and mentally, and has inspired them by his personality. Eloquent, able, untiring, fearless morally and physically, hard-headed, ruthless, patient, he is the kind of man that Italians would like to be, and, not being, are glad to follow.

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## CHAPTER XIX

### MUSSOLINI

**M**USSOLINI'S government has always been that of one man, for, while he has had assistants, he has never had a colleague. He has the ability possessed by all great executives of making others do his work for him. His has been the directing brain, and from him have come the new ideas and the inspiration that have wrought the revolution, the details having been worked out by his subordinates. For a decade he has been the absolute and undisputed dictator of Italy, standing head and shoulders above his associates, not one of whom measures up to him in either force or ability.

Before the march on Rome, Mussolini appointed the quadrumvirate of the fascista party, as a sort of executive committee, under his direct control. It consisted of Michele Bianchi as secretary and executive officer, Italo Balbo, commanding the black shirts, General de Bono, a retired regular who had won fame for his gallant defense of Monte Grappa, and C. M. de Vecchi, a deputy. Dino Grandi, a newspaper man, was attached as political adviser. These constituted the inner circle of the fascista machine and have remained the close friends of their leader ever since.

The cabinet that Mussolini submitted for the approval of the king contained twelve members, and included representatives of the principal groups, excepting the left socialists. Besides the prime ministership Mussolini took the portfolios of foreign affairs and the interior, General Diaz was given war, and Admiral Thaon di Revel the navy, these two as soldier and sailor respectively being supposed to have no

political affiliations but being nevertheless ardent fascisti. Tangorra at the treasury and Cavazzoni, labor, were popolari; Rossi, industry, was a follower of Giolitti; Gentile, education, and de Capitani, agriculture, were liberals; Cesarò, posts, was a right-wing socialist; Federzoni, colonies, was the nationalist leader who with his party soon joined fascismo; while de Stefani, finance, and Carnazza, public works, were fascisti.

As Gentile almost immediately after his appointment became a fascista, all the important portfolios in this first fascista cabinet were in the hands of men who could be certainly counted on by the prime minister. Before many months had passed the non-fascista members of the cabinet had either died or retired voluntarily or under pressure, and their places had been taken by fascisti.

On November 16, 1922, when Mussolini faced the chamber as prime minister, he told it that he might have dissolved it and governed without its authority, but that he preferred to ask it to grant him absolute power for one year. He promised to call parliament together at the end of that time and to report that he had balanced the budget and restored Italy to order at home and dignity abroad. He further told the chamber that if the authority he sought were refused he would dissolve it, and assume absolute power without its consent. Whereupon the chamber, overwhelmingly Giolittian, with only forty-eight fascista and nationalist deputies, granted Mussolini the authority he demanded by a vote of 275 to 90 and then adjourned.

The action of the chamber was unconstitutional and revolutionary, for it conferred upon Mussolini an unlimited dictatorship, never contemplated by the statuto. The 227 non-fascista and nationalist deputies, who supported Mussolini's demands, by so doing associated themselves with the revolution, and scarcely improved their standing in the eyes of the world when later they claimed to have voted under duress.

The ease with which Mussolini intimidated the chamber shows clearly the quality of the membership of that body, and while thereafter and for some years opposition among the deputies to the new régime continued, it was very largely vocal.

In December 1923 Mussolini, whose title of *duce*, or chief, had in the meantime been conferred upon him by fascism, met the chamber, reported progress, and submitted a bill for the chamber's reorganization, which was promptly passed, whereupon parliament was dissolved.

Under the terms of the new law Italy was divided into fifteen election districts, each electing a fixed number of deputies on a single ticket in proportion to its population. The party polling a plurality of the total votes in the nation was to receive two-thirds of the seats in the chamber.

The elections were held on April 6, when 7,628,859 votes were polled, the fascisti receiving 4,693,690 or 65¼ per cent of the total. The old art of "making" an election had evidently not died with the coming of the revolution, and yet in fairness it must be conceded that the intimidation used at the polls was no greater than was usually employed under the old régime.

It has been said<sup>1</sup> that when Mussolini became prime minister he intended, certainly in the beginning, to carry on the government under then existing political institutions but that a short experience with the chamber convinced him of the necessity of a change.

The *statuto*, while respected in its letter, had been greatly modified in its spirit. Under Giolitti it had been more and more ignored, and the chamber of deputies had become the willing tool of the prime minister in his dictatorship. The *statuto* had expressly reserved the executive power to the

<sup>1</sup> *Italy*, by Luigi Villari, New York, 1929, p. 176.

king, and had given the senate and chamber of deputies equal authority.

The chamber had centered the executive power in its own hands and had reduced the senate to the position of a register of the deputies' decrees.

While the chamber had shown complete subservience to the will of the new dictator, it was by no means certain that under the existing group system that subservience could be counted on indefinitely.

Mussolini had certain very clearly defined views on government, including the belief that the executive branch should be independent of and superior to the legislative. Under Giolitti the executive had become the creature of the chamber, a condition that might and probably would return as soon as the deputies recovered from their fear of the revolution.

Mussolini believed that the only way by which the efficient functioning of the legislative branch of government could be restored was by laying the axe to the root of the group system and creating a majority party in the chamber.

The method he employed was original and effective. It was, however, never intended to be anything but a stop-gap, and the next year, when it became evident that fascismo had established its power sufficiently to ensure a majority of the voters, the former one-member districts were reestablished and remained in being until the present system was enacted.

When parliament met May 24, 1924, fascismo seemed to be firmly seated and yet a fortnight later began the most serious crisis of its existence that nearly brought its rule to an end.

Giacomo Matteotti was a rich man, thirty-nine years of age, a deputy and secretary of the right-wing socialist party. He was the author of a book, *Un anno di dominazione fascista*, in which he had violently denounced the revolution,

and was counted as one of fascismo's most uncompromising and courageous enemies.

On May 30, 1924, he delivered a two-hour speech in the chamber of deputies, in which he vigorously attacked fascismo, charging especially that the recent election had been carried by fraud and violence.

On June 10 he left his home in via Antonia Scialoja to go to the chamber of deputies and then disappeared.

As the days passed and nothing was heard of him, his family and his friends became very much worried and appealed to the government for help. The duce announced on the floor of the chamber that everything possible was being done to find the missing deputy and that if unfortunately he had been made away with, his murder would be probed to the bottom and his murderers brought to justice.

On the 15th most of the non-fascista deputies, as a protest against what they called the slackness of the government, withdrew from the chamber and were afterwards called "the deputies of the Aventine" in memory of the Roman plebs who had literally gone to the Aventine to mark their disagreement with the policies of the aristocracy.

The cry was raised that Matteotti had been murdered and that the government was responsible, and for a time the survival of fascismo seemed in doubt. While no one either suspected or suggested that the duce was personally implicated, it was charged that those near him were deeply involved.

On June 16 the duce transferred Federzoni from the colonies to the interior, with orders to "clean house" which the minister promptly proceeded to do.

On August 16 Matteotti's body was found in a wood, some ten miles from Rome. The murderers had crushed and twisted it in the effort to force it into a trench which they had dug, and while it was in an advanced state of decomposition, it was perfectly obvious that murder had been done.

An "instruction" was at once ordered, and the examining magistrate caused the arrest of Dumini, Volpi, Poveromo, Viola, and Malacria, five notorious fascista gunmen of the early revolutionary days, Dumini having been the head of the Florentine squadra, Cesare Rossi head of the press bureau in the prime minister's office, Marinelli administrative secretary of the fascista party, Filipelli editor of the *Corrieri Italiano*, and Naldi editor of the *Nuova Paese*.

A twelve-year-old boy who had been standing in front of Matteotti's home on June 10 testified that he had seen the latter seized by some men who had jumped from an automobile, that when Matteotti had cried out one of his attackers had knocked him down, and that he had then been carried to the car, which had rapidly driven away. The boy identified Dumini as the leader of the assassins. Under examination Dumini charged that Marinelli and Rossi had hired him to kidnap and beat Matteotti but not to kill him, that Matteotti had died under the beating "which had been very gentle, because of a weak heart." He further gave the names of his associates, and involved Finzi, the assistant minister of the interior, and General de Bono, the chief of police, in the affair.

The prime minister at once asked for the resignations of Rossi and Finzi, while General de Bono demanded a trial by the senate of which he was a member.

The examining magistrate having held the prisoners for trial, they appealed from his decision.

The opposition press became exceedingly violent and the duce put into force the decree for the regulation of the press that had been issued the year before. Under it the newspaper critics of the government found themselves faced with either change of policy or suppression. Most of them reorganized, substituting fascisti for the opposition editors who were discharged; a few like the socialist *Avanti* and the democratic



*Mondo* continued for a time to lead an unreorganized but chastened existence, but before long they disappeared.

The imposition of a rigorous press censorship was followed by a general increase of severity which resulted in a renewal of activity on the part of unauthorized groups of black shirts.

In the summer of 1925 Giovanni Amendola, leader of the Aventine group of deputies and proprietor of the newspaper *Il Mondo*, was taking the cure at Montecatini, recovering from an attack that had been made upon him by fascisti in Rome the previous winter. While walking in the outskirts of the town he was held up by a band of black shirts and so severely beaten that he died shortly afterwards. His murderers were never arrested.

In October of the same year the Tuscan provincial secretary of the fascista party was murdered by Freemasons, so it was said. His friends cried out for vengeance and for several days there followed a reign of terror in Florence, during which the houses of Freemasons were sacked, and a number of leading Freemasons killed, without much effort on the part of the authorities to restore order.

In December 1925 the criminal section of the court of cassation handed down its decision in the Matteotti case, the senate having already absolved General de Bono.

The court exonerated Filipelli, Marinelli, and Rossi, but held Dumini and his fellow gunmen for trial for "homicide without premeditation."

The trial took place at Chieti, the prisoners being defended by Roberto Farinacci, the secretary of the fascista party, and ended March 24, 1926. Malacria and Viola were acquitted on the ground that they had not left the motor, while Dumini, Poveromo, and Volpi were found guilty of "unpremeditated, unintentional homicide, extenuated by the subnormal physical resistance of Matteotti," and were sentenced to five years, eleven months, and twenty days imprisonment, from

which a year and nine months were deducted according to the Italian law as having been served while awaiting trial, and four years more were deducted by a general amnesty. Their total punishment was therefore two months and twenty days in prison.

Subsequently, from the safety of Paris, Finzi, Rossi, and Dumini charged that the murders had been committed by direct orders, coming presumably from the duce. Their charges were so utterly fantastic that not even the duce's worst enemies believed them. Dumini, who later was so foolish as to return to Italy and there repeat his charges, was clapped into jail and has not been heard from since. Rossi, who was living in Switzerland and had never ceased to repeat his very unbelievable story, was enticed over the frontier by a woman secret-service agent, and promptly followed Dumini to prison.

The Matteotti murder, like that of Amendola, will probably always remain an unsolved mystery. It was undoubtedly the work of irresponsible men who thought they were gaining the goodwill of their betters by their actions. No fair-minded man can for a moment believe that any of the real leaders of fascismo were involved. The only leader under suspicion was General de Bono, the hero of Monte Grappa, and the case against him rested on the unsupported word of a professional gunman and ex-convict.

Had the leaders of fascismo ordered the murder, it would have been not only a crime but a political mistake of the most serious description. Matteotti was too prominent a man to be tampered with, with impunity. His murder certainly did not help the cause of fascismo, in fact, for the moment at least, it very seriously menaced it. It is inconceivable that any responsible leader would have wittingly run the tremendous risk to his cause involved in the encouragement of the crime.

Delacroix<sup>2</sup> points out that "all involved have gone to the enemy and are now plotting abroad against the régime. It was a belated episode of the civil war which had raged since 1919."

Had the opposition been well advised it is possible that fascismo might have fallen. Instead, they followed a course that only helped to strengthen the government. The extreme constitutionalists and the moderate socialists formed a coalition with the left-wing socialists and communists who wished to destroy the constitution, and withdrew from the chamber. As the press was muzzled, they thus deprived themselves of the sole method of expressing their grievances that was open to them.

Only Giolitti, Orlando, and Salandra with a handful of their personal friends remained in the chamber, and their opposition to the government was so mild as to be negligible. The government repeatedly invited the Aventinians to return to the chamber but without success.

In the House of Commons or the House of Representatives a call of the house results in the arrest of absent members by the sergeant at arms, and in their appearance at the bar of the house, where they are subject to the will of their fellow members.

The Italian chamber of deputies, having no method to compel the attendance of absent members, the Aventinians continued their futile and childish policy until in 1926 the chamber expelled them all for failure to attend to their duties.

Next to the Matteotti murder the most serious difficulty that Mussolini was called upon to face was the financial situation. De Stefani, as minister of the treasury, had reorganized the finances with such success that a budget deficit of 14,500,000,000 lire in 1920-1921 had been reduced to 418,000,000

<sup>2</sup> *Un uomo e un popolo*, p. 349.

in 1923-1924, the first fiscal year of fascismo, and later turned into a surplus of 497,000,000 in 1927-1928.

It is interesting to note that for the year 1931-1932, when the United States was groaning under an enormous deficit, Italy's deficit, despite the world depression, was only 576,000,000 lire.

In 1926 the Banca d'Italia was made the sole bank of issue, the banks of Naples and Sicily being at the same time deprived of the privilege of issuing bank notes, which they had up to that time enjoyed.

De Stefani, despite his good work in other directions, failed in trying to stop the fall in the value of the lire which from twenty to the dollar fell to thirty. The duce accepted the minister's resignation July 1925 and put in his place the governor of Tripoli, Count Giuseppi Volpi, a well known industrialist whose efforts to restore the lire were crowned with success.

The war debt due to the United States was by treaty reduced from \$2,148,000,000 to \$360,000,000, or by 82 per cent, while that to Great Britain was reduced from £610,000,000 to £254,000,000. At the same time a loan to stabilize exchange, amounting to \$100,000,000, was negotiated with American bankers, and in December 1927 Italy returned to the gold standard and the value of the lire was fixed at nineteen to the dollar, where it has remained ever since. Volpi's stabilization of the lira was accomplished with rapidity and with much courage and ability, and thoroughly deserved the great praise that he received for his achievement. Besides this Count Volpi abolished the *dazio*, or municipal customs duties, which had been an unprofitable and abominable nuisance, only retained because of the unwillingness of previous governments to discharge the army of employees required for their collection.

While Mussolini was increasing his power at home, he was at the same time asserting a very vigorous foreign policy.

On August 27, 1923, General Tellini, Italian president of the interallied Greek-Albanian boundary commission, and four of his staff were murdered by Greeks on Greek territory, following a series of violent attacks against Italy on the part of the Greek press. Mussolini at once demanded an apology and an indemnity of 50,000,000 lire. The Greek government having refused all responsibility for the murders, an Italian squadron was ordered to seize Corfu, which it did after having bombarded the town and unintentionally killed a number of non-combatants. Greece having appealed to the Council of the League of Nations, the latter referred the matter to the conference of ambassadors then sitting in Paris. After an inquiry the ambassadors sustained the Italian claims and held that Greece was responsible for the murders, and should pay the required indemnity. Whereupon Greece paid in full, and Italy on September 27 withdrew from Corfu. Exactly one month after the murders Mussolini had won his first diplomatic success.

Four months later he won a second diplomatic victory of far greater importance to his country. As a result of negotiations with Yugoslavia which had lasted for some fourteen months there were signed at Rome on January 27, 1924, a series of treaties by which Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to work together in support of the peace treaties, and to stand by each other politically and diplomatically in case of attack by a third power. Yugoslavia recognized Italy's sovereignty over Fiume, while Italy recognized Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Porto Baros, near Fiume, a free customs zone being established to include Fiume and Caŕna.

By these treaties Italy at last received the much desired city of Fiume and relations with Yugoslavia, which had been greatly strained, were for the moment at least improved.

By the following year, however, relations between the two countries were once more far from satisfactory and Yugoslavia flatly refused to ratify an agreement signed at Nettuno

July 20, 1925, in reference to the rights of the nationals of Italy and Yugoslavia in each other's countries.

A treaty of friendship between Yugoslavia and France signed November 7, 1927, was answered by a treaty of alliance between Italy and Albania signed November 22 of the same year.

Under this latter treaty Italy acquired what was virtually suzerainty over Albania, whose so-called president became king under Italian auspices in 1928. The feeling in Yugoslavia against Italy became extremely bitter and it was not until Briand, the French foreign minister, had used his good offices with that country that its government finally, on August 13, 1928, ratified the treaty of Nettuno.

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CHAPTER XX

FASCISMO AT WORK

WHEN in October 1930 the eighth anniversary of the march on Rome was celebrated, Mussolini could fairly claim that the revolution of which he had been the creator and inspiration had been completed.

A new Italy had been built upon the foundations of the old, new in ideals, new in purposes, new in government. The old order and the old governing caste had disappeared and new men had taken their places.

Italy is today the *fascista syndical corporative state*. It is ruled nominally by a king belonging to the House of Savoy, but the actual head of the state is Mussolini, from whom all powers of government are derived.

The fascista party consists approximately of a million members, men of over eighteen years of age, out of a population of about forty-two million, belonging to all classes in the community from the highest to the lowest. These are the "fascii di combattimento," or fighting groups, and are recruited by the admission of members of the "avanguardia," composed of boys between fourteen and eighteen, which in its turn is recruited from the "balilla," composed of boys under fourteen. The avanguardia and balilla together have a membership of about two million out of a total school population of four million.

The balilla is a military adaptation of the boy scout movement, and is under the ministry of education. The emphasis in the training of the boys is on discipline and military drill, boys not members of the balilla receiving military drill in the schools.

Since 1925, with the exception of a few honorary appointments, officers on the active list of the army and navy being ineligible, no one has been allowed to join the party unless he has worked his way up through *balilla* and *avanguardia*. In 1931 90,000 *avanguardisti* were admitted to the party, and eventually every full-fledged fascist will be a disciplined and fairly well drilled soldier.

There are also parallel organizations of women, numbering in all about half a million.

The old fascist *squadre di combattimento* have been abolished and in their place a black-shirt militia numbering 190,000, with a budget of 50,000,000 lire, has been organized and takes its orders directly from the *duce*. On mobilization, two battalions of black shirts are attached to each infantry division of regulars.

The *fascii* in the various provinces appoint delegates who in turn appoint a provincial secretary. These secretaries with the central committee constitute the national council, which elects the central committee and the ten members of the directorate and the general secretary of the party, all these elections being subject to the approval of the *duce*.

— The fascist party has become the government, or rather the government has been absorbed by fascism; all other parties have been abolished.

Next to the *duce* the highest authority is the fascist grand council, which consists of the *duce* as chairman, the members of the cabinet, and some of the under-secretaries, the *quadrumviri* of the march on Rome, the general commanding the militia, the presidents of the two houses of parliament, the president of the fascist criminal court, and the presidents of various syndicates of employers and employed.

Besides having general jurisdiction over the party, the grand council appoints the party officers, passes on the candidates for election to the chamber, determines the powers and composition of the senate and chamber, the prerogatives



of the crown, the succession to the throne, approves treaties involving territorial changes, the powers of the prime minister, and, in case of a vacancy in the office, chooses his successor.

The grand council, on paper at least, is supreme, and it is even conceivable that it might make itself very disagreeable to the duce, but as it is composed of his appointees and friends this is scarcely probable.

The senate has been left as it was, made up of the appointees of government, enjoying life terms. The chamber has been entirely reorganized. Its membership has been reduced to 400, elected from the nation at large on a single ticket. Each of the thirteen confederations of employers and employed and certain other organizations are entitled to a fixed number of members. Their councils submit the names of 800 candidates from which the grand council chooses 400 names, or may substitute candidates of its own for those submitted. The candidates approved by the grand council are then submitted to the electorate, who vote either "yes" or "no" upon the ticket as a whole. In the almost impossible event of the ticket being defeated, an extremely complicated arrangement is provided for a second ballot.

In the first election held under the new law the suffrage was given to all men over twenty-one years of age paying a direct tax of 100 lire, or who were holders of at least 500 lire of government bonds, or who were state pensioners, office-holders or clerics belonging to any recognized church, and included a total of about 9,500,000 of whom 8,650,000 voted.

The powers of parliament are limited and may be at any moment enlarged or restricted by a decree of the grand council. There have been occasions when the budget was enacted by decree, being read by the finance minister to a mass meeting at the Scala Theater at Milan, with no opportunity for discussion or amendment.

To strengthen central authority, the old provincial and communal elective councils have been done away with. For the former have been substituted advisory economic councils, appointed by the *prefetti*, while the communes are now ruled by *podestà* appointed by the minister of the interior, and govern with the advice, which they need not accept, of *consulenti* or councils chosen from the voters in the commune. The *podestà* need not be a resident of the commune but may be anyone agreeable to the minister.

It has been charged that before the change, the government of the communes was not only grossly inefficient, but also exceedingly corrupt. The smaller communes were generally governed by a few families or by a single family, of *grand' elettori*, who ran them in their own personal interests, while the large communes such as Milan and Bologna were governed by small close corporations, or machines, with such reckless disregard of economy and honesty as to drive many of them into near bankruptcy.

While the minister of the interior had the legal power to dissolve municipal and provincial councils, it was a power that he never used for fear of losing the electoral support of those involved. The consequence was that the local governments did very much as they pleased, without let or hindrance, and they usually pleased to do their work extremely badly.

As aids to the enforcement of authority a number of measures have been adopted which to one living in a democratic country seem to be, to say the least, extreme.

The first restriction of the freedom of the press, put into force after the Matteotti murder, was followed after the first attempt on Mussolini's life by a complete suppression of all opposition newspapers. No one may be a newspaper man who is not a member of the fascista syndicate. It is often said that there is no press censorship in Italy. It is unnecessary. Were any newspaper in the kingdom to attack or criticize

the government, it would be at once suppressed. Newspaper men must needs be discreet.

Civil servants, from the highest to the lowest, who are out of sympathy with fascismo may be dismissed. The number, however, who have suffered for their opinions has not been large when compared with the changes that occur in the United States as a matter of course with every change of administration in the nation, states and cities. Only seventeen employees of the ministry of justice were removed on the coming of fascismo, and only two university professors and four elementary school teachers, as against thirty-two professors removed from the University of Naples alone for Bourbon sympathies on the acquisition of the Two Sicilies by the kingdom of Italy.

There are many officials, some of them of high rank, who are still in office although not members of the fascista party. These are of course not enemies of the government and are presumably at least sympathetic to the source of their livelihood.

Italians living abroad who are held to have injured the interests of Italy may be deprived of their citizenship and their property. Yet of all the many "fuorusciti," as they are called, who from their headquarters in Switzerland and France constantly conspire against fascismo, only fifteen, it is claimed, have been so punished.

The death penalty has been revived for murder, acts of sedition, and attempts upon the lives of the king, the crown prince, and the duce. There has been created an emergency court martial that tries those charged with sedition and may on conviction sentence them to death, confinement in the ordinary prisons, or on one of the penal islands, or to police supervision. On the enactment of the law the number of those sent to the "confini" (the penal islands) was said to have been 698, while 959 people were alleged to have been put under

police supervision. It is claimed that since the recent amnesty very few are still upon the islands.

All secret societies including the Freemasons have been abolished and the grand master of the latter, Torrigiani, was sent to the confino, but with Malatesta, the anarchist, was shortly afterwards pardoned.

It must be remembered that Latin Freemasonry is quite different from that of the United States, Britain, and Germany, so much so that it is not recognized by Freemasonry in the latter countries. It is anti-religious and political, opposing the Church in the Catholic countries where it has its being, and taking an active although secret part in politics for the benefit of its own members. Both in France and in Italy before the revolution, the political power of Freemasonry was generally recognized, and it was conceded that a non-mason had but a poor chance of making a political career.

Masonry had become in Italy a state within a state, and it was as a matter of self-defense that Mussolini took drastic action against it. In doing so he had only followed the example of the Church that had long since put it under the ban of excommunication.

It will be seen that the power which the duce has attained is as nearly absolute as human ingenuity can make it. Through his instrument, the grand council, he may by decree repeal, amend or enact any law he pleases. The state is so centralized that there is no public official who is not directly under superior authority in Rome, and who is not immediately removable. Opposition parties and groups having been abolished, the press being entirely governmental, and the interpretation of what constitutes sedition being extremely liberal, serious hostility to or criticism of fascismo are impossible.

All of this, it may be said, offends our democratic sentiments, but fascismo has never claimed to be democratic, and has insisted that inefficiency is the price of democracy.

The duce never offered to give Italy democratic institutions. What he did promise was to give Italy the place to which she was entitled in the family of nations and to start her on the road to financial and economic prosperity, and both of these promises he has kept. /

Before the World War, Italy counted but little in the family of nations; today she stands as one of the four great powers of Europe. With a budget that until the present world depression was balanced, a stabilized lira, and an army of 325,000 regulars and 190,000 militia, who in case of war can be expanded to a total of 4,500,000, the word of Italy counts, and her friendship is sought as never before.

This newly acquired position in world affairs has given her people a pride in their country and a devotion to their leader that is a new development in Italian history.

In domestic affairs the revolution has been quite as great. The people are very heavily taxed but the revenue so raised has been wisely used. Primary education has been made compulsory, while the health of the children has been cared for through the *balilla*, *avanguardia*, and the parallel organizations for girls.

The "dopolavoro" office supervises the well-being of the people in their leisure time, encouraging employers' welfare plans for their employees, and providing opportunities for education, amusement, and sport among the workers. The total number of *dopolavoro* groups in 1930 was 11,084, with a membership of 1,622,140.

Fascismo has laid great stress on the physical development of the people, and has not only encouraged and subsidized athletics but has waged with considerable success a war against tuberculosis and other communicable diseases. A comprehensive scheme of social legislation has been inaugurated and as soon as funds are available will be completed with laws for insurance against old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment, and for mothers' and children's welfare.

Throughout the government services waste has been reduced, graft largely done away with, and efficiency increased, while the morale of the personnel has been much strengthened. The railway service has been improved and 20 per cent of the lines have been electrified, many new motor roads have been built, the water power has been largely developed, and the mercantile marine has been increased by nearly 500,000 tons.

The duce has taken under his personal supervision the encouragement of art and archeology. New museums have been organized in many of the larger cities and in almost all the smaller towns where none already existed, while the exhibitions of modern art in Rome and Venice have become international institutions. Much progress has been made in excavating Pompeii, Rome, and Ostia, and many monuments of antiquity and of the renaissance have been restored, as for example the castles in Mantua and Verona, which from having been semi-ruins have been transformed into two of the most interesting and beautiful museums in Italy.

During its decade of life fascismo has done more for Italian art than was accomplished during the preceding half century.

While slightly more than half of the people of Italy live by agriculture, more than a quarter of the food supply must be imported. To remedy this condition, the duce, in 1925, began what he picturesquely called "the battle for wheat."

The wheat campaign has had for its purpose technical development so as to obtain the maximum yield per unit, without displacing other crops. The "battle" has thus far been extremely successful. The wheat crop has increased from an average of 5,000,000 metric tons before the war and 4,500,000 immediately after the war, to 6,100,000 in the first six years of the campaign, rising to 7,100,000 in 1929.

In the beginning fascismo had no labor policy of its own, and it was not until 1926 that one was evolved. The most

drastic change under Mussolini has been the reorganization of labor and its relations with its employers and with the state. By the decree of April 3, 1926, the previous parliamentary state gave place to the corporative or guild state.

For the purpose of the decree the employers of labor including engineers and managers are divided into six great confederations: 1, industry; 2, agriculture; 3, commerce; 4, banks; 5, land and inland water transport; and 6, sea and air transport.

The workers by hand and brain are organized into seven federations corresponding to the confederations of employers, and are united into one national confederation of fascista syndicates, or trade unions. The workers in sea and air transport and the artisans are organized separately, the latter being affiliated with the employers' confederation of industry. The professions are organized into a federation of intellectual workers, consisting of sixteen associations representing the various professions, and are affiliated with the workers' confederation.

The federations and confederations choose their own officers, subject to the veto of the minister of corporations, who has the general direction of the whole movement. Public employees have their own organizations combined in a general association, the army, navy, judiciary, university professors, and the personnel of the foreign office being, however, forbidden to organize.

Under the federations and confederations are "corporations" for the provinces and cities. In the various branches of activity there are national corporations representing both employers and employed under a chairman appointed by the minister.

These are the permanent deliberative and advisory bodies representing both employers and employed but directly under the government. They not only regulate the conditions of labor, but organize and direct employment offices, and act

as boards of mediation in disputes before reference to the labor courts. Strikes and lockouts are illegal and the findings of the labor courts, directed by the minister, are final.

The minister has an advisory council composed of delegates from the confederations, federations, government employees, and the various educational and welfare boards such as the *balilla*, *dopolavoro*, etc.

The corporations are sustained by a fund to which each employer annually pays an amount equal to one day's pay for every man he employs, while each worker pays through his employer one day's pay a year, and this applies also to workers who are not members of a union.

While many members of the workers' syndicates are at the same time members of the fascista party, the vast majority are not, for membership in the party is an entirely different matter from membership in the syndicates. The two exist for entirely different purposes, although the party, through the grand council, dominates the syndicates.

The total membership of the workers' federations of syndicates was about 4,000,000 in 1928, while that of the employers' confederation was about 900,000.

While non-official syndicates are not forbidden by law, they have almost ceased to exist. They may not legally represent their members, and have no official standing. The advantages of membership in the official unions are so obvious and so great, that it is probable that within a few years practically all of both employers and employed will have been unionized.

The link between government and the corporations is very close, for not only do the confederations submit to the grand council of the fascista party candidates for the chamber, but they have direct representation on the grand council itself, while on the other hand the control of the whole movement is finally under the direction of the minister of corporations.



Under fascismo, as it has been developed, the individual has been absorbed into the state so that to paraphrase the charter of labor proclaimed April 21, 1927, the individual is subordinated to national interests, work is a social duty, private initiative is the most effective instrument of production, but the organizers of industry are responsible to the state for results. While the workers are partners in production, the management and direction belong exclusively to the employer, and over both and supervising production and distribution is the state.

It will thus be seen that while the *statuto* has never formally been repealed, nothing now remains of the original document but Article XXXIII, which creates the senate and provides for its composition. By the action of the chambers or by decree, every other article has either been nullified or whittled away beyond recognition.

The *statuto* declares that the throne is hereditary but under the law of December 9, 1928, the grand council determines the succession. On the death of the king it will be the duty of the grand council to determine whether the Prince of Piedmont shall succeed, or whether the crown shall be given to some other member of the House of Savoy or to an outsider.

The *statuto* declares that "the executive power belongs solely to the king who is the supreme head of the state," but under the law of December 24, 1925, the executive power is actually vested in "the head of the government" (*il capo del governo*), which is Mussolini's official title, who is in theory and in theory only nominated and recalled by the king and responsible to the king for the general management of the nation. By this and other laws all other powers of the king reserved by the *statuto* have either actually or by inference been terminated. The *statuto* declares that "the press will be free," but the law of December 31, 1925, completely abolishes its freedom. The *statuto* provides in a number of Articles for the creation and election of the chamber of deputies, and for

the duties and rights of its members. All of these Articles have been abrogated by the law of May 17, 1928, and the present chamber "corporate in origin, is political in character and has political functions." None but fascisti are eligible, and no question can be discussed unless on the calendar or submitted by the head of the government. Members "may freely discuss the work of the government, not, of course, for the purpose of overthrowing it, but for the purpose of criticism and collaboration."

As under the law of January 31, 1926, the executive, which means the head of the government, may at any time issue decrees on any subject, having the force of law, it follows that the chamber may only legislate on such subjects as the government permits. In other words, the functions of parliament are more ornamental than useful.

The statuto declares "individual liberty is guaranteed." Under the various laws and decrees of fascismo the individual has become a mere item in the life of the state, with only such liberty of speech and action left to him as the state may see fit to grant.

It must be remembered that while pre-revolutionary Italy was not a real democracy, the statuto was not a democratic constitution. It did not come from below but from above. It was not the work of the people, but was a charter of liberty granted by the king. It was the ultimate concession that he was willing to make to his subjects, and coming as it did from a monarch who had hitherto believed in and practised absolutism, it marked a great advance along the road to freedom travelled by a people who hardly knew the meaning of the word. During the years which followed, the statuto remained intact in form, and ministers more than once showed much ingenuity in preserving its letter while violating its spirit.

When fascismo came into power the government was faced with the alternative of devising some method of transforming

a charter of liberty, based in theory at least on democratic principles, into the fundamental law of a government that repudiated democracy and all its works, that would satisfy the scruples of constitutional lawyers, or of ignoring it.

As the new government was frankly revolutionary, it boldly chose the latter course.

Under the old order power was derived from the king, under the new order power is derived from the fascista party. So in nullifying the *statuto* the government has been perfectly logical in claiming for itself supreme authority, supreme over any law or body of laws coming from any other source, whether from king or from people.

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## CHAPTER XXI

### THE VATICAN ACCORD

SINCE the passing of Pius IX there have been four popes, of whom two have been primarily statesmen and two men of near sainthood.

Leo XIII, who reigned from 1878 to 1903, was probably the ablest diplomatist and statesman of his time, and enjoys the distinction of being the only man who succeeded in defeating Bismarck or, in accordance with the expression of the day, in making him "come to Canossa."

Bismarck in his Kulturkampf against the Church had enacted legislation designed completely to destroy its freedom and subject it oppressively to the police power of the state. Leo, with infinite tact, patience, and skill succeeded in forcing the Iron Chancellor to reverse himself and to restore the Church to its former position of independence. This victory did more to increase the prestige of the Vatican than any event that had occurred since the French Revolution.

Throughout the world Leo strove for harmonious relations between church and state, holding that the form of government existing in any country was of no concern to the Church provided it received justice from the authorities.

In his relations with Italy, however, he remained intransigent, forbidding the faithful either to vote or hold office, and flatly refusing to recognize the Italian government without a restoration of the temporal power. Nevertheless negotiations were begun, and it is probable that Leo would have been satisfied with a very small territorial concession. But the times were not ripe for an accord between church and state, and the Italian liberals, like most of the so-called liberals in Latin countries, violently illiberal in religious mat-

ters, brought the negotiations to an end in 1889 by deliriously celebrating the birthday of Giordano Bruno.

Under Pius X, who reigned from 1903 to 1914, considerable progress was made in the betterment of relations with the Quirinal. The pope, unlike many clericals who regarded themselves as internationalists, could never forget that he was an Italian who loved his Italy. His kindness of heart and gentleness prevented him from harboring any animosity against the country of his birth, or against her people.

While officially continuing the claim of the papacy for the temporal power, and insisting on the right of the Church to complete liberty, the inhibition against voting was relaxed so that the faithful were permitted to take part in elections, both as voters and candidates, and the "Catholic Action" was created, a non-political society having for its purpose the civic, social, and religious education of the Italian people.

At the beginning of the Turkish war chaplains were furnished the troops by the Vatican at the request of the Quirinal, the first time in forty years that the Italian army had the official ministrations of religion.

In 1911 a regiment of bersaglieri that was going to the front was passing the Vatican, when the Holy Father coming to his window blessed them. Forgetting the bitterness of the past, he remembered only that they were his countrymen on their way to fight and die for Italy.

On August 2, 1914, Pius appealed to the world to keep the peace, and called on the faithful everywhere to join with him in praying that the horrors of war might be averted. Eighteen days later he died with this prayer for peace upon his lips, universally regretted and mourned.

He was succeeded by Benedict XV who reigned from 1914 to 1922.

The new pope, while a *diplomat de carrière*, was a man of great piety, a lover of justice and of peace. He began his reign by declaring the strict neutrality of the Holy See in

the Great War, a neutrality from which he never swerved. The horrors of the war sickened him, and he strove incessantly and eloquently to bring peace.

No man has ever been more unjustly abused than Benedict XV. Because he was neutral, the war hysteria of the time charged him with favoring either one side or the other. Nevertheless, disregarding the attacks that were made upon him, he kept his poise and bravely followed the course which he had set himself, to do all in his power to bring the world back to reason and to mitigate the sufferings of those who had gone down in the strife.

The Italian government restricted to an unjustifiable degree the independence of the Holy Father. The diplomatic representatives of the central powers to the Vatican left Italy at the suggestion of the pope and those of the Vatican were obliged to go to and from Austria and Germany via Switzerland. It was charged and scarcely denied that letters and telegrams were opened and many never delivered, and that clerics were subjected to espionage. It was a humiliating situation and wellnigh intolerable, and the Holy Father protested against it with great vigor and demanded the restoration of some small part of the temporal possessions as a guarantee of that independence so essential for the liberty of the Church.

When the passions and hysteria of the war have been forgotten and the world is once more capable of an impartial judgment, Benedict XV will receive the credit that is his due. He was an honest, sincere, and holy man, who strove against overwhelming odds to bring peace to a war-worn world. He will be remembered long after the little men who brought about the war have been forgotten.

On January 22, 1922, Benedict died and on February 6 Pius XI was elected in his place.

Achille Ratti was born May 31, 1857, at Desio, a suburb of Milan, and was the son of Francesco Ratti, a prosperous

silk manufacturer. He was ordained priest December 20, 1879, and finished his studies three years later and has since then had a distinguished and varied career. After a few months as parish priest at Barni he was appointed professor of dogmatic theology in the Great Seminary at Milan. In 1888 he joined the staff of the Ambrosian Library and in 1907 became its prefect. He not only completed a reclassification of the library on modern lines but became a really great paleographer. In 1912 he was appointed vice-prefect of the Vatican Library and canon of St. Peter's.

In 1919 Benedict XV sent him to Poland as nuncio apostolico and created him titular archbishop of Lepanto. He was chosen by the interallied commission, at the suggestion of Germany and Poland, as ecclesiastical commissioner. On the death of Cardinal Ferrari in June 1921, he was appointed archbishop of Milan and created cardinal. Eight months later he was elected pope.

He had proved himself as an executive and an administrator. His service in Poland showed that he was a diplomat and statesman of high order. He has travelled far more widely than most of his countrymen, is a scholar, and a good linguist. He is a man of great breadth of view, a just man who loves mercy and is very human.

He is a lover of nature, but more than that he is a mountaineer. From his ordination to his election as pope every summer vacation was spent in the Alps. He has made a number of first ascents, including a new way up Monte Rosa, usually without guides, and has written and published one of the most delightful of existing books on mountain climbing, *Scritti Alpenistici*. His apostolic letter declaring San Bernardo di Mentone the patron saint of Alpinists is one of the most beautiful essays on the mountains and mountaineering that has ever been written.

Throughout his long career in Milan, Pius XI had always been on excellent terms with Italian officials and had always

shown himself possessed by a profound love and admiration for his country. From the beginning of his reign he began quietly to feel out the Quirinal as to the possibility of a rapprochement. His exceedingly able foreign minister, Cardinal Gasparri, conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Holy See, but it was some time before a responsive chord was struck in the heart of the Italian government.

Italy is, nominally at least, overwhelmingly Catholic. According to the census of 1911, 33,000,000 out of a population of 35,000,000 had claimed allegiance to the Catholic Church.

While the extreme supporters of the Holy Father were inclined to intransigence, referring to the king as "colui che detiene," or "he who withholds" (the temporal power), some extremists even going so far as to wear mourning on the anniversary of the capture of Rome, as time passed the vast majority on both sides learned to treat their differences with good nature.

The anti-clericals never went to the extremes that were reached in France, while the vast majority of the clericals found no difficulty in being both good Catholics and good Italians.

The bitterness of the 1870's had given place to a new spirit of tolerance. "The uncompromising *non licet* of Pius IX had become merely the *nunc non expedit* of Leo XIII,"<sup>1</sup> and even that had been withdrawn.

Mussolini, who previous to his assumption of power had been a violent anti-clerical and as lately as 1920 had announced that the revolution would seek to destroy the Church, had begun his career as head of the state with words of friendliness toward the Holy Father.

Every time, however, that pope and duce drew together something occurred to check the growing kindliness of relations. First it was the abolition of the pacifist Catholic boy

<sup>1</sup> Luigi Villari, *op. cit.*, p. 300.



scouts, and the substitution in their place of the militaristic *balilla* and *avanguardia*, then it was the suppression of the Catholic Action Society.

As this latter occurrence was accompanied by a good deal of needless force on the part of the militia, the reaction of all Catholics throughout Italy was immediate and violent. Relations between the Vatican and Quirinal became much strained and all the efforts that had been made toward a better understanding seemed to have been wasted.

Mussolini had never forgotten that although Bülow had threatened the restoration of the temporal power, Benedict had flatly refused to help the intrigues of Germany and Austria during the war, and had even requested their diplomatic representatives, accredited to the Vatican, to leave Italy. The duce was not ungrateful and to his words of friendliness had added acts which at the time had been sincerely appreciated by churchmen.

He had restored the crucifixes in the schools, where they hung below the portraits of the king and of Mussolini himself, set up once more the large cross in the Colosseum, which had been taken down in 1870, and permitted religious processions to be held anywhere in Italy.

The pope who had, as a guarantee of his good faith, abolished the *popolaro* party and sent its founder and leader, Don Sturzo, into exile, resented the implication that he had broken faith and allowed his followers to engage in political activity under the guise of philanthropy, using the Action as their instrument.

A compromise was finally reached, and the Action was permitted to resume, greatly limited in its scope, so as not to interfere with the work of the *balilla* and *avanguardia* and pledged to refrain from all political activity.

Good feeling was gradually restored and by 1926 Mussolini judged it to be opportune to approach the Vatican with a proposal for direct negotiations looking to the settlement

of the Roman question. The Holy Father accepted the duce's proposal with right good will, and the negotiations began.

They were conducted secretly, Signor Baroni representing the duce and Monsignore Duca and Signor Pacelli the pope. After Signor Baroni's death the duce and Cardinal Gasparri dealt with each other through Signor Pacelli.

At the beginning of 1929 it was rumored that an accord had been reached, but so startling was the suggestion that it was generally disbelieved. On February 7 Cardinal Gasparri summoned the diplomatic corps and announced that the Roman question had been settled and that an accord was about to be signed, and at the Lateran Palace in Rome, at noon on February 11, the accord was signed.

Ever since the occupation of Rome by Victor Emanuel in 1870 churchmen had been sharply divided upon the question of the restoration of the temporal power. On the one hand were those who believed that it was essential for the dignity, honor, and authority of the Church that the sovereignty of the pope should extend not only over things spiritual but also over a territory sufficiently large to make him independent of Italy and free to rule his spiritual domain without let or hindrance from any other political state. There were some who hoped for a restoration of the former States of the Church; these were, however, very few in number and included no really practical ecclesiastical statesmen. There were others who favored the acquisition of territory outside of Italy as the gift of some Catholic and friendly power, but the proponents of a second Babylonian exile were so insignificant in numbers and influence as to be negligible. The vast majority of those who sought a reconciliation on the basis of a territorial state were realists who neither expected nor desired any large domain, knowing that Italy would never make such a cession. They favored reconciliation with the Quirinal in return for the grant of a small and compact papal state with access to the sea. The misgovernment of the king-

dom of Pius IX had been such as not to encourage any ambition to repeat the experiment. What was wanted was an independent sovereignty large enough and no larger than necessary to house the offices of the papal government, with the possibility of free and open communication with the rest of the world, without the necessity of crossing Italian territory. A small papal state would be easy to govern and would at the same time answer the requirements of the papacy quite as well as would a larger. But territorial sovereignty, with all the powers and rights that sovereignty implies, was considered an absolute necessity if the Church was to function with the maximum of efficiency and freedom.

On the other hand were those who deplored the very idea of a restoration of the temporal power. They argued that the Church could gain nothing, by a return of political sovereignty, that it did not already possess under the terms of the Law of Guarantees. That if the Holy Father would abandon the fiction of being the "prisoner of the Vatican" and go quietly about his business, the work and mission of the Church would be accomplished quite as well as it would be were temporal sovereignty restored, and the papacy would be freed from the responsibilities and annoyances of administering a temporal state.

In addition, and this was their strongest argument, they expressed the fear that with a temporal state, an enclave of Italy, and granted by the goodwill of the Italian government, the Church would depend for its temporal existence on the whim of that government and inevitably from being the church universal sink to the position of being nothing more than the Italian state church.

Those who favored the restoration of territorial sovereignty included not only every successor of Pius IX but almost all the cardinals of the Curia, and the Church in Italy as well as the vast majority of churchmen elsewhere. The opponents of the territorial claims were mostly American, English, and

German, they were few in number, and, as many of them had formerly inclined to modernism, their influence was not great and in no way hampered or delayed the accomplishment of the accord.

The accord of the Lateran signed by Mussolini and Cardinal Gasparri consists of three documents, a treaty, a concordat, and a financial convention.

By the treaty Italy recognizes the full sovereignty and possession of the Holy See over the state of the "Vatican City" thereby constituted, including the present confines of the Vatican palace and its outbuildings with St. Peter's and the square in front of the church and a few acres on the slope of the Janiculo, the boundaries of the state being defined by an annexed map, Italy agreeing to refrain from all interference within the new state. The right of the Holy See to send and receive diplomatic representatives is recognized, territorial immunity is granted to the patriarchal basilicas, and to the Lateran palace and Castel Gandolfo.

The Holy See declares that it will not seek admission to international congresses or other temporal competitions, and will only take part in them if unanimously invited to do so for the purpose of carrying out its mission of peace.

It recognizes the kingdom of Italy under the House of Savoy, and Rome as its capital, and declares the Roman question definitely settled and that it now possesses the guarantees necessary for the liberty and independence of the spiritual government of the Church.

The concordat regulates the relations between the Church and the kingdom of Italy.

Under it the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman is recognized as the only state religion although other religions are tolerated. Religious instruction is compulsory in the elementary and secondary schools, while for Catholics religious marriage is obligatory and questions of voiding or dissolving marriages are reserved for the ecclesiastical courts.

The religious congregations and orders are given the status of legal corporations, and are to be free from any special taxes. The clergy are to receive their stipends tax free, are free from military service, and if convicted of crime are to be detained in special prisons.

On the other hand the Church agrees that all appointees to ecclesiastical benefices in Italy, including archbishops and bishops, must have the approval of the Italian government, and that they must not only be Italians, but must speak Italian and before assuming their duties must swear allegiance to the king.

Under the financial convention, the Holy See agrees to settle in full for the loss of the States of the Church in 1870, on the receipt of 750,000,000 lire in cash and 1,000,000,000 lire in Italian 5 per cent bonds at par.

It will be seen that the outlet to the sea, so much desired by the Curia, was not included in the treaty and that the sum granted under the financial convention was much less than that contained in the Law of Guarantees so indignantly rejected by Pius IX, and that the terms were not so favorable as those offered by Ricasoli in 1866. Nevertheless from the point of view of those who desired a return of the temporal power the accord gave all that was really essential for the independence and dignity of the Church.

The pope is once more a temporal sovereign with all the rights, powers, and dignities such sovereignty implies, and while it may be said that this tiny state exists only at the pleasure of Italy, it is also true that such was the case during the decade before 1870.

On her part Italy has gained quite as much as, if not more than, has the Vatican. The festering sore of the Roman question has been healed, the divided allegiance of many Italians between church and state is a thing of the past, and a Catholic may now be a patriotic Italian without any conscientious qualms. Besides this, now that peace and harmony have been

restored between church and state, because of her geographical position as surrounding the state of the Vatican City, Italy may well aspire to pose as the physical protector of Catholicism not only in Italy but in the uncivilized places of the world, with a corresponding gain in the estimation of 330,000,000 Catholics.

The accord satisfied the Holy See and satisfied Italy. It was a real diplomatic triumph, for each side received what it wanted. It would never have been possible but for the open-mindedness and willingness to give and take of Mussolini and Pius, and the fairness and real ability with which both Mussolini and Cardinal Gasparri conducted their negotiations.

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## CHAPTER XXII

### THE FUTURE

IN ITS inception fascismo was exceedingly opportunist, never hesitating to change its principles and its theories as circumstances might dictate.

With the exception of the will to power and an intense nationalism, its ideas were nebulous and subject to alteration overnight, while its philosophy has been evolved during the last few years and has been an apology after the fact, rather than the theory upon which the movement was founded.

Mussolini and his followers were originally revolutionary syndicalists of the Sorel school, seeking the substitution by force of a republic for the monarchy, for the greater glory of Italy and the fascista party.

The revolution accomplished and power attained, the radicals of yesterday became the conservatives of today and republicanism and democracy were alike thrown into the discard. The only relic of the past that was retained was the memory of the syndicalism of their youth, a memory that still greatly influences fascismo in dealing with the domestic affairs of the state.

After ten years of power the doctrines of fascismo have been consolidated and it is possible to appreciate more or less accurately what those doctrines are, and predicated on those doctrines what the future policies of Italy will be.

That eminent jurist, Professor Alfredo Rocco, lately minister of justice, has expressed very concisely the fundamental political theory of fascismo. "In its spirit as in its exterior form, the fascista state is the exact opposite of the liberal democratic state which had brought the Italian nation to the verge of ruin. . . . The creation of a state of truly sovereign

authority, which dominates all the forces of the country, and which at the same time is in constant contact with the masses, guiding their sentiments, educating them and looking after their interests: this is the political conception of fascismo."<sup>1</sup>

And again: "Fascismo rejects the theory of equality. Society does not exist for the individual, but the individual for society. With this difference: that Fascismo does not annul the individual in society, as the individual annuls society in the older doctrine, but merely subordinates him to society.

"Italian society is, in fact, reorganized on a professional basis, that is to say, on the basis of the productive function exercised by each individual.

"The fascista state is certainly an authoritative state, but it is also a popular state, such as no other has ever been. It is not a democratic state, in the old sense of the word, because it does not give the sovereignty to the people, but it is a state, eminently democratic in the sense that it is in close touch with the people, is in constant contact with them, penetrating the masses in a thousand ways, guiding them spiritually, realizing their needs, living their life, and coordinating their activities."

In his article "Fascismo" in the recently published *Encyclopedia Italiana*, Mussolini says:

"Fascismo is radically opposed to the whole mass of democratic ideology and repudiates it, both in its theoretical premises and in its practical applications. Fascismo denies that numbers, from the mere fact of being numbers, can play the rôle of leaders of human communities. Fascismo denies that numbers can govern, through a system of periodical consultation of the electorate, but affirms the irremediable, fruitful and beneficial inequality of men, who cannot all be reduced to the same level by an external and mechanical fact such as universal suffrage."

<sup>1</sup> *What Is Fascism and Why?*, edited by Tomaso Sillani, New York, 1931, pp. 16 *et seq.*



He has summed up the fascista doctrine in a sentence: "Nothing outside the state, nothing against the state."

According to the fascista theory the "average man" is unfit to govern, his function being to produce for the benefit of the state, the affairs of government being left to a carefully trained ruling class.

The ordinary citizen enjoys only such rights as may be compatible with the national interests, his life and his affairs being regulated and guided by government from the cradle to the grave.

To carry out the mission of fascismo as conceived by its founders requires above all things order at home and peace abroad.

While there are those of exaggerated imperialism who dream of putting into practice the Giobertian theory of the moral world primacy of Italy, by redeeming the Italia Irredenta of Nice, Corsica, and Malta, the actual governors of the kingdom are hard-headed realists.

They know that there are very practical problems to be solved, and while there has been from time to time a certain amount of sabre rattling, it has been chiefly for its domestic effect. They know that Italy can accomplish far more by international goodwill than by antagonizing the other great powers. Accordingly during the last few years Italy has constantly stood for a good understanding with the other powers, a cancellation of war debts and reparations, and a general reduction of armaments.

Relations with Yugoslavia have been much improved and the tension with France lessened.

The development of the army and navy, the firmness of the duce, and the tact and diplomatic ability of Dino Grandi, the former minister of foreign affairs, have all been elements in obtaining for Italy a sympathetic hearing, whenever she has desired to be heard.

While standing firmly for the peace of the world, the duce does not believe in the possibility of its perpetual maintenance. He is for peace but is not a pacifist, and glorifies war in saying that "it carries all human energies to the height of tension and gives the seal of nobility to peoples that have the courage to confront it."<sup>2</sup>

In other words, fascismo is whole-heartedly for peace, but is at the same time ready for war, believing that war can never be abolished.

As a corollary to the belief that war is ultimately inevitable, fascista Italy has sought in every way to increase her man power and to hold the allegiance of as many of her sons as possible.

The population of the kingdom numbers some 42,000,000 and is growing constantly and rapidly. Before the World War the surplus population emigrated, so that it is estimated that today there are some 9,500,000 Italians living abroad, most of whom have become citizens of the countries of their residence and have been lost by Italy.

Because of restrictive immigration laws in the United States and elsewhere, it has not been difficult to keep Italians at home, and the population of Italy threatens soon to surpass the ability of the peninsula to maintain it.

Intensive cultivation, breaking up of the latifundie in the south and development of industry have done something, and may in the future do more to care for the increase in population. But if the birth rate continues to grow at its present speed, the time is not far distant when colonial outlets will be absolutely essential if all Italians are to be kept under the national flag.

Of the present Italian colonies, Somalia and Eritrea are equatorial and unfit for white men. Libya was of necessity almost abandoned during the Great War. While it has been

<sup>2</sup> "Fascismo," in *Encyclopedia Italiana*.

reconquered and pacified, it is largely desert and, with the exception of a strip of seacoast, incapable of cultivation even by the hard-working and frugal Italian peasant. There is today in the colony a total Italian population of only 45,000.

Italy has suffered a series of bitter disappointments in her colonial aspirations. Tunis, that she expected ultimately to obtain, was snatched from her by what Italians have always believed to be French sharp practice. Libya, for which she fought a war, has not come up to expectations. Eritrea and Somalia are useless, while Rhodes and the Dodecanese are so small as to be negligible.

Italians, firmly believing that Diaz's successful campaign ending in the victory of Vittorio Veneto won the World War, expected colonial accessions in Africa and Asia Minor as part of their reward. The outcome was a heartbreaking disillusionment.

It is true, they say, that Italy obtained the upper Adige, Triest, and finally Fiume and Istria and part of Dalmatia. These acquisitions, however, had only strategic and sentimental values, and were of absolutely no avail as homes for surplus population, and have given her a problem very similar to that of Germany's former problem with Alsace and Lorraine.

On the other hand, Britain who had all the colonies she needed received most of German Africa, while France with no colonists whatever received German territory in Africa as well as Syria merely to gratify her vanity, and even Japan, who had played a very inconspicuous part in the war, received territory in the Pacific. Of colonies Italy received none.

Since the war Britain has allowed Egypt to rectify the boundary between Libya and her own territory to the advantage of the former and to the extent of a few square miles of oasis and desert, while Somalia has in the same way received some slight accessions. Neither acquisition, however, was of any importance.

Where and how Italy is to gratify her colonial ambitions is a serious problem. The only possibilities in the Mediterranean basin are either in French or Turkish hands, while the desirable former German colonies in Africa belong to the British. None of these three powers will consider yielding an inch of territory, whether held in actual possession or under mandate, and their seizure as spoils of war is for the present at least unthinkable.

Failing to acquire adequate colonies the government has done its best to keep control of the emigrants who have not lost their Italian citizenship, and in doing so has pursued a policy unlike that of any other country.

For this purpose in February 1928 there was published a constitution for foreign fascii, the organizations to which all Italian subjects living abroad are expected to belong. There is a fascio in each consular district, with a secretary for each country and a general secretary stationed in Rome, as well as an *avanguardia*, *balilla*, and women's fascio in connection with each men's fascio.

The object of the organization is to preserve the Italianism of the emigrant, to keep him in touch with home, to make him feel that he is and always ought to be an Italian, and to keep him under discipline for his own good and for the credit of his country.

In France, where some 150,000 Italians go every year to help move the crops, the organization has undoubtedly been of great service in protecting the rights of the temporary emigrants, working in cooperation with the consular service. In Brazil and Argentina, where there are many Italians, the fascii have flourished, while they have been withdrawn from the United States at the request of the department of state.

In addition to the foreign fascii, Italian schools, newspapers, and cultural centers have been established abroad by government wherever there are Italians who do not already enjoy these advantages.

The effort is being constantly made, thus far with no great success, to induce France to give to Italians settled there and in Tunis the rights and privileges of French citizens without requiring them to surrender their Italian nationality.

The natural tendency of immigrants is sooner or later to acquire citizenship in the country of their residence. The material and political advantages are so great that it is extremely difficult for the motherland to hold their allegiance. The foreign fascii serve to keep alive the loyalty of the Italian living abroad for "la patria" while he is establishing himself in his new home. When he has begun to feel himself a part of his new country his enthusiasm for his place of origin becomes purely sentimental and his political value to his native land becomes nil. Therefore, fascismo, while recognizing the right of expatriation, discourages its exercise, and makes it exceedingly difficult for Italians to leave Italy except for very short periods, as for example for the duration of the harvest in France.

The colonial question is one of the major problems which require future solution, and is only a part of that still greater question which is constantly asked, "Has fascismo become the permanent form of Italian government, or is it only a passing incident destined to disappear within the next few years?"

There is nothing so futile as political prophecy. In the past, governments apparently founded on rock have fallen without warning. No government or form of government can be called permanent, for like everything else of human origin they last only as long as they serve the requirements of their environment and their times.

Within these limitations, it is not too hazardous to predict that in all probability fascismo will endure for many years to come.

Those who are opposed to it, the fuorusciti, living in Switzerland, France, Britain, and the United States, insist that it

is tottering to its fall, that it is honeycombed with discontent and sedition, with secret societies that the police have been unable to destroy, and with the general hatred of the people who are living under a reign of terror.

If any of this be true there is no evidence of it upon the surface. The government seems confident of its position from the fact that there has been a general lightening of the heavy hand of authority, most of those imprisoned in the confini have been released, there is less police supervision, both at the frontier and within, and fewer arbitrary arrests, while the hitherto almost intolerable oppression of the Germans in the upper Adige and of the Slavs in Triest and Fiume has been much modified. Government seems far more certain of itself than it did a few years ago. In fact, if the individual minds his own business and refrains from criticizing the government, he need not fear it, but on the contrary finds it his good friend and supporter.

Fascismo has been in absolute power for a decade. The new generation, who were children when it came into being, have for all practical purposes known no other form of government, and the black shirt has become so much a national institution that it is difficult to visualize Italy without it.

Today there are some 12,000,000 who belong to the fascista party, its subsidiaries the avanguardia and the balilla, and the fascista syndicates. It will not be long before practically every Italian will be either a member of the party or one of the affiliated syndicates, in other words, all Italy will have been fascistacized, and practically all Italians will be fascisti. That is to say, they will all support in general terms the same form of government, as in Britain and the United States practically everyone supports in general terms the British or the United States constitution.

Differences among fascisti will occur, as they have already occurred more than once.

The effort is made by propaganda, by education, and by the control of the press to mould all Italians into one authorized fascista model, holding the same ideals, believing the same principles and following the same purposes.

The actual result has been that while all fascista Italians use the same terminology, and as the years pass the fascista terminology will probably be employed by all Italians, differences of opinion as to how that terminology shall be applied are bound to arise, as they have already arisen within the ranks of the party itself, and among the duce's most ardent supporters.

There is what may be called a left wing of the party, represented by the old squadristi, the local ras or petty bosses, and the intransigents like Farinacci, who would rule Italy like a conquered province for the exclusive benefit of the makers of the revolution; there is a right wing of men like Federzoni, who believe that the revolution having been achieved and that government and party having been fused, the revolutionary excesses should be forgotten and Italy peacefully fascistacized.

Villari, in summing up the varying tendencies among fascisti, says: "There are coming to be within the fascista party itself many different opinions and tendencies, which undoubtedly make themselves felt today and will do so to a larger extent in the future, so that in time all reasonable views will be able to influence public policy."<sup>3</sup>

It may be urged that this will inevitably result in a return of the group system, with all its drawbacks. As long, however, as the present method of electing the chamber of deputies remains in force, while political groups may exist outside of parliament, they cannot exist within.

The chamber no longer represents the people as individuals who desire to express their political opinions, but it represents

<sup>3</sup> "Italy," *op. cit.*, p. 195.

them as members of the confederations which represent not politics, but trade, industry, and agriculture.

To quote Villari again: "Parliament now is not sectional but national. . . . It has been observed that the voting of a list proposed by the government is not really an election but a plebiscite or referendum. This is true, as the voter does not vote for this or that candidate in any particular constituency, but for a program and a policy. It is a sort of ratification of the action of the government in the past and an expression of confidence (or the lack of it) for the future, rather than a creation of the powers of the government. A small majority would act as a warning that the policy hitherto pursued must be revised, and were the government list to fail to secure a majority at all, there would be the possibility of an alternative government or system."

It is highly improbable that for many years to come the government list of candidates for the chamber will ever fail to receive a majority. It is of course always a possibility which some day or other may be taken advantage of, should an overwhelming preponderance of the people desire a change of rulers.

Actually the people, who have never known real democratic self-government, have always been content to have their governing done for them by a ruling caste, and have been satisfied to work out their lives as the most frugal and industrious people on earth, content if able to earn a bare living for themselves and their families without bothering with politics.

Under fascismo for the first time the proletarian and the peasant finds government taking a direct interest in their welfare, an interest which lasts twelve months a year and is not limited, as formerly, to the kind words of the deputy seeking reelection.

The wage earner, as a member of his syndicate, has become a part, although a very small one, of the actual government of



the state. Thanks to the incessant propaganda for fascismo, which he meets at every turn, in the schools, the press, the cinema, in speeches, parades, and holidays, he has acquired the consciousness that he is a fascista and as such a citizen of a great country, and a loyal Italian.

On the part of the vast majority of the people who have never been aware of any other there is complete acceptance of the present régime.

Of the former ruling class, the intransigents have either left Italy or been silenced. Most of them, without profound convictions, have elected to swim with the tide, and are as enthusiastic fascisti as the best.

Big business, which strongly supported the movement in the beginning as an insurance against disorder, cooled toward it for a time when it became evident that in taxation the duce declined to play favorites. It has since recognized the inevitable and once more supports the government.

There have been a number of attempts upon the life of the duce, but all have been engineered from abroad, with the exception of one made by a mad woman and that in which General Capello, the hero of Gorizia, was most unfortunately involved and for which he received a sentence of thirty years imprisonment. Whatever of opposition there may be in Italy is among the intelligentsia, is scattered and inarticulate, and confines itself to whispered criticism and direful predictions made in confidence to the hearer.

The glamour of fascismo appeals to the masses, and they support it; its solid accomplishments appeal to the hard-headed middle classes, and to the vast majority of the thinking people in the kingdom.

In the years that are to come the forms of fascismo, and perhaps even its theories, will be altered, but its terminology will remain.

As long as Mussolini lives the government that he has created will endure substantially unchanged. Who and what

will follow him no man can predict. One thing, however, is certain: there can be no second duce. No one who may follow him can wield the authority that has been his, for it is an authority predicated upon a combination of personal force and remarkable achievements that cannot be repeated.

He has evolved a new theory of government and made a new state, both peculiarly adapted to the genius of the Italian people. He has ruled that state with an eye single to its best interests. He found it suffering from the loss of its self-esteem due to the settlement of the World War, and has made it one of the great powers of Europe. He found it distracted with internal disorder, with ill feeling against its former allies, and with almost ruined finances. He has restored peace at home and goodwill abroad, and the financial credit of his country.

With infinite patience, a patience seldom met with anywhere, but most rarely in Italy, he has taught his people the habit of fascismo and by so doing has broken down regionalism. For the first time there is a united country of men and women who, forgetting that they come from this or that province, under the inspiration of the duce remember only that they are the children of one great nation.

He has taught his people to think nationally and has after many years fulfilled the hope of d'Azeglio, for as Cavour made Italy, Mussolini has made Italians.



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## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

1814	January	Return of Pius VII to Rome Reconstitution of the Society of Jesus
	March	The allies enter Paris
	April	Abdication of Napoleon; Louis XVIII returns to Paris
	May	First peace of Paris
	September	The Congress of Vienna meets
1815	January	Triple alliance: Austria, France, Great Britain
	March	Return of Napoleon from Elba; flight of Louis XVIII Treaties among Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, and Russia against Napoleon
	March-June	The Hundred Days
	June	Adoption of the Federal Act at the Congress of Vienna Adoption of the Final Act by the Congress of Vienna Battle of Waterloo Second abdication of Napoleon
	July	Second restoration of Louis XVIII
	July-August	The white terror in France
	September	Murat shot at Pizzo in Calabria Promulgation of the Holy Alliance
	October	Napoleon lands in St. Helena
	November	Second peace of Paris The treaties of Paris Austria the dominant power in Italy Restoration of absolutism throughout the peninsula
1816	July	Motuproprio of Pius VII
1818	October-November	Evacuation of France by allies
	November	Renewal of quadruple alliance Papal concordat with Bavaria and Russia
1819	August	Settlement between Pius VII and French Church
1820	July	Outbreak of revolt in Sicily and in Naples; king grants constitution
	October	Meeting of Conference of Troppau
1821	January	Death of Napoleon I Meeting of the Conference of Laybach

- 1821 March End of Neapolitan revolt  
 Insurrection in Piedmont; abdication of Victor Emanuel I  
 Pepe defeated at Riete  
 December Arrest of Count Federico Confalonieri and Silvio Pellico
- 1821-31 Carlo Felice, king of Sardinia
- 1822 October Opening of Congress of Verona
- 1823 August Death of Pius VII  
 September Accession of Leo XII
- 1824 September Death of Louis XVIII; accession of Charles X
- 1825 Death of Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies; accession of Francis I
- 1827 April Canning prime minister  
 August Death of Canning  
 Manzoni's "I promessi Sposi"
- 1830 July-August Revolution in Paris; Louis Philippe called to power  
 Risings in central Italy  
 Death of Francis I of the Two Sicilies; accession of Ferdinand II
- 1831 February Election of Gregory XVI  
 February-March Rising in the Papal States; Louis Napoleon among insurgents  
 April 27 Accession of Charles Albert in Piedmont  
 Mazzini founds Giovane Italia
- 1832-38 French troops in Ancona
- 1833 Young Italy's conspiracy in Piedmont
- 1834 Expedition against Savoy; first appearance of Garibaldi
- 1835 March Death of Francis I of Austria and accession of Ferdinand I
- 1837 June Accession of Queen Victoria
- 1840 Marriage of Victoria and Albert
- 1843 Gioberti's *Primato Morale e Civile Degli Italiani*, and Balbo's *Speranze d'Italia*
- 1844 Bandiera revolt in Italy
- 1845 The protest of Rimini  
 Gioberti's *Prolegomeni al Primato*
- 1846 June Accession of Pius IX  
 July 16 Pius IX decrees amnesty

- 1847 Gioberti's *Gesuita Moderno*  
 Settembrini's *Protesta del popolo delle due Sicilie*  
 March 10 Pius IX appoints advisory council  
 July 17 Austrian troops occupy Ferrara  
 Charles Louis sells duchy of Lucca to Leopold II of Tuscany
- 1848 January 12-27 Successful insurrection in Palermo under Ruggiero Settimo  
 January 28 Insurrection in Naples; king grants constitution  
 February 10 Pius IX allocution, beginning "God bless Italy"  
 February 17 Promulgation of statuto by Grand Duke of Tuscany  
 February 22 Austria proclaims martial law in Lombardy and Venetia  
 February 24 Louis Philippe abdicates; republic proclaimed; provisional government of Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin  
 Balbo forms first constitutional ministry in Piedmont  
 March 4 Promulgation of statuto by Charles Albert of Piedmont  
 March 10 Pius IX appoints liberal ministry  
 March 14 Pius IX grants constitution  
 March 18-22 "Cinque giornate" in Milan  
 March 22 Austria evacuates Venice; republic proclaimed under Manin  
 Charles Albert of Piedmont declares war against Austria  
 March 23 Papal troops declare for cooperation with Piedmont; Pius IX ratifies declaration  
 April 20 Pius IX encyclical declares against war  
 May 15 Riots in Naples; end of constitutional régime  
 May 30 Piedmont defeats Austria at Goito  
 June 10 Radetzky recaptures Vicenza  
 July 23-25 Radetzky defeats Piedmont at Custoza  
 July 27 Union declared of Piedmont, Parma, Modena, and Venice  
 August 6 Radetzky recaptures Milan  
 November 9 Armistice declared  
 November 15 Murder of Pelegrino Rossi

- 1848 November 25 Flight of Pius IX to Gaeta  
 December 2 Abdication of Emperor Ferdinand I of Austria  
 in favor of Francis Joseph
- 1849 February 5 Constituent assembly summoned  
 February 8 Tuscan republic proclaimed  
 February 18 Pius IX appeals to the powers for help  
 March 12 Charles Albert denounces armistice  
 March 23 Radetzky defeats Piedmont at Novara  
 April 11 Leopold of Tuscany restored by plebiscite  
 April 30 Garibaldi repulses Oudinot at Rome  
 May 5 Fall of Palermo and end of Sicilian revolution  
 May 25 Austrians enter Florence  
 May-June Fall of Brescia; Haynau's reign of terror  
 June 30 Garibaldi evacuates Rome  
 July 15 White terror in Rome  
 August 24 Negotiations for surrender of Venice begun  
 August 27 Venice surrenders; Manin leaves  
 Autocracy restored everywhere in Italy but in  
 Piedmont  
 Massimo d'Azeglio prime minister of Piedmont
- 1850 January 9 Piedmontese parliament approves peace with  
 Austria  
 February Siccardi laws in Piedmont  
 Cavour minister of agriculture
- 1851 Gioberti's *Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*  
 December 1-8 Coup d'état of Louis Napoleon  
 Cavour minister of finance in Piedmont
- 1852 May 6 Grand Duke abolishes Tuscan constitution  
 November 4 Cavour prime minister of Piedmont  
 December 7 Mantuan trials; Tazzoli and others executed
- 1854 April Crimean War begins  
 December 8 Proclamation of dogma of Immaculate Con-  
 ception
- 1855 January 25 Piedmont joins France and Britain against  
 Russia  
 August 16 Piedmont defeats Russia at Chernaya  
 August 18 Austrian concordat with Rome (revoked 1867)
- 1856 March 6 Treaty of Paris ends Crimean War
- 1857 August Garibaldi founds the National Society

- 1858 January 14 Orsini attempts murder of Napoleon III  
 July 21 and 22 Conference between Napoleon III and Cavour at Plombières
- 1859 January 10 Treaty between Piedmont and France  
 April 23 Austria sends ultimatum to Piedmont  
 April 29 Austria declares war against Piedmont  
 April 30 France declares war against Austria  
 June 4 Victory of France over Austria at Magenta  
 June 24 Victory of France and Piedmont over Austria at Solferino  
 July 8 Armistice of Villafranca  
 July 13 Cavour resigns; Rattazzi prime minister  
 August-September Tuscany and the duchies declare for union with Piedmont  
 November 7 Treaty of peace signed at Zurich
- 1860 January 6 Rattazzi resigns; Cavour prime minister  
 March Union of Tuscany and Emilia with Piedmont  
 March 24 Treaty of Turin cedes Nice and Savoy to France  
 April 2 New Italian parliament meets in Turin  
 May 11-27 Garibaldi and The Thousand land at Marsala and capture Palermo  
 August 22-September 1 Garibaldi lands at Reggio, marches north and captures Naples  
 October 12 Garibaldi's victory at Volturno  
 October 13 Victor Emanuel crosses Neapolitan frontier  
 October 21-22 Naples and Sicily declare for union with Piedmont  
 October 26 Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel meet at Teano  
 November 4 The marches and Umbria declare for union with Piedmont
- 1861 February 13 Fall of Gaeta  
 March 17 The kingdom of Italy proclaimed by the first Italian parliament  
 April 18 Garibaldi denounces Cavour in parliament  
 April 23 Garibaldi and Cavour formally reconciled  
 June 6 Cavour dies; Ricasoli prime minister
- 1862 March Ricasoli falls; Rattazzi prime minister  
 August 29 Garibaldi defeated and wounded at Aspromonte  
 December Rattazzi falls; Farini prime minister  
 Farini retires; Minghetti prime minister



- 1864 September 15 "September convention" between Piedmont and France for the latter's evacuation of Rome  
 December 8 Publication of papal encyclical and syllabus  
 Minghetti falls; La Marmora prime minister
- 1866 April 8 Italy and Prussia sign treaty of alliance  
 May 6 Italy refuses to abandon Prussia in return for cession of Venetia  
 June 20 La Marmora resigns; Ricasoli prime minister  
 June 24 Italy defeated by Austria at Custoza  
 July 3 Austria defeated by Prussia at Sadowa  
 July 20 Italy defeated by Austria on sea at Lissa  
 August 12 Treaty of Prague between Prussia and Austria  
 October 3 Treaty of Vienna between Austria and Italy  
 October 22 Plebiscite in Venetia favors union with Italy  
 December French evacuate Rome (reoccupy, 1867)
- 1867 April Ricasoli resigns; Rattazzi prime minister  
 November 3 French and papalists defeat Garibaldi at Mentana  
 Rattazzi confiscates church property in Italy  
 October 26 Rattazzi falls; Menabrea prime minister  
 December 5 Rouher, French premier, declares in chamber that France will never permit Italy to occupy Rome
- 1869-70 Meeting of Ecumenical Council in Rome
- 1869 November 15 Rubattino buys Bay of Assab from Sultan of Rahaita for 47,000 lire of government funds  
 December Tobacco scandal; Menabrea falls  
 Giovanni Lanza prime minister, Visconti-Venosta foreign minister, Quintino Sella finance minister
- 1870 July 16 France declares war against Prussia  
 July 18 Dogma of Papal Infallibility declared  
 August 9 Italy declares neutrality between France and Prussia  
 August 31-September 1 Battle of Sedan  
 September 20 Italian army enters Rome  
 October 2 Plebiscite in Rome declares for union with Italy  
 November 26 Amadeo of Savoy king of Spain

- 1871 March 21 Law of Guarantees voted in Italian chamber by  
185 votes to 106  
May 15 Pius IX repudiates Law of Guarantees and calls  
on Catholic sovereigns to restore temporal power
- 1873 Abdication of Amadeo as king of Spain  
April 29 Lanza-Sella cabinet reconstituted  
June 5 Rattazzi dies at Frosinone  
June 23 Lanza falls; Minghetti prime minister; policy of  
trasformismo inaugurated by Minghetti
- 1875 Papal bull of *Quod Nunquam*  
June 7 General Ricotti-Magnani's army reform adopted  
September Italian king visits Berlin and Vienna
- 1876 March 18 Minghetti and the right fall; Depretis prime  
minister  
November First election under the left; returns 421 min-  
isterialists, 87 opposition
- 1877 Autumn Crispi undertakes unsuccessful diplomatic mission  
to Paris and Berlin  
December 14 Depretis reconstructs ministry, dropping  
Nicotera, Melegari, and Zanardelli, taking  
on Crispi and Magliani
- 1878 January 9 Death of Victor Emanuel II; accession of Hum-  
bert I  
February 7 Death of Pius IX; accession of Leo XIII  
March Depretis falls; Cairoli prime minister  
November Attempt on king's life by Passanante; Cairoli  
wounded  
December Cairoli falls; Depretis prime minister for second  
time
- 1879 July 12 Depretis falls; Cairoli prime minister  
November 24 Cairoli reconstitutes ministry with help of  
Depretis
- 1881 February 23 Foreign loan authorized for 650,000,000 lire  
May 12 Treaty of El Bardo; France occupies Tunis  
May 14 Cairoli falls; Depretis prime minister for third  
time, with Mancini at foreign office  
October Visit of king and queen to Vienna  
November 3 Franco-Italian commercial treaty signed

- 1881 June 20 Franchise reform bill increasing electorate from 600,000 to 2,000,000  
Surplus of 53,000,000 lire  
September 20 Sultan of Rahaita accepts Italian protectorate and Assab becomes crown colony
- 1882 May 20 Triple alliance, Germany, Austria, and Italy, signed  
May 11 New army bill adopted  
June 2 Garibaldi dies at Caprera  
July 11 Alexandria bombarded by British  
July 27 Italy declines to join Britain in Egypt  
Assab under Italian sovereignty
- 1883 April 12 Forced currency abolished; gold standard adopted
- 1884 Secret treaty signed by Austria, Germany, and Russia  
January 1 Grist tax repealed
- 1885 February 5 Italy occupies Massowah  
June 16 Depretis reconstitutes his ministry, his fifth, substituting Robilant at foreign office for Mancini  
March 6 State railways leased to three private companies—Mediterranean, Adriatic and Sicilian—for sixty years, state to resume if it desires at end of twenty or forty years  
Deficit 23,500,000 lire  
Employer's liability law enacted
- 1887 January 25 Ras Alula of Abyssinia repulsed from Saati  
January 26 Dogali disaster, 524 Italians under Colonel de Cristoforis killed by Abyssinians  
February 4 Adverse vote in chamber over disaster of Dogali  
March 17 Depretis reconstitutes ministry, his sixth  
May 17 Triple alliance renewed  
July 29 Depretis dies; Crispi prime minister  
Deficit 73,000,000 lire
- 1888 Deficit 250,000,000 lire  
June New penal code drawn by order of Zanardelli
- 1889 May 2 Treaty between Italy and Abyssinia signed at Ucciali
- 1890 January 1 Colony of Eritrea created  
General election gives Cabinet four-fifths majority
- 1891 January 31 Crispi falls; Rudini prime minister  
June Triple alliance renewed for period of twelve years

- 1892 May 5 Rudini falls; Giolitti prime minister  
November General election
- 1893 May 11 Menelek denounces treaty of Ucciali  
August 10 Banca d'Italia created  
August 16-18 Italian workmen murdered at Aiguës-Mortes  
Autumn Unrest in Sicily  
Deficit 150,000,000 lire  
November 23 Report on Banca Romana scandal read in chamber  
November 24 Giolitti falls; Crispi prime minister  
December Insurrections in Sicily and Massa-Carrara crushed by Crispi
- 1894 July 11 Public safety law enacted
- 1895 May General election gives Crispi 200 majority  
December 6 Major Toselli and 2,000 men annihilated by the Abyssinians
- 1896 February 29 General Baratieri and 20,000 men nearly annihilated near Adua  
March 5 Crispi falls; Rudini prime minister  
March General election  
October 26 Treaty with Abyssinia signed at Addis Ababa, annulling treaty of Ucciali
- 1899 May Disturbances due to high price of bread  
May 7-9 Riots in Milan  
May 9 Martial law in Milan, Florence, Leghorn, and Naples  
June 18 Rudini falls; General Pelloux prime minister  
October Admiral Canevaro, foreign minister, begins negotiations with France for new commercial treaty after commercial war of ten years
- 1900 June General election  
June 24 Pelloux falls; Saracco prime minister  
July 29 King Humbert murdered at Monza by anarchist Bresci; accession of Victor Emanuel III (born November 11, 1869)
- 1901 February 9 Saracco falls; Zanardelli prime minister, Giolitti at interior  
April 10-14 Franco-Italian fêtes at Toulon  
During first six months of year six hundred strikes involving over a million workers

- 1902 January 4 Strike on Mediterranean Railway, men mobilized, settled June  
Divorce bill presented and dropped  
April New 3½ per cent loan voted, placed in Italy  
June Triple alliance renewed for twelve years  
October Exchange at par  
Surplus 16,000,000 lire
- 1903 July Leo XIII dies; accession of Pius X  
October King and queen visit Paris  
October Zanardelli resigns; Giolitti prime minister for second time
- 1904 September 15 General strike proclaimed  
November General election gives Giolitti majority
- 1905 March Giolitti resigns; Fortis prime minister  
April 17 General railway strike  
June Purchase of railways voted  
June 11 Encyclical abolishes *non expedit*  
December 17 Fortis reconstitutes his ministry with San Giuliano as foreign minister
- 1906 January 30 Fortis resigns; Sonnino prime minister  
May 17 Sonnino falls; Giolitti prime minister for third time  
Debt converted from 4 per cent to 3½ per cent  
Surplus 65,000,000 lire
- 1907 January Number of religious houses formerly under protection of France taken over by Italy  
June and July Agricultural strikes  
October General strike in Milan
- 1908 June Strikes in Parma  
October Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina  
December 28, 5 a.m. Earthquake in Sicily and Calabria, over 150,000 killed
- 1909 March At general elections over score of clerical deputies elected  
December 2 Giolitti resigns; Sonnino prime minister for second time
- 1910 March 21 Sonnino resigns; Luzzatti prime minister
- 1911 March 18 Luzzatti resigns; Giolitti prime minister for fourth time  
September 28 Ultimatum to Turkey on Tripoli

- 1911 September 29 War declared by Italy against Turkey  
November 5 Italian sovereignty extended to Tripolitana  
and Cyrenaica
- 1912 Franchise extended from three to eight million voters  
Payment of members  
Government monopoly of insurance  
June Bissolati, Bonomi, and their friends expelled from  
socialist party for supporting the war  
Strikes at Turin and Milan  
October 15 Peace preliminaries signed at Ouchy  
October 18 Treaty of Ouchy signed; peace with Turkey  
Triple alliance renewed
- 1913 General strike at Milan  
October 26-November 2 Election under new franchise  
Socialists increased to 79, Catholics to 33
- 1914 March 10 Giolitti resigns; Salandra prime minister  
Revolutionary sindacato ferrovieri threatens  
strike, gives way  
June 7 Riots on statuto day at Ancona, followed by gen-  
eral strikes in the marches and Romagna; near  
revolution, led by Malatesta and Mussolini, lasted  
for over week, quelled by nationalists  
June 28 Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife mur-  
dered at Sarajevo  
July 23 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia  
August 3 Italy declares neutrality  
October 16 San Giuliano dies, succeeded by Salandra  
October 31 Salandra reconstitutes cabinet with Sonnino as  
foreign minister  
Italy occupies island of Sareno  
December 26 Italy occupies town and harbor of Valona
- 1915 January 13 Earthquake in the Abruzzi, kills 30,000  
April 26 Secret treaty of London signed by Italy, Britain,  
France, and Russia  
May 3 Italy denounces triple alliance  
May 13 Salandra reconstitutes his cabinet  
May 20 Government given full war powers  
May 23 General mobilization ordered

- 1915 May 24 War declared against Austria and diplomatic relations with Germany broken off  
Offensive on eastern front  
August 21 War declared against Turkey  
December 1 Italy adheres to London agreement not to conclude separate peace
- 1916 May Defeats in Trentino and Asiago  
June 10 Salandra resigns; Boselli prime minister  
August 4 Gorizia captured by General Capello after eleven days' desperate fighting  
August 28 War declared against Germany
- 1917 Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne in reference to Asia Minor  
August Revolutionary riots in Turin  
October 23 Defeat and rout of Caporetto  
October 26 Boselli resigns; Orlando prime minister  
November 22 Enemy's advance checked at the Piave  
Cadorna relieved and succeeded by Diaz
- 1918 January 8 Wilson publishes his Fourteen Points  
June Austrian offensive driven back with heavy losses  
October 24 Italians attack from Asiago to the sea  
November 2 Budget shows deficit of 6,271,000,000 lire  
November 3 Austrian army annihilated, 600,000 prisoners and 7,000 guns captured  
November 4 Armistice in force  
Italy's losses 600,000 killed and 1,000,000 wounded  
December Postal strike averted by granting high wages
- 1919 January Partito Popolare Italiano formed by Don Luigi Sturzo  
February 7 Italian government presents memorandum to peace conference, stating claims  
April 13 Rioting and strikes in Milan  
April 23 Wilson makes his appeal to Italian people over heads of government  
April 25 Orlando endorsed by parliament  
May 5 Orlando returns to Paris  
June 19 Orlando beaten in chamber and falls; Nitti prime minister  
June 28 Treaty with Germany signed  
July 2-5 Rioting in Fiume

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- 1919 September 10 Treaty of St. Germain with Austria  
 September 12 D'Annunzio takes charge in Fiume  
 September Proportional election law enacted  
 November 16 General elections return 156 socialists, 101  
 popolari, and 30 combatenti  
 December 1 Socialist deputies withdraw
- 1920 January 13 Postal employees strike  
 January 22 Railway employees strike  
 January 29 Nitti agrees not to punish strikers; strike ends  
 in triumph of strikers  
 March 22 Nitti reconstitutes his cabinet  
 May Nitti legalizes seizure of Mazzonis' cotton mills by  
 strikers  
 May 12 Nitti reconstitutes his cabinet  
 June 4 Nitti issues decree reducing bread subsidy  
 June 9 Nitti withdraws decree  
 June 16 Nitti resigns; Giolitti prime minister for fifth  
 time  
 June 24 Italy withdraws from Albania  
 June 27 Budget shows deficit of 14,000,000,000 lire  
 July 5-16 Conference of Spa  
 July 11 Anti-Italian demonstrations at Spalato  
 August 10 Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey  
 September 19 Giolitti induces owners of factories to con-  
 sent to form of workers' control to be em-  
 bodied in a bill  
 September 27 Factories evacuated  
 October 4 Work in factories resumed  
 October 14 Communist riots in Bologna suppressed by  
 fascisti and nationalists  
 November 8 Conference of Rapollo  
 November 12 Treaty signed with Yugoslavia  
 November 21 Communist city council in Bologna sup-  
 pressed by fascisti and nationalists  
 Many industrial disturbances throughout  
 the year and many factories seized by the  
 workers
- 1921 January 18 D'Annunzio leaves Fiume under pressure  
 February 27 Rioting in Florence  
 March 1 Bread subsidy repealed by chamber



- 1921 April 7 Chamber dissolved  
 May 15 New elections return liberals and democrats 275,  
 popolari 107, socialists 122, communists 16,  
 fascisti 35, nationalists 10  
 June 26 Giolitti resigns; Bonomi prime minister  
 November 4 Tomb of unknown soldier dedicated  
 November 6 First fascista congress at Rome  
 November 10 Communists and socialists proclaim general  
 strike as protest against presence of fascisti  
 at Rome, much rioting
- 1922 February 2 Bonomi resigns; Facta prime minister  
 March 18 General strikes in shipping broken by fascisti  
 April 10 Economic conference at Genoa  
 July 12 Budget statement shows deficit of 4,500,000,000 lire  
 July 19 Facta reconstitutes his cabinet  
 August 1 General strike called in all Italy  
 August 4 Fascisti break strike  
 September 29 Mussolini declares for monarchy  
 October 3 Socialist party breaks into two groups  
 October 24 Fascista congress in Naples  
 October 27 Facta resigns  
 October 30 Fascisti enter Rome; Mussolini prime minister  
 October 31 Fascisti leave capital  
 November 16 Chamber gives Mussolini full powers to  
 carry on for one year, 275 votes to 90  
 Deficit 6,500,000,000 lire
- 1923 January Fascista militia constituted  
 Railway staff reduced from 225,000 to 170,000  
 Eight-hour day restored  
 February 21 Santa Margherita convention signed with  
 Yugoslavia  
 August 27 General Tellini and Italian commission mur-  
 dered by Greeks  
 August 29 Italian ultimatum presented to Greece and  
 Italian squadron seizes Corfu  
 September 1 Greece appeals to League of Nations, matter  
 referred to conference of ambassadors  
 September 13 Ambassadors sustain Italy on all points  
 September 27 Italy leaves Corfu

- 1923 November Country divided into fifteen election districts, party receiving plurality of votes to have two-thirds of seats
- 1924 January 25 Parliament dissolved  
 January 27 Treaty signed with Yugoslavia giving Fiume to Italy  
 February 22 Commercial treaty signed with Yugoslavia at Nettuno  
 April 6 Elections give fascisti 64¼ per cent of total vote  
 May 24 Parliament meets  
 June 10 Matteotti murdered  
 June 15 "Aventine" deputies withdraw  
 July 8 Decree of July 12, 1923, against freedom of press enforced
- 1925 Anno Santo, or Holy Year, over a million pilgrims in Rome  
 February 10 Old single-member constituencies revived  
 June 12 General de Bono acquitted by senate of complicity in Matteotti murder  
 August Amendola beaten by fascisti and dies  
 Surplus of 417,000,000 lire  
 October 3 Rioting in Florence  
 October 28 Governor of Rome created  
 November 5 Plot against Mussolini's life by ex-deputy Zaniboni and General Capello  
 November 14 Debt settlement with United States  
 The battle for wheat begun  
 December Secret societies suppressed  
 December 24 Power of prime minister greatly increased
- 1926 January 27 Debt settlement with Great Britain  
 January 31 Law against fuorusciti  
 February 4 Communes placed under government of podestà  
 March 24 Trial of Matteotti murderers ends  
 April 3 Creation of corporations of employers and employed  
 April 7 Attempt to murder Mussolini by the insane Hon. Violet Gibson  
 August 18 Value of lira fixed at 90 to the pound, or 19 to the dollar  
 September 11 Attempt to murder Mussolini by Lucetti

- 1926 September 30 Mussolini and Sir Austen Chamberlain meet  
 October 31 Attempt to murder Mussolini by Zamboni  
 November 9 "Aventine" deputies expelled by chamber of  
 deputies  
 November 24 Commercial treaty signed with Greece  
 November 27 Treaty signed with Albania creating virtual  
 protectorate  
 December 15 Enactment of law "for the protection of the  
 state"
- 1927 War against mafia in Sicily  
 April 23 Charter of labor published  
 August 22 New criminal code published  
 November New law for chamber of deputies
- 1928 April Catholic boy scouts dissolved  
 July Mussolini reconstitutes cabinet, substitutes Mosconi for  
 Volpi at the treasury, and Giuliano for Fedele in  
 department of public education  
 September 19 Decree published giving grand council new  
 and greatly enlarged powers  
 Dazio abolished
- 1929 Treaty signed with Holy See ending the Roman question
- 1932 July 20 Mussolini reorganizes the cabinet: Grandi, foreign  
 affairs; Mosconi, finance; Giuliano, education;  
 Rocco, justice; and Bottai, corporations, resign.  
 Mussolini takes foreign affairs and corporations,  
 and appoints de Francisci, justice; Jung, finance;  
 and Ercole, education  
 October 30 Tenth anniversary of the revolution. Amnesty  
 proclaimed in favor of many criminal and most  
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